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\ABSTRACT
This study aims to demonstrate the existence of a French identity abroad and its 
influence upon firms’ international modes of management. We thereby aim to test the 
hypothesis according to which, under the pressures of international markets, a process of 
uniformisation in firms’ behaviour is taking place, which will lead to the inevitable decline of 
their nationality.
In this study, we shall attempt to define a "mode of thinking’ characteristic of French 
firms, and which will influence how managements react abroad. This is a new approach to 
examining the nationality effect in international firms, which will emphasise the links 
between firms’ nationality and their ways of operating abroad. The ‘culturalist’ approach, 
which conceives of cultural values as immutable, cannot account for the evolution of firms’ 
behaviour in the international arena. The ‘institutionalist’ approach, which focuses upon a 
number of firms in a given sector or examines sectoral, national and host factors in a small 
number of firms, does not take into account all the variables that can affect its conclusions, 
and thus cannot generalise its findings beyond the firms under study.
In order to characterise a mode of thinking which is generalisable to all firms of a 
nation, it must be independent of all space and time parameters -  or ‘filters’. Therefore, the 
study is based upon a diverse sample of French multinationals -  comprising eleven case 
studies, operating in a variety of sectors and having internationalised at different periods of 
time. We will examine companies’ international strategies in a dynamic perspective, that is 
their initial strategies, their effective implementation, the difficulties experienced by firms, 
etc. This will be done by looking at how French firms have integrated their British 
acquisitions; the internationalisation of their corporate structures and modes of control; and 
finally, the development of an international human resources policy.
The examination of French firms’ international strategies will enable us to establish 
that there exists a French ‘third way’. As a result of global market forces, French firms have 
acquired features of an international model of organisation and leamt from their British 
experience. But, paradoxically, French companies have retained a distinctive management 
style abroad. The French international management model is globally successful, because it 
has a capacity of adaptation and integration whilst being able to retain its identity. None the 
less, it has underlying problems, as it has difficulties implementing certain international 
questions of a strategic nature. We can thus conclude that the nationality of a managements 
impacts upon firms’ behaviour abroad, and provides distinctive strengths and weaknesses.
»
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\Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
The globalisation of firms in response to the globalisation of competition, the 
process of regional integration and worldwide deregulatory trends, has brought the 
question of national identity into relief. Current developments in the world economy 
have led to the view that global market pressures are leading to a process of 
homogenisation in international firms’ behaviour, marking the inexorable decline of 
their national specificities.
There is strong evidence of the insidious progress of globalisation in the way 
firms are being managed. Corporations’ behaviour is increasingly dictated by the 
logic of market, and the need to operate on a global scale in order to secure the 
productivity gains required for survival in the cut-throat competitive global market. 
This is exemplified by the current wave of global consolidation, which, via a snow­
ball effect, spares no industry: in response to the demands of their increasingly global 
customers, firms are forced to become more global and to meet global standards of 
productivity, in turn pushing their suppliers to grow and internationalise. In this 
context, one is led to believe that the nationality of firms is eroding.
At the same time, attachment to nationality remains strong in advanced 
industrialised countries. This is manifested in the increasing tensions between 
governments and their firms, reflecting the growing gap between, on the one hand,
2
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the logic of globalisation in the way firms are managed, and national economic 
systems and interests, on the other. Processes of globalisation are raising concerns in 
all countries, as governments are still not prepared to renounce the protection of 
national economic interests nor abandon the control of firms operating in their own 
territory.
The fundamental question of national identity in the phenomenon of 
globalisation will be the focus of this study. Through an examination of the case of 
French multinationals, our objective is to understand whether nationality still matters 
in a context of globalisation, in other words whether a managements’ national 
background influences the way in which organisations are managed abroad.
The question of nationality is raised in an acute way in France, where there is 
still a strong attachment to nationality and where a protectionist stance is favoured by 
governments and business alike. The French business system has followed a different 
path towards capitalism than Anglo-Saxon countries and inherits strong cultural and 
historical legacies. The question of how French firms will adapt to international 
market forces, which proponents of globalisation say will eventually see the decline 
of national identity for a corporate culture is thus of salient interest.
Assessments of the current evolution of the world economy have produced 
two opposite views. To some, the globalisation of competition, growing capital 
mobility, and intensifying trade have created a global marketplace, within which a 
new breed of multinational firms can operate, these ‘global’ firms, which manage to 
reach out on a global basis according to purely economic-based criteria, and 
ultimately aim to optimise their global network. This type of firm is no longer 
attached to any nation, having ridden itself of national identity, sources of 
inefficiency in a world driven by market logic, and is able to override host 
environments’ specificities (Ohmae 1985, 1990; Reich 1990).
VIntroduction
Others have a radically different vision of current changes in the international 
economy and, rather than seeing globalisation as tolling the death knell for national 
identity, believe that firms’ national specificities are exerting a strong and durable 
influence upon the ways in which international firms operate. Firms, they argue, 
retain an attachment to their home base which remains the locus of key strategic 
decisions, functions and employment, and their national characteristics are likely to 
be enduring and dominate market-driven pressures (Hu 1992; Doremus et al. 1998; 
Femer and Quintanilla 1998; Quack and Morgan 2000).
The strength and direction of change in firms’ behaviour under the impact of 
global forces, and the hypothesised disappearance of their national model in favour of 
a global model, will have implications for firms themselves as well as governments. 
For firms, which are confronted with the challenge of managing the transition of their 
national management system to a model adapted to the requirements of international 
markets, the questions raised concern how globalisation should be approached from 
an organisational perspective. Do firms’ distinctive traits bring advantages, or 
alternatively are they sources of handicap in responding effectively to international 
competition? In other words should firms seek to emphasise or downplay them? If 
the global model is indeed the best way to succeed internationally, is the evolution 
towards an a-cultural model possible given the model that they inherit? On the other 
hand, firms are faced with the question of whether giving up their national 
characteristics is desirable, or, as some have expressed concern, could it lead to firms 
losing their distinctiveness which hitherto has been source of success (Streeck 1997).
The kind of evolution of firms’ behaviour in the global economy also 
underpins current debates upon the role of Nation States vis-à-vis their firms in a 
global environment, and the issue as to whether governments can and / or should seek 
to regulate the activities of business in order to protect their national interests. If 
firms are committed to globalisation and are indeed becoming increasingly detached 
from their domestic environment, with their home market no longer the primary 
concern in their international strategies, this will have significant implications for
4
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countries’ social, political and economic stability, eventually requiring adjustments in 
governments’ relations to their firms. Proponents of globalisation advocate a 
minimalist role for the State, and that policies should no longer favour the criteria of 
nationality of their firms (Reich 1990).
These debates form the backdrop against which the study is set. Our objective 
is to characterise the ways and means through which French companies adapt to 
international markets. We shall thereby be able to establish whether French 
companies do align themselves to a common pattern of organisation under the 
pressures of market forces, as the globalist strand of literature predicts. French 
companies account for the major actors on the international scene, yet relatively little 
is known about them. Will they evolve towards a common model of organisation or, 
on the contrary, retain their distinctive features? Will their domestic base be a 
springboard or weigh them down as they seek to internationalise? Will they learn 
from the international environment? French companies’ behaviour will be examined 
in Great-Britain. Britain has a culture that is very different from France, but also its 
economy has a highly advanced degree of marketisation which is strongly integrated 
into the global economy. It will thus enable us to examine how French companies 
adapt to a culture radically different from their own, but also observe the mechanisms 
through which they adapt to the global economy.
How can we proceed to analyse the impact of national identity upon French 
multinationals’ behaviour? In this study, we shall attempt to define a ‘mode o f 
thinking’, characteristic of French firms abroad, which, we argue, will influence how 
managements react abroad. In other words, rather than addressing the question of 
what firms actually do abroad, we focus explanations on why French management 
has come to act in the way it has abroad, both in the light of the kind of management 
that it inherits and the variables it is confronted with in the international arena.
This is a new approach to examining the nationality effect in international 
firms, which will emphasise the links between a firm’s nationality and its ways of
5
*operating abroad. Conventional approaches give partial accounts of the manner and 
extent in which nationality influences managements’ behaviour abroad. ‘Culturalist’ 
theories, which conceptualise national culture as a set of immutable values, cannot 
explain the evolution of managements’ national traits as firms pass from their 
domestic environment to the international arena. The ‘institutionalist’ approach, 
which focuses upon a number of firms in a given sector, or examines the relations 
amongst a greater number of variables but within a small number of case studies, 
does not take into account all the parameters both in space (such as industry, host 
environment) and time (such as the firm’s period of internationalisation) that may 
affect their findings, and as a result, their conclusions are bounded in a specific spatial 
or temporal context.
In order to define a mode of thinking which can be generalised to all firms of 
a given nation, it must be independent of the international factors - or ‘filters’ - that 
are met. Only a comparison of a large number of cases can enable us to go beyond 
the ‘filters’. We will thus examine a diverse sample of French multinationals, 
comprising eleven case studies, operating in a variety of sectors and having 
internationalised at different periods of time.
We will thereby consider whether the period at which French companies have 
begun internationalising will have effects upon their ability to operate in today’s 
highly competitive and globalised markets. In addition, the effects of sectoral 
variables upon firms’ international behaviour will be looked at. Half of our case 
studies operate in the manufacturing sector and another half in the service industries. 
As many service sector firms are new to internationalisation and little is known about 
the way in which they operate abroad, we will address the issue as to whether ‘multi­
domestic’ sectors experience different kinds of problems abroad from ‘global’ 
industries.
We will further seek to demonstrate the existence of a mode of thinking 
characteristic of French firms, through an examination of the evolution of firms’
Introduction
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international strategies: that is, their initial strategies, how managements went about 
implementing them, the difficulties they experienced, the outcomes of those 
strategies, etc. The dynamic analysis of firms’ strategies can reveal a typical 
managerial behaviour.
French multinationals’ international strategies will be observed throughout the 
last decade, since the beginning of their internationalisation in the late 1980s. Three 
key issues will be the focus of our investigation: firstly, how French firms have 
approached the British market and integrated their British acquisitions; secondly, the 
internationalisation of their corporate structures and modes of control; and finally, the 
development of an international human resources policy.
Plan o f the Thesis
Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical ground for the research and presents the two 
opposite analysis regarding the impact of globalisation upon the nationality of firms. 
We will present in detail, our conceptual approach to identifying national identity in 
international firms. Drawing a managerial behaviour abroad in turn requires a 
different kind of methodology from conventional approaches. This will be the focus 
of Chapter 3.
In order to determine whether and how managements’ nationality affects its 
behaviour abroad, we must begin by describing firms’ domestic national model, from 
which point they eventually depart. This will enable us to draw out the key features 
of the French management style at home. Chapter 4 will show that French firms have 
seen a highly distinctive evolution throughout the post-war period until the 1980s, as 
they have evolved in the bosom of the State for many years and long been shielded 
from international competition.
Chapter 5 to 8 introduce the empirical material. Each chapter will examine a 
specific aspect of firms’ corporate strategies, which it is hoped will enable us to
Introduction
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demonstrate the extent and manner in which their national features have influenced 
their responses. It will then be possible to elicit a notion of what constitutes French 
managements’ behaviour abroad.
Chapter 5 examines the entry and the process of the establishment of French 
companies in Great-Britain from the late 1980s onwards. It addresses the issue of 
how French firms have adapted to such a highly advanced capitalist system as the 
UK, with which they were unfamiliar and shared little in common, and seeks to 
establish whether French companies have handled the integration of their British 
operations in a distinctive way. We will apply an institutionalist perspective to our 
analysis of French firms’ processes of adaptation to the British system and introduce 
a multi-level conceptual model that will enable a deeper examination of the nature of 
interactions between ‘nationality’ factors and the ‘host environment’ variable.
Chapter 6 considers trends within French companies’ international product 
strategies, corporate structures and modes of control in response to the globalisation 
of competition. Here, we are concerned with determining the extent to which French 
companies have acquired features of the ‘global’ or ‘transnational’ organisation 
model, which has emerged in response to international market forces according to 
writers such as Ohmae (1985) and Bartlett and Goshal (1989). Chapter 7 deals with 
the internationalisation of the management of human resources in French 
multinationals, and explores how firms’ national features have impacted upon their 
responses. It traces the different stages in French companies’ responses to 
implementing a strategic IHR system from the beginning of their internationalisation 
in the late 1980s, focusing upon the issues of the internationalisation of their 
management development policies and the development of an international culture, to 
which firms have devoted much attention.
Finally, Chapter 8 argues that French companies, through their course of their 
international experience, have learnt from the British environment and acquired 
Anglo-Saxon characteristics. It examines the forms and dimensions of this learning
K
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process upon firms’ international ways of operating. It also looks at the implications 
of French managements’ international experience upon their home environment.
The concluding chapter will summarise the features that characterise French 
managements’ mode of thinking abroad, and discuss its strengths and weaknesses, as 
firms evolve towards an international model. It will finally consider the future 
evolution of the model in tomorrow’s global environment.
In total, the examination of French firms’ international strategies throughout 
the 1990s will enable us to demonstrate a path of internationalisation à la Française. 
It will show that, as a result of international market pressures, a process of 
homogenisation in firms’ behaviour is taking place and that French firms have 
acquired patterns of an international model of organisation. But, paradoxically, they 
have retained some of their distinctive features. Thus, contrary to the conventional 
view that market forces are the main drivers of firms’ corporate behaviour, we argue 
that national identity remains a critical factor influencing firms’ modes of adaptation 
internationally, as well as having implications on their international performance.
9

Chapter II
GLOBALISATION OF FIRMS AND NATIONAL IDENTITY: 
THE DEBATES AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES
Introduction
The debate about the effects of globalisation on the nationality of firms is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. This debate has emerged in the wake of the 
accelerating internationalisation of companies during the last decade, and the extreme 
claims by some observers that this process had reached such an extent so as to render 
the concept of nationality meaningless. There is little doubt, that the triadisation of 
the world economy, the increasing opening up of countries and the globalisation of 
competition are altering the dynamics of the international economic order and 
challenging the behaviour of previously nationally-centered firms. At the heart of the 
debate about the role of nationality, lies the issue of whether firms’ nationality 
confers them with an advantage on the international scene. It then becomes crucial to 
understand how the changes within the global environment affect firms’ national 
identity.
The first two sections examine the two opposite views with regard to the role 
of nationality in today’s global markets, arguing that the theme needs to be re­
positioned to incorporate the effects of both the factors that are driving globalisation
11
Vand those that are sources of diversity, namely the country of origin of firms and the 
host contexts in which they operate. In exploring the question of the nationality 
effect on multinationals’ behaviour, one is faced with the issue of conceptualising this 
variable, which has remained a contentious matter in academia. This question is the 
focus of the third section, where a new conceptual approach is proposed.
2.1. The globalisation thesis
Proponents of the globalisation thesis argue that in today’s global 
environment, a new kind of multinational has emerged: these ‘global’ firms, whose 
behaviour is fundamentally driven by international market pressures, who follow their 
own rules of maximising efficiency on a global scale, and have consequently become 
increasingly detached from their home nation and the countries in which they operate.
One of the key proponents of this argument is Ohmae (1985; 1990) a 
consultant for the American consultancy McKinsey. Ohmae argues that in a 
‘borderless world’, ‘global firms’ are now the dominant actors. Present in all the 
major markets of the Triad, the US, Asia and Europe, they organise their production 
chain globally. In contrast with the old multinational model, the global firm is fully 
integrated in local countries becoming an ‘insider’ that is closely linked to local 
suppliers, governments and customers. In those firms, the criteria of nationality is 
disappearing: their home markets account for a smaller proportion of turnover, the 
centre is ‘decomposed’ into several regional headquarters, whilst the organisation is 
being tied by a strong corporate identity, which ‘replaces the glue a nation-based 
orientation once provided’ and which applies everywhere:
‘Before national identity, before local affiliation, before German ego or 
Japanese ego (...) comes the commitment to a single unified global mission 
(...) You work for Honda or Nissan or Toyota (...). Country of origin does 
not matter. Location of headquarters does not matter. The products for 
which you are responsible and the company you serve have become 
denationalized’
(Ohmae 1990: 94)
Theoreiical framework
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company’s culture. In a similar vein, but coming from a political economy 
perspective, Reich (1990) argues that the nationality of the firm is a concept that is 
becoming meaningless in an increasingly globalised world: product components are 
sourced from all over the world, companies’ shareholders are increasingly 
international, and their managements multinational. The answer ‘Who is us?’: the 
American workforce, the American people, but not particularly the American 
corporation. The implications are that the interests of national firms should no longer 
be identified with those of the nation: as the US economy becomes more globalised 
and dominated by global firms whose operations are mobile, the criteria of nationality 
should no longer be favoured by governments but instead, policy should focus on 
creating an innovative, highly-skilled national environment in order to attract and 
retain those corporations.
Whilst not making such extreme claims as Ohmae and Reich about the firms’ 
loss of nationality as they recognise the cultural and historical legacies of firms, 
Bartlett and Goshal (1989) none the less share a similar conception about the strength 
and direction of change, and predict that international firms will ultimately converge 
towards a single model of organisation. The authors, on the basis of a comparative 
analysis of American, Japanese and European corporations’ international strategies, 
suggest that firms have increasingly adopted common responses in order to respond 
to the demands of the international competitive environment and that a new 
organisation model is emerging: the ‘transnational’ organisation. These firms 
organise their productive capacity globally, their operations are integrated and 
coordinated flexibly, and, in their search for achieving global standards of 
performance, they leverage international best practices from all parts of the 
corporation. This organisation model enables to combine simultaneously the 
competitive advantages of ‘global efficiency’, ‘multi-national responsiveness’ and 
‘worldwide learning’. It is further argued that the internal organisation of the future 
multinational firm is at the heart of its achievement of global competitive advantage, 
and whilst they point to the challenges confronting multinational managements on
Theoretical framework
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international firms should follow if they wish to be successful. ‘In the future, a 
company’s ability to develop a transnational organizational capability will be the key 
factor that separates the winners from the mere survivors in the international 
competitive environment’ (1989: 212). Humes (1993) cites trends in international 
corporate restructuring of Japanese, American and European companies. This 
indicates that they have all begun to adopt an integrated model of organisation in the 
face of intensifying pressures of global competition.
Kanter (1995) sees the two dimensions of ‘globalism’ and ‘localism’ 
emerging in the new international economic order, but similarly emphasises the 
powerful pull exerted by globalisation upon firms and nations. She argues that the 
current process of globalisation creates a ‘globalisation cascade’, whereby global 
consolidation in one industry pushes suppliers and customers to become global and 
meet worldwide standards of performance, in turn forcing local units to raise their 
own standards.
Thus, according to one perspective, under almost irresistible global market 
forces, international firms are following the same rules of capitalism, leading to a 
process of homogenisation in their behaviour. Firms’ nationality is disappearing in 
the face of market-driven pressures, and today the international firm bears only its 
own corporate flag. Whilst some authors see globalisation as a positive development, 
others are more pessimistic but none the less share the view that international market 
forces will lead to the inevitable decline of national management models. Streeck 
(1997), in an assessment of the possible scenarios of the evolution of institution- 
governed economies such as Germany, fears that the German management model is 
not suited to the rules of international markets and it might have difficulties surviving 
in its present form.
Theoretical framework
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A three-pronged critique of Ohmae’s and Reich’s globalist thesis has been 
formulated, firstly with regard to the fact that firms have become detached from their 
home nation, secondly that they are beyond the influence of national governments 
and thirdly, that they are converging towards a single model of international 
organisation.
Regarding the first point, whilst recognising the profound changes the world 
economy is undergoing, the main point is that the phenomenon of globalisation and 
the declining role of national institutions needs to be put in perspective (Dicken 
1998). Coming from the political economy perspective and on the basis of an 
examination of international FDI statistics of firms’ degree of internationalisation, 
Hirst and Thompson (1996) give a more sober assessment of the phenomenon of 
globalisation. Firstly, multinationals continue to rely upon their home base as the 
centre for their economic activities and thus remain ‘heavily nationally embedded’ 
(1996: 98); secondly, patterns of investment flows continue to show strong national 
differences. Cohen (1996) on an analysis of international FDI data, reaches similar 
conclusions that the phenomenon of triadisation still concerns only a small number of 
firms; the globalisation of firms’ production chain does not hold for all firms, sectors 
and countries; finally, the bulk of firms retain a national base.
Similarly, Hu (1992) notes that the home nation remains at the centre of a 
firm’s innovative efforts, with strategic decision-making and control resting firmly in 
national hands, and that the growing internationalisation of shareholders seldom 
means that governments and nations will begin to view the enterprise as a 
‘commodity’ willing to ‘leave it to the vagaries of the market’, given their economic 
importance to the home nation. A firms’ home base is also a crucial source of 
international competitiveness (Hu 1992, 1995). In a criticism directly addressed to 
Reich’s sweeping statements, he writes: ‘(...) because of the special nature of the 
links between the corporation and its home nation and because of the citizenship of
Theoretical framework
15
\Theoretical framework
the majority of its owners, managers, and workers, a “national” company with 
international operations is “one of us’” (1992: 123).
In addition to the fact that firms inherit a domestic base, the importance of the 
Nation State is further demonstrated by the continuing protectionism of countries 
which favour their own firms. Mason & Encamation (1994) conclude that nationality 
obviously still matters when the US and European governments’ trade policies 
discriminate against Japanese firms. There is ample evidence that some governments 
are far from willing to leave their own firms to the hands of the market and still see 
their interests as being tied to those of the nation (Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995). 
Protectionist countries such as France, Japan or Germany continue to seek to 
safeguard the interests of society and retain control of strategic industries: the entry of 
Renault into Nissan’s capital has dealt a humiliating blow to the Japanese business 
community; the landmark take-over of a national flagship telecommunications 
company Mannesman by British Vodafone raised outrage in Germany and could not 
leave the German government taking a disinterested position because domestic jobs 
were at stake, whilst the French government insists upon French companies to 
retaining their headquarters on domestic grounds.
Whilst recognising the profound changes the international economic order is 
undergoing, many studies emphasise the continuing importance of national 
governance in the global economy. Eiger and Edwards (1999) argue that the control 
of Nation States in particular over labour matters is being reshaped as a result of the 
complex interactions between global forces and national contexts, but remains a key 
level of regulation. Stopford and Strange (1991) argue that national policies are 
shifting from national protectionism towards promoting domestic competitiveness, as 
governments ‘compete’ against one another in order to attract foreign capital. Kanter 
(1995) shows how local communities are being transformed by creating an 
environment that attracts global companies to ensure a viable economy ‘that links 
locals to global success’ (1995: 199).
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Thirdly, the scenario that multinationals are converging towards a universal 
model of organisation and that nationality has no influence upon firms’ type of 
management are qualified by many studies which have shown that multinational 
companies originating from different countries differ in aspects of their behaviour. 
Thus, there exists a large body of evidence concerning American and Japanese 
multinationals, which demonstrates significant differences with regard to their 
patterns of internationalisation or their internal mode of governance. The Japanese 
model has been found to rely on a distinctive system of production characterised as 
‘lean’, based on a highly integrated production process from design to marketing, 
'Just-In-Time' principles as well as the emphasis on total quality management and 
continuous improvement. Such a production system is, in turn, highly dependent 
upon a committed and flexible workforce, which has enabled Japanese firms to 
produce low cost, high quality products and to outstrip their competitors’ levels of 
productivity (Womack et al. 1990). Distinctive features have also been identified 
with regard to Japanese multinational companies’ management structures and culture, 
with a highly centralised and network-style of management, and a consensual 
decision-making process (Bartlett and Yoshihara 1988; Bartlett & Goshal 1989).
In constrast, American firms are said to be more reliant on sophisticated 
financial control systems, which combine a large degree of delegation with control 
through formalised and standardised management systems (Bartlett and Goshal, 
1989). GE epitomises the American model, relying on ‘batteries’ of planning and 
financial control systems, and corporate policies which are applied worldwide. A 
series of comparative studies have also confirmed financial control systems to be 
central to American firms’ modes of control (Neghandi 1983; Coates et al. 1992).
In tum, these differences have been found to originate in firms’ domestic 
environment. Japan’s distinctive socio-institutional environment has been presented 
in many studies as the key to explaining the development of Japanese companies’ 
superior system of production central to their international competitiveness (Kogut 
1990; Oliver and Wilkinson 1992; U.S. C.O.T.A. 1993). Similarly, according to
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Bartlett and Goshal (1989), American firms’ ‘one best way’ model has emerged from 
the ‘managerial capitalist’ system which prevailed in their home country, whose 
origins and historical development were analysed by Chandler (1990).
Other authors have shown the defining role of firms’ national identity upon 
their competitiveness. For Porter (1990), the Nation State is the level from which 
firms derive their competitive advantages. National factors, including national 
demand, patterns of domestic competition, industry support networks and factor 
endowments, constitute what he refers to as the ‘national diamond’ which shapes 
firms’ competitive strengths. The notion that a link exists between firms’ domestic 
organising principles and their international dynamism has been made by Hu (1995) 
and Quack and Morgan (2000). Kogut (1990) has argued that a firms’ pattern of 
internationalisation is related to their technological advancement, which itself is the 
product of their socio-institutional context.
The culture-bound nature of firms’ management practices has been the subject 
of a long-running argument from the culturalist perspective, which sees firms’ 
behaviour as being mainly determined by their national culture (Hofstede 1980, 1991; 
Laurent 1983, 1986; Adler 1991). Adler (1991) rejects the idea of a convergence in 
firms’ behaviour, because of the profound influence of national culture. She writes, 
‘(...) the transnational organization, the organization that is beyond nationality in its 
design and operation, remains in reality a myth’ (1991: 60). Using cross-cultural 
theories based on Hofstede’s concepts of national culture, studies have revealed the 
influence of culture upon multinationals’ behaviour. For example, Kogut and Singh 
(1988) and Hennart and Larimo (1998) argue that ‘cultural distance’ between the 
parent and the host environment affects multinationals’ choice of the mode of entry, 
whilst Wong and Bimbaum-More (1994) found culture to influence multinationals’ 
structures. Rosenzweig and Nohria (1994), in a comparative study of Canadian, 
Japanese and European multinationals’ HR practices in the USA, demonstrate a 
strong nationality effect, but also suggest that nationality has differential effects
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\depending upon the issues studied: thus they find that some HR practices are more 
likely to be left to local discretion because of national regulations.
More recently, a critique of the globalist strand of literature has begun to 
structure itself around institutionalist theories, which had originally focused upon the 
study of national settings and how these influence firms’ behaviours (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983; Maurice et al. 1984, 1986b; Whitley 1992; Lane 1989, 1995a, 1995b; 
Hollingsworth et al. 1994). Rozensweigh and Singh (1991), Westney (1993) and 
Femer (1997) advocate an institutionalist approach that conceptualises multinational 
firms as being embedded in a variety of environments, and being subject to a set of 
diverse and contradictory influences.
Taking this perspective, studies have established a direct and persistent causal 
link between country of origin and the corporate behaviour of firms internationally. 
In a comprehensive study of how German multinationals manage their human 
resources in the UK, Femer et al. illustrate the continuing influence of nationality in 
the face of global market pressures (Femer and Quintanilla 1998; Femer and Varul 
1999, 2000a, 2000b). Whilst recognising a process of convergence towards an 
‘Anglo-Saxon’ model, the authors see it as ultimately constrained by firms’ pre­
existing patterns of organisation. Firstly, German firms remain imprinted by their 
development in their domestic environment. Secondly, the authors find that Anglo- 
Saxon practices tend to be absorbed into the existing German culture rather than 
fundamentally challenging it: for example, practices such as Anglo-American style 
mission statements became subsumed into the existing family and long-term ethos of 
German firms.
The international institutionalist perspective emphasises the influence of 
domestic institutions upon firms’ behaviour which in turn carries through 
internationally. It implies that, because nation states are subject to only slow 
evolution, divergence in key aspects of firms’ behaviour at an international level are 
likely to persist. Doremus et al. (1998) comparing the patterns of overseas
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\investments as well as international R&D policies of American, German and Japanese 
firms find systematic differences, resulting from their national specificities. Whitley 
(1994), doubting the extent to which a distinct supranational system of economic 
governance has emerged, believes that the possibilities of firms significantly 
departing from their domestic modes of governance is unlikely, and will ultimately 
depend on the nature, cohesion and relative strength of national institutions vis-à-vis 
international economic structures.
Quack and Morgan (2000) argue that firms’ institutional and cultural legacies 
exert a structuring influence upon their behaviour internationally. Social institutions, 
they say, are a critical component of firms’ international economic performance. 
They emphasise the complex and dynamic processes between global forces on the 
one hand and national factors on the other, which, rather than simply bringing about a 
process of standardisation, tend to reinforce and expand firms’ national specificities. 
This implies that globalisation needs to be conceived as a ‘dynamic interplay of 
distinctive competitive advantages, derived from different models of organisation’ 
(2000: 22).
The culturalist and international institutionalist approaches emphasise the 
nationality factor as being a critical determinant of the ways and forms in which firms 
adapt internationally, and challenge the globalist perspective that sees multinationals’ 
behaviour as dictated solely by the logic of globalising markets and their trivialisation 
of the effects of non-economic dimensions upon the phenomenon of globalisation. 
Their work suggests that in order to understand firms’ modes of internationalisation, 
one needs to take account of their domestic environment and national features.
In the same way as studies point to the continuing influence of national origin 
upon multinationals’ behaviour, other studies emphasise the importance of the host 
environments in which firms operate. Taking an institutionalist perspective, Streeck 
(1996) argues that firms’ organising principles are rooted in a broader socio- 
institutional context,which poses a major obstacle to the transplant of international
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\best practices. Thus, he points to the inherent difficulties in seeking to transfer the 
Japanese lean manufacturing systems into the established German system of 
production given their radical differences.
A recent study of ABB has shown that even the most advanced global firms 
do not operate in a world bereft of national cultures. Bélanger et al. (1999) in a study 
of the Swedish company in six different countries, reveal the powerful processes of 
convergence within the group, resulting from a process of standardisation of products 
and management methods in order to meet global standards of performance. 
However, against these strong forces of convergence, local factors, including the 
weight of history, the varying degrees of competitive pressures across countries, 
firms’ embeddness within the economic, political and IR environment all continue to 
inform different local management responses to central policies. Furthermore, the 
authors state that, in a global firm, the local dimension becomes critical for its ability 
to attract and use available corporate resources. Therefore, the study underlines the 
complexity of interactions between corporate, sectoral and local forces: and the need 
to take a multi-level approach to the study of internationalisation of firms, reinforced.
In conclusion, therefore, the literature shows that if multinational companies 
are moving in the direction of becoming ‘global firms’ where all the rules of 
capitalism are being adopted, capitalism is not uniformly implemented and the 
national dimension remains important in the process of globalisation: firms remain 
attached to their home country, nation states continue to play a role and firms’ 
national origin does influence key aspects of their behaviour internationally.
However, the debates still leave many questions unanswered. In the view of 
the ‘globalists’, firms are seen purely as instruments in the hands of market forces and 
cultural differences are only residues in a global market. For the proponents of the 
nationality effect thesis, firms are the bearers of their nationality. The former view 
tends to overlook the effects of both national and host national governance regimes, 
whilst the latter suffers from a bias upon the country of origin as the dominant and
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durable influence upon firms’ behaviour, but throwing little light on the nature of the 
interactions between global forces and firms’ national origins. Our understanding of 
firms’ responses to the globalisation of competition is also limited by the dearth of 
empirical material with the exception of the few empirical studies outlined above. 
These point to a more complex picture of the interplay between global forces and 
national identity than either strand suggests.
Further, studies overwhelmingly focus upon American and Japanese firms. 
Much less is known of European firms, and in particular there appears to be a lack of 
any comprehensive study of French companies operating abroad. Yet, France holds a 
prominent place on the international scene and further, is marked by a strong cultural 
legacy. This raises the question as to whether, in the same way as an American and 
Japanese management systems have been defined, there exists a French management 
model abroad.
In this study, we will seek to establish whether there exists a French identity 
abroad and to determine the manner of its influence upon French firms’ international 
behaviour. We shall thereby be able to verify whether French companies do align 
themselves to a common pattern of organisation under the pressures of market forces, 
as the globalist strand of literature predicts.
Our view a priori is that one should not underestimate the changes currently 
under way in the international economic order, yet a firm’s behaviour is the result of 
its past experience. It is therefore unlikely that global market forces will sweep 
everything away overnight. We see multinational firms as being tom between their 
home environment and the global environment, and believe the outcomes of those 
processes of adaptation, and the evolution of national features are more complex than 
the rather polarised debate suggested by the literature.
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However taking into account the ‘nationality’ variable in the analysis of the 
internationalisation of multinational companies raises the problem of its 
conceptualisation, and this is an issue we now turn to.
2.3. Conceptualising the nationality effect in international firms
The issue of national culture in international management has remained a 
contentious matter in academia, and there is little agreement upon a conceptual 
approach capable of examining the nationality effect on multinationals’ behaviour 
and demonstrating that national features exist and are not stereotypes. Existing 
theoretical approaches are short of providing explanations of the links between 
country-of-origin and firms’ behaviour abroad. Yet, in spite of the difficulties of 
pinpointing the actual influence of national culture, its pervasive influence upon 
managements’ behaviour abroad can seldom be denied: who has not heard ‘this is 
typically American’, ‘the French are like that’, justifiably or not maybe, but we have 
all come across these kinds of statements.
As outlined above, one can distinguish two main theoretical approaches to 
studying the nationality effect on multinationals’ behaviour: the ‘culturalist’ 
perspective and the ‘institutionalist’ approach. The first influenced by Hofstede 
(1980; 1991), Adler (1991) and Laurent (1983, 1986) is perhaps the more established 
and has dominated international management thinking for over two decades. The 
second derives from what can be broadly labelled as the ‘institutionalist’ perspective 
and, by and large, emerged with the experience of Japanese multinationals in the US 
and Europe, as studies focused upon understanding the origins of their distinctive 
production system (Oliver and Wilkinson 1992; Eiger and Smith 1994). This 
approach recently gained new momentum in the light of the accelerating globalisation 
of firms of different origins and the debates about the role of nationality, as discussed 
above. Each approach carries its own assumptions and conceptual tools in seeking to 
capture the ‘nationality’ variable in international firms.
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The culturalist perspective emphasises the influence of ingrained national 
cultural values upon managements’ behaviour and attaches great importance to the 
traits themselves of being say French or American, taking those as deep-seated and 
immutable. This approach has found theoretical underpinning in the work of 
Hofstede (1980; 1991). Hofstede contends that culture determines the identity of a 
population at national level, which shares a similar system of societal norms and 
values, what he calls ‘mental programs’. Those values in turn underpin 
organisations’ modes of functioning. On the basis of a large empirical study of 
employees’ work related values in different countries within an American 
multinational IBM, Hofstede operationalised national culture in a four-dimension 
construct; ‘power distance’ - the degree to which organizational members prefer 
autocratic superior/subordinate relationships; ‘uncertainty avoidance’ — the extent to 
which organizational members avoid stress-creating situations in work relationships, 
‘individualism vs. collectivism’ - the degree to which individual organization 
members depend upon the organization for goal fulfillment; ‘masculinity vs. 
feminity’ - the extent to which assertiveness and self-reliance are promoted within the 
organisation. Laurent’s (1983) studies provide another version of the culturalist 
approach. In a comparative study of managers’ views about the nature of managerial 
roles across nine different countries, he argues that national origins shape the views of 
how managers should manage organisations. For example, managers’ attitudes to 
such aspects as ‘what is required to have efficient work relationships’, ‘whether a 
manager is an expert or a problem-solver’or ‘what is the purpose of a hierarchy’, he 
argues, vary significantly along country lines. This approach has then been pursued 
and applied to a wider range of countries by Trompenaars (1992) and Hampden- 
Tumer and Trompenaars (1994).
Taking these deep-seated cultural values as their starting point, culturalists 
then use them to argue that the management of a given nationality will retain its own 
values abroad, hence problems will arise when managers from one culture interact
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with managers from another. Adler (1991: 45) for example reports on the basis of 
Laurent’s work, that American and French managers have difficulties understanding 
one another. The former believe the role of the manager is to act as problem-solver 
and that managers should help subordinates to discover ways to solve problems by 
themselves. On the other hand, French employees see their manager as an expert and 
therefore French managers should give subordinates a precise answer. Inevitably, 
when an American manager comes to work in a French organisation, clashes occur 
as, for example, when he tells French employees ‘I don’t know the answer, ask the 
marketing manager’, the French employee may see the American manager as 
incompetent because he did not provide him a precise answer. Similarly, if a French 
manager gives an American subordinate a precise answer, the American thinks the 
French manager is more egotistical than competent. Other examples of cross-cultural 
problems are provided by Laurent (1986), when illustrating the misunderstandings 
that multinationals face in seeking to transfer HR policies such as management-by- 
objectives in other countries, as local managers have different understandings about 
their roles than those of the parent.
One of the contributions of the culturalist approach lies in its recognition of 
the existence of a culture shared by people at national level, as well as its efforts to 
conceptualise the most intangible aspects of national culture. Culturalist approaches 
are behind the bulk of the literature on issues such as managing cross-cultural teams, 
leadership across countries and expatriation training (Adler 1991; Trompenaars 
1992). In particular, businesses have been keen consumers of culturalist accounts to 
national cultures as reflected in the success of the studies of Trompenaars, himself an 
ex-IHRM manager at Shell, who reports a spate of anecdotes arising from his work 
experience alongside managers operating in different countries.
The main weakness of the approach however rests in its very assumptions. 
The culturalist perspective, conceiving of cultural values as set in stone, believes that 
a French manager will remain French abroad, as would an American manager. If 
managers have such strongly ingrained values, then one has difficulty conceiving how
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two such different mentalities are able be work with one another, as illustrated in the 
above example. Yet, common sense suggests that the picture culturalists depict of 
cross-cultural misunderstandings bears little resemblance to the real world and 
different nationalities are able work with one another all the time. This approach 
therefore, basing its analysis of multinationals’ behaviour solely on cultural values, 
remains based on stereotypical accounts and cannot account for the evolution of 
managements’ national traits as they depart from their domestic environment to the 
international arena.
The institutionalist approach
In light of those weaknesses, the ‘institutionalist’ current of thinking has 
emerged as an alternative to the culturalist approach for examining the influence of 
national identity upon multinational companies’ ways of operating. Wrong footing 
the culturalists, institutionalist theory no longer relies on national values to 
encapsulate the role of nationality upon multinational firms’ behaviour, but on 
concrete facts. It typically attaches itself firstly to understanding the historical and 
economic institutional setting within which firms are embedded. From this, it draws 
a set of tangible characteristics of firms, for example with regards to their modes of 
control or their work organisation.
Using these concrete characteristics as a starting point, the typical method of 
research adopted is to seek to locate those features in the host environment in which 
firms operate1. Managements may have habits in its country of origin, the question is 
can we find those same practices abroad. For example if French companies are 
centralised at home, will they be centralised abroad? If American firms rely on 
sophisticated financial control systems in their domestic market, will they do the 1
1 The term ‘institutionalism' is used here in a broad sense to characterise studies which follow this 
method of research (that is to define the characteristics of managements in their country of origin as a 
set of practices, and then seek to locate those in the operating company to identify nationality effects). 
But, it does not strictly refer to ‘new institutionalist' theories. In fact, studies are often found to rely 
upon a diversity of theoretical strands to examine the domestic context of the multinational firm as 
their starting point.
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\same abroad? Oliver and Wilkinson’s (1992) study of Japanese manufacturing 
companies in the UK illustrates this method of research. Having analysed the 
Japanese business system, defined a Japanese management model composed of a set 
of distinctive features (such as key tenets of Just-In-Time/Total-Quality-Control 
production, the ‘three treasures’ of lifetime employment, seniority wages and 
company welfarism), the authors, through the use of surveys and case studies, then go 
on to compare this set of features against the practices o f Japanese firms’ UK 
subsidiaries to determine whether a Japanese model had been transferred. It is in fact 
on this method of relying upon tangible practices to define a national identity, that a 
Japanese and an American model of management have been found in the literature.
One of the strengths of the institutionalist approach is its emphasis upon the 
need to locate the firm in its environment of origin and to gain an understanding of its 
behaviour at home, as an analytical base for examining how firms’ nationality 
influences the way they operate internationally. This perspective conceives of the 
firm as being ‘embedded’ in its environment of origin and emphasises the 
conditioning effects of national institutions upon managements’ behaviour at home 
(Femer 1997). These assumptions in turn derive, implicitly or explicitly, from 
institutional theories of national models (Hall 1986; Hollingsworth et al. 1994; 
Streeck 1996; Maurice et al. 1986b; Whitley 1992; Lane 1989, 1995a, 1995b) which 
conceive of national economies as constituted of a set of interrelated political, 
economic and social institutions, which shape key dimensions of managements’ 
behaviour in distinctive ways. The key assumption underlying this approach is that, 
managements’ behaviour is ‘ingrained’ and therefore, it is likely to exert an influence 
upon the way it will behave abroad.
However, the main problem which can be addressed to the systemic-type of 
approach lies with the generalisability of the findings. By seeking to define a national 
behaviour on the basis of tangible practices, studies imply that nationality is a set of 
practices that can be found in all companies all the time and we thus come to the 
flawed notion that IBM is run like MacDonalds, or Toyota like Nissan.
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\This method, based on a matched comparison of the behaviour of the parent 
and that of the subsidiary, does not enable a comparison of comparable facts. To be 
pertinent, it can only be applied to firms operating in the same industry, or to 
individual case studies. For example, Womack et al. (1990) identified a distinctive 
Japanese production system, through a comparative study of a number of Japanese 
car manufacturers. Their findings are conditioned by the industry variable however. 
Their conclusions, whilst being valid in the context of the car manufacturing industry, 
cannot be generalised to other Japanese companies operating in different sectors, or 
having internationalised at different periods of time.
In the same way as the industry variable has influenced the outcome in this 
case, other factors, such as a firm’s period of internationalisation, may have had an 
influence upon the findings. One thus begins to see the conditioning effects of 
temporal and spatial parameters upon studies’ findings, and the necessity to take into 
account a comprehensive number of variables, that may influence firms’ national 
characteristics, in order to go beyond the effects of those factors, and be able to draw 
conclusions that can be applied to all firms of a given nation. Other studies have 
examined the interactions of a larger number of intermediate variables, but these 
often remained restricted to a small number of firms. For example, Abdullah and 
Keenoy (1995) have examined the interactions between sectoral variables, home and 
host country influences in Japanese electronics multinationals operating in Malaysia 
but have considered only two case studies. As a result, their findings remained 
restricted to their case studies. The ‘institutionalist’ perspective therefore does not 
take into account all the parameters that may affect their Findings, and as a result, the 
type of conclusions it produces are bounded in a specific spatial or temporal context.
In the face of the weakness of the institutionalist approach, has come a third 
school of thought which has been critical of institutionalists’ tendency to give a 
salient role to nationality in the explanation of firms’ behaviour. In essence, these 
critics observe that IBM is not like MacDonalds, that both firms do not have the same 
history, the same corporate culture, the same strategies and they do not operate in the
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same sector meaning that the idea of practices being universally applied in their home 
country is not viable. Wood (1992), in a criticism addressed to Oliver and 
Wilkinson’s findings, claims that there is a diversity of practices in Japan and 
therefore the attempt to define a Japanese management style is flawed. Dedoussis 
(1995) makes a similar point. In a study of Japanese transplants in Australia, he 
found in some companies no attempt by the parent to transfer a Japanese paradigm of 
management. Kenney and Florida (1995) found that Japanese electronics firms US 
subsidiaries behaved differently than their car industry counterparts, and thus 
emphasise the effects of industry-specific factors upon multinationals’ behaviour. 
Eiger and Smith (1994) advocate a method that takes account of technological 
pressures as well as the socio-economic context of the host environment, in 
addressing the issue of the ‘transferability’ of the Japanese model. The fundamental 
point of this third strand of literature, therefore, is that there are a large number of 
variables which influence firms’ behaviour, and as consequence they refute the 
importance of the nationality effect in the face of others factors which are as critical 
as the industry, corporate culture or history.
However, this approach, which advocates that one should take into account 
diversity, has some flaws in its arguments. It implies that IBM is different to 
MacDonalds, and thus that diversity is such that, to put it bluntly, there can be no 
nationality effect. Although it emphasises the importance of taking into account a 
variety of factors, it stops its reflection half way through: indeed, like the 
institutionalist approach, it focuses upon what firms actually do, and therefore it 
cannot recognise and / or demonstrate the existence of a nationality effect which is 
applicable to all firms of a given nation.
In conclusion therefore, conventional approaches, whilst having strengths, 
offer partial accounts of the consequences of national identity upon firms’ behaviour 
abroad. The culturalist approach recognises the existence of a national, intangible 
cultural identity but, because it conceptualises national culture as a set of immutable 
values, it cannot explain the evolution of firms’ national traits, as firms depart from
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their domestic environment to the international arena. The institutionalist perspective 
can identify certain national traits which characterise multinationals, but, because it 
does not take into account a comprehensive number of international factors which 
may influence those traits, its findings are bound by the temporal or spatial conditions 
of the firms which they study.
A ‘behaviourist’ approach to examining nationality effect in international firms
We propose a new approach to examining the effects of national features upon 
international firms, which places emphasis upon the links between firms’ national 
identity and their mode of functioning abroad.
We introduce a new variable, which is the examination of a ‘mode of 
thinking’, or ‘managerial behaviour’2, constituted o f a set o f features, which is 
common to a managements o f a given nationality, and is non measurable. The reason 
why such behaviour exists is that management’s past experience has been shaped by 
the home environment in which it has evolved and conditioned its mode of thinking. 
Secondly, we contend that firm s’ national traits are in turn going to influence the 
practices that firms adopt abroad, and in ways which are more complex than 
conventional approaches suggest.
Indeed, as the firm departs from its domestic environment to the international 
arena, its traits will interact with a number of international factors, or filters’, and, as 
a result, these traits may filter through abroad in different forms. The consequences 
of managements’ traits upon the outcome practices will vary and are complex 
however. Figure 2 -  1 gives a situation of two companies originating from the same 
country, which operate in different conditions for example different sectors therefore 
the intermediate variables, or filters, vary.
2 From the outset, we emphasise that the concept of ‘behaviour’ in our study refers to a national 
managements’ mode of thinking, as opposed to what the firm actually does abroad.
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Company a: Filters
Figure 2 - 1 :  Theoretical framework: The links between managements’ national traits 
and practices adopted abroad
Firstly, a trait can have implications in several tangible facts. Thus, a trait, or 
several traits, can lead to the same practice (Trait 2 in Company (a) and Trait 1 in 
Company (b) have led to practice X). Further, two different outcome practices can be 
the result of the same antecedent feature (Practices X in Company (a) and Y in 
Company (b) resulted from Trait 2).
Secondly, we contend that a national feature can filter through internationally 
at varying degrees o f intensity, depending upon the context with which firms are
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\faced: it can filter through in its entirety; or it can be lessened or emerge occasionally. 
In Figure 2 -  1, we see that Trait 1 was prevented from going through in Company (a) 
because of the international filters met; but it did filter through in Company (b) under 
a different set of circumstances.
Further, through this approach, we remain open to the possibility that ‘new 
features ’ might be gained by managements via the contact with international factors, 
and subsequently become part of their behaviour abroad. Thus, in addition to the 
‘obvious’ features and the ‘potential’ ones, the ‘new’ features which the firm may 
acquire, constitute a third building block of managements’ behaviour abroad.
Our task is then to reconstitute managements’ behaviour abroad. As 
international filters may influence how traits will express themselves in practice, we 
need to detach ourselves from the practical level and go beyond the effects of those 
filters. Our aim is to demonstrate that, beyond the practices adopted by multinational 
managements, there exists a mode of thinking common to all firms, which has led 
management to act in the way that it has abroad, both as a result of the management it 
inherits from home and the international context it is faced with. In other words, we 
focus explanations upon why management has come to act in the particular way that it 
has abroad.
Thus, our approach takes account of elements of both the culturalist and the 
institutionalist schools of thought, whilst renewing them in other areas. Compared 
with cultural analyses, we recognise the importance of an intangible component of 
national culture. However, we do not base our analysis solely on values: like the 
institutionalist perspective, we consider managements’ concrete responses abroad. 
However, we see practices only as a means to uncover managements’ traits, which 
may have influenced the implementation of those specific practices. In other words, 
rather than solely focusing upon the question of how the firm actually operates 
abroad, we instead address the question of why management has come to act in the 
way that it has abroad.
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In order to draw out managements’ national features abroad, we will proceed 
as follows. We shall consider a maximum number of international filters, through the 
examination of a diverse sample of French companies operating in different sectors 
and having internationalised at different periods of time. Indeed, having established 
that international filters have an influence upon the ways in which managements’ 
features will filter through in practice, only the comparison of a large number of firms 
can enable us to identify managements’ features abroad in a comprehensive and 
systematic fashion, and ensure that our findings are not biased by specific filters. The 
sole examination of company (a) would not have enabled the identification of Trait 1; 
but, a large cross-case comparison is more likely to bring out features that have 
filtered through in different forms depending upon the context.
Conventional approaches, by considering a limited number of intermediate 
variables, give a partial view of managements’ behaviour abroad: they are able to 
identify features which have transpired as such, such as Japanese lean production or 
American standardisation. However, they risk omit the ‘potential’ features which 
filter through occcasionally or at different degrees of intensity: even though Trait 1 
does not emerge in all cases, it is potentially there and constitutes part of 
managements’ behaviour abroad. Nor is the approach, by setting out the problematic 
in terms of transferability of firms’ features, able to identify firms’ newly gained 
features.
Further, in seeking to explain how and why managements have come to act in 
the way that they have abroad, we need to consider not only firms’ practices abroad 
and how they operate at a given point in time, but also examine parent companies’ 
strategies over time: that is their initial intents, the difficulties they have experienced, 
the effects of the filters met, how management has altered its initial strategy in 
response to those, and the actual consequences. It is through an understanding of the 
evolution of managements’ initial intentions, that a typical behaviour can be revealed.
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\In total, this method enables us to reconstitute managements’ behaviour 
abroad in a systematic and comprehensive manner: we can identify the ‘three tiers’ - 
that is the features that always transpire, those that may not always filter through or 
filter through lessened; and finally, the ‘new features’. By considering a maximum 
number of temporal and spatial parameters and the evolution of firms’ strategies over 
time, we can draw out a behaviour which goes beyond the filters that are met, and, 
therefore, can be generalised to all companies o f a nation.
To reiterate, through this method, our objective in this study is to seek to 
prove the existence of a mode of thinking, common to French managements, which is 
going to influence their decisions independently of the filters met. In other words, it 
will be applicable to other French companies or French companies internationalising 
at different periods of time. Defining such a behaviour means it will be possible to 
predict how managements will react in a given context. This does not mean that all 
companies will do the same thing at the same time, but that this behaviour might 
express itself depending upon the context that is met. It thus constitutes what can be 
referred as a potential set o f national features which will filter through abroad, if they 
are allowed to under time and environmental conditions that are met.
This method thus enables us to demonstrate that there exists a national 
behaviour, which implies that, beyond their practices, IBM and MacDonalds have 
some things in common: a common mode of thinking and reacting. National culture 
is a complex phenomenon which, although recognised by all of us as exerting a 
pervasive influence, is unseizable and therefore it requires the development of 
concepts which are non-measurable. In spite of its non-measurable character, the 
behavioural variable we introduce into our analysis, we believe, is more 
representative of the description of a national management model abroad than under 
conventional approaches and enables for a deeper examination of the potential 
consequences of national identity on firms’ international operations.
Theoretical framework
34
C o n c lu s io n s
Analysts are divided with regard to the effects of globalisation upon the 
nationality of firms, between those who predict its decline under the forces of 
globalisation, and those who argue that a firm’s nationality is enduring and continues 
to influence the way it operates abroad. The objective of this study is to test these 
two hypothesis, through an examination of French multinationals’ international 
strategies.
In order to examine the effects of French identity upon firms’ behaviour 
abroad, the approach adopted is to characterise a mode of thinking specific to French 
companies, which will influence the way they react abroad. To obtain this behaviour, 
we have to take into account a comprehensive number of international filters, which 
can influence a firm’s traits, as it departs from its domestic environment. These 
filters broadly include time-related factors (the parent’s period of internationalisation; 
its international experience3) and space-related variables (industry-specific factors; 
the host environment in which firms operate). These will be defined in detail in the 
proceeding chapters.
3 The variable, ‘international experience', refers to the firm's familiarity with the rules of capitalism, 
which dominate the global environment at present.

\Chapter III
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Introduction
In order to examine the extent of the nationality effect upon French 
multinationals’ behaviour, we have chosen to adopt a qualitative method of research. 
Firstly, the rationale behind the research strategy adopted will be discussed, followed 
by the presentation of our research design, and then concluding on our chosen 
methods of analysis and the kind of output of the study.
3.1. Qualitative research and multiple case-studies as research strategy
The research seeks to establish whether there exists a distinctive French 
management style abroad. Given our research objectives and theoretical approach 
outlined in the previous chapter and recapitulated in Figure 3 -  1, we opted for 
qualitative research, through the means of a multiple case-study method, examined in 
a historical perspective. This choice was made necessary first by the nature of our 
research. In the absence of any comprehensive study of the internationalisation 
process of French companies, our research was basically starting from scratch, and 
not being able to refer to prior theoretical or empirical work in the literature, we were 
forced to build up interpretative theories of French companies’ behaviour abroad.
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The additional factor was that our conceptual approach to examining the 
nationality effect aims to draw out French managements’ mode of thinking, or 
behaviour abroad, and therefore we are concerned with exploring an intangible 
phenomenon. Indeed, we are seeking, not to characterise practices observed within 
the operating company abroad, but derive a set of behavioural characteristics specific 
to French managements that have influenced their strategies abroad, and to this end 
practices are only a means to uncover French managements’ behaviour.
Thirdly, in order to examine how French companies’ national features evolve 
as they leave their domestic borders, we have to take into account a large number of 
variables with which companies will be confronted in the international arena, or 
filters, which are both time- (period of internationalisation, international experience) 
and space-related (host environment, industry).
Filters
Figure 3 -1 :  Theoretical framework
In light of those conditions, only a qualitative approach could enable us to 
explore the complexity of French companies’ internationalisation strategies. 
According to Yin (1994), this approach is particularly appropriate to study the kind of 
phenomenon where ‘the boundaries between phenomenon and context are blurred’, 
and is capable of dealing with the ‘entangled situation between phenomenon and
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context’. A qualitative approach could enable us to examine the nature of the 
interactions of companies’ strategies and the multiplicity of factors they encounter 
abroad, in order to draw out the complexity of French managements’ behaviour 
abroad independently from those filters.
In order to characterise French managements’ behaviour abroad, we rely on a 
multiple case-study method comprising eleven companies. As Eisenhardt (1989) 
argues, the strength of a multiple-case study method of research comprising over five 
cases is the potential higher level of applicability of findings generated, as it enables 
one to test explanations and models through a ‘replication logic’ across cases.
In our case, the choice of relying on a large sample of companies was made 
necessary, so that French managements’ features drawn from our case studies could 
be tested against a large number of companies and thus were not restricted by either 
spatial or temporal contingencies. Given the large number of international filters that 
entered the equation, there was a risk that on the basis of a small number of cases, our 
findings of French managements’ behaviour abroad would have been biased because 
of specific antecedent conditions which would be exceptional. Thus, for our study to 
be pertinent, it was very important to be able to examine a large panel of companies 
so as to be able to draw national features which go beyond the set of filters identified, 
and in turn can be generalised to all firms of a nation. By examining 
comprehensively the interactions between international filters and French companies’ 
behaviour, in each case, we could weigh the influence of each of those filters upon 
French features which had led to specific outcomes within the operating company.
Being interested in understanding the evolution of French companies’ features 
as they leave their domestic borders, it was necessary to examine their process of 
internationalisation over time in order to appreciate the direction and patterns of 
change. Pettigrew (1990) advocates a historical approach when it comes to 
developing a more ‘holistic’, ‘dynamic’ approach towards understanding a 
phenomenon. How French companies respond to the international environment they
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\are confronted with is not an instant phenomenon but evolves over time, and thus a 
snapshot approach, by separating events under study from their temporal contexts, 
cannot reveal the processes at work. The period under investigation covered the 
decade beginning from the late 1980s to the end of the 1990s, because this decade 
represented a significant period of internationalisation for many French 
multinationals. French firms caught the train of globalisation only ten years ago. The 
added advantage of observing them from the very beginning of their 
internationalisation was to be able to follow through the evolution of their features 
from a state where companies’ national features were very French, that is non- 
contaminated so to speak by any other international influences. Thus, the behaviour 
of today’s French multinationals that we attempt to unfold in this study, has built up 
during this ten year period.
Although dealing with a large number of case-study firms, we were able to 
acquire the kind of information required to address our research question, both 
because of the nature of the research problem itself, as well as specific conditions 
related to fieldwork which have been favourable. Our research objective is to draw 
out characteristic features of French managements abroad, that is of those who 
manage multinational companies. Therefore our data collection focused on the 
management population of French firms, rather than being concerned with studying in 
great detail established practices within operating companies.
In conducting our study, we have also benefited from several advantages. 
Firstly, given the high concentration of power within French firms, it was possible, by 
accessing top management levels, to obtain the information required in a relatively 
short space of time. In addition to being close to the centres of power, given French 
organisations’ employment patterns, French managers interviewed had for the most 
part spent their entire career within their companies, and therefore had followed 
through their firms’ international strategies over long periods of time, and were thus 
knowledgeable about past and current choices, as well as the difficulties they faced 
abroad.
Research method«>!<>gy
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In addition, the acquisition of information was facilitated by the timing of the 
research as it took place at a turning point for French firms as they were 
internationalising on a large scale, and were questioning their existing strategies on 
many fronts, as evidenced by their progression forward in the UK observed 
throughout the study. Our study was thus addressing a real need for companies, and 
thus managements talked openly about the issues they were faced with, which 
allowed us through the interviews conducted to go to the heart of the matter. Finally, 
being a French national myself and having spent ten years in the UK, this helped to 
develop an appreciation of the behaviours of French managements in the UK, going 
beyond the stage of cultural stereotypes whilst not de-contextualising each country s 
distinctive cultures.
3.2. Methods of data collection and analysis
Selecting cases
The choice of France, the selection of case study firms as well as that of the 
UK as a host environment was directly linked to the analytical framework and the 
international filters which had been defined as being relevant.
France is a strong test case to address the globalisation vs. nationality eflect 
debate, first because French companies are successful abroad: France holds a 
prominent place on the international scene1. By the same token, France is a country 
which has a substantial historical and cultural legacy, and, in contrast with Anglo- 
American firms who are embedded in a market-based system, French lirms have not 
been greatly exposed to domestic competition. Seeking to understand why they are 
successful abroad, and examining how they react in the face of global competition 
was a good opportunity to assess the role of nationality upon firms’ international 
competitiveness. Further, as the specificities of the French institutional environment 1
1 In 1997, France had 13 companies among the top 100 TNCs ranked by assets held abroad; the US 
27; Japan 17; UK 11; Germany 11 (World Investment Report 1999, Foreign D irect Investment and  the 
Challenge o f  Developm ent, United Nations).
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were well-known through an extensive literature search, we could establish a profile 
of management’s domestic features. This provided a solid starting point to examine 
the evolution of these features as companies departed from their domestic borders.
Great Britain as a host environment provided an interesting observation 
ground in order to explore the behaviour of French firms. Britain has a culture that is 
very different from France, but also its economy has a highly advanced degree of 
marketisation which is strongly integrated into the global economy. It thus raised the 
issue of how French companies adapt to a culture which is radically different from 
their own, as well as enabling us to observe the mechanisms through which they 
adapt to the global economy.
A number of criteria guided the selection of our sample of case studies. 
Firstly, the study focused upon large French corporations, as, characteristically in 
France, internationalisation is driven by large companies, a reflection of the French 
State’s strategy of creating national champions: in 1993, ten groups accounted for a 
third of total employment abroad whilst SMEs accounted for less than 5% (Tersen 
and Bricout 1996).
Secondly, in order to test our hypothesis, it was important to gain access to 
companies that were representative of the diversity of French capitalism. Thus our 
sample includes companies that are part of the large state-led industry sector, the 
predominant industrial governance pattern and domain of French excellence, but also 
companies that were part of the competitive sphere. Further distinctions can be made 
with regard to firms’ specific historical and domestic sectoral settings according to 
their ownership characteristics (state-owned, those that were privatised in the 1986 or 
1993-4 waves of privatisation, family-owned and / or controlled, entrepreneurial). It 
was therefore possible to assess the impact of historical and sectoral domestic 
backgrounds upon firms’ behaviour.
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Thirdly, our sample includes both manufacturing and services firms, reflecting 
the sectoral distribution of French firms’ internationalisation patterns in the UK (table 
3 - 1 ) .  In total, the services industries account for half of our sample (banking, 
construction, insurance, retail, utilities). Our sample thus enables us to compare the 
impact of the industry variable (global vs. national) upon French firms’ features. 
Operating internationally in manufacturing sectors is now well established with 
companies having long re-located their factories to produce in cheaper countries for 
example, and the sector effect is known to be less prominent. However, in the service 
sectors the bulk of which are newly internationalised - aside from banking and 
construction in our sample, the local character of industry is very strong, raising the 
question of whether French companies in multi-domestic industries will be faced with 
tougher problems abroad as the ones in global industries.
Table 3-1:  Sectoral distribution of French investment stocks in the UK’, 1995
Research methodology
Services 62
Manufacturing 22
Natural resources 9
Holding 5
Others 2
a: % share.
Source: La Balance des Paiements 1995, 1996, Banque de France.
Quoted in Conjoncture et Marchés, Lettre d’information des Postes 
d'Expansion Economique de l’Ambassade de France, London.
The fourth and final criterion affecting choice was to select firms who had 
joined internationalisation in different time periods, each corresponding to specific 
international contexts and strategies. Whilst the bulk of French companies begun 
internationalising in the late 1980s, some, because of the industry they operated in, 
had a long international history abroad. Thus, groups selected fell into three time 
periods that can be identified as significant: prior to the 1970s where firms were 
mostly located in the French colonies or Southern Europe; the late 1980s which 
corresponded to the beginning of the internationalisation of French companies which 
focused on Europe; and the mid-1990s where all French companies internationalised 
and adopted strategies of global expansion. The question for the research to address
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therefore was the effect of firms’ international history upon their ability to operate in 
today’s highly competitive and globalised markets. Table 3 - 2  summarises the key 
background variables of our sample of case study firms, which may filter companies’ 
national features in a strength and direction that had to be determined“.
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Table 3 -2 :  Presentation of the eleven case-studies sample
Domestic
background
Industry Industry
nature
Period of 
entry in UK
Internat.
positioning"
1. Alcatel Privatised
State-led
Telecoms Global Late 1980s World
2. AXA Entrepreneur
Market-based
Insurance National Mid-1990s France
3. Crédit Lyonnais State-owned
State-led
Banking Mixed 1960s Europe / 
Colonies
4. Danone Family
Market-based
Food National Late 1980s France
5. La Redoute 
(PPR)
Entrepreneur
Market-based
Retail National Mid-1990s France
6. Peugeot Family
State-led
Car Global 1970s Europe / 
Colonies
7. Saint Gobain Privatised 
State-led
Building
materials
Global Late 1980s Europe / 
Colonies
8. Schneider Family 
State-led
Electronics Global 1960s Europe / 
Colonies
9. Total Privatised
State-led
Oil Global 1960s Europe / 
Colonies
10. Vinci (Vivendi2 3) Private
Market-based
Construction National Late 1980s Europe / 
Colonies
11. Vivendi Water 
(Vivendi4)
Private
Market-based
Water
distribution
National Late 1980s France
“ This is not an additional criteria but only gives an indication of the companies’ international state as 
they set foot in the UK. ‘France’ means the companies were not internationalised at the time; 
‘Europe/Colonies’ means they were present in only a few countries often in Southern Europe and the 
colonies; ‘World’ refers to companies that were pursuing global strategies.
2 Obviously, the sample of French companies that met those key criteria was further narrowed down 
using various sources of information including Who owns Whom database, UK company reports, etc. 
in order to weed out companies having small operations in the UK, or being present only through 
commercial outlets. It was indeed unlikely that they would have provided a terrain of observation of 
French managements' behaviour internationally.
3 Group Générale des eaux changed its name to Vivendi in 1998. The group construction division, 
SGE, was renamed Vinci, whilst the water division was given the name of Vivendi Water.
4 Cf Footnote 3.
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Whilst exhibiting significant differences in terms of domestic historical and 
sectoral background, and degree of internationalisation, the companies selected are 
nonetheless comparable, firstly because they are all of a similar size, and secondly, 
irrespective of their differences, they are today all faced with similar global pressures 
to internationalise. Having defined the key background variables to our case study 
firms which can potentially influence firms’ national features, we could reduce 
extraneous variation thereby enhancing external validity of the findings.
Research design and unit o f analysis
We began our research with a semi-structured, flexible interview agenda in 
order to allow for key issues regarding French firms’ internationalisation process to 
emerge. The research began with a focus on examining how French companies 
manage their human resources across borders, and with this in mind we then set out to 
examine their international strategies in order to understand how it affected their IHR 
policies. As the research progressed, two developments emerged which required an 
adjustment of the issues explored. Firstly, with regards to the management of HR, as 
French companies were new internationally, we found, in all but one case, that the 
management of HR issues at an international level was concerned with the creation of 
a group culture and the internationalisation of managerial personnel. We found 
companies at this stage did not focus upon developing a comprehensive IHR policy 
from top management to workforce levels, and those issues were by and large left to 
local discretion. Thus, our study focused on the strategic dimensions of the 
management of human resources internationally, that is how companies create an 
international culture, how managers are developed internationally, rather than dealing 
with the management of non-managerial personnel. For example, whilst French firms 
were in the vanguard of setting up European Works Councils, these turned out to 
have only a limited role internationally, and thus whilst some characteristics of 
French managements could be drawn from this fact, we did not pursue the issue in 
great detail because it was unlikely it would have revealed any specific traits of how 
French managements behave abroad.
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In addition, as fieldwork evolved, we realised French firms’ international 
strategies did not only impact upon the management of their human resources, but 
was linked to other functions as well. Again as a result of the very early stage of 
internationalisation that French firms were at, whilst the management of HR abroad 
came to be on managements’ agenda, it was generally implemented after many other 
changes were introduced in other functions including general management, finance, 
production and marketing. In order to reach our research objective of defining 
managements’ features which have influenced French companies’ strategies, we thus 
had to understand the international strategies of companies as a whole which meant 
we had to broaden our research agenda to include all other relevant domains of 
management.
In order to be able to draw out a French behaviour, we had to understand the 
evolution of firms’ international strategies, and not only how they were managed at a 
given point in time. We thus followed through companies’ strategies in relation to 
the past, the present and the future: that is, what was their initial strategies, how 
managements went about implementing them, the difficulties companies experienced, 
the mistakes that were made, how their experience helped managements for the 
future, etc.
Companies’ strategies were examined through four themes (cf. Appendix). 
Questions were asked, first of all, with regard to the history of their UK acquisitions 
and how they approached the issue of integration, their degree of knowledge of 
managing abroad, the obstacles they encountered and the outcomes of the process. A 
second major theme dealt with companies’ internal structures of power and control as 
well as the evolution of their corporate structures in response to international market 
pressures. Questions at both levels of organisation dealt with the operating 
company’s degree of autonomy, the modalities of control used by headquarters, 
issues related to operating in the UK market, as well as addressing how management 
went about the evolution in their corporate structures. The third issue focused upon 
the strategic management of their HR internationally, as discussed above; we
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\followed through the key changes that companies made in their HR policies through 
the course of their internationalisation, and the issues and problems they were 
confronted with. A fourth and final broad area looked at whether and how the 
experience they gained in the UK helped them for the future.
Methods of data collection consisted mainly of in-depth interviews with 
French and British managers both at headquarters and UK operating company levels. 
In total, 162 managers were interviewed and a well-balanced number of interviews 
carried out at corporate headquarters (75) and in the UK operating company (87). A 
minimum of around ten up to twenty interviews were carried out per company. The 
period of defining the research questions, gaining access to companies and conduct of 
the case studies spanned two years.
In each case study company, information was gathered at both corporate and 
operating company levels in order to follow through the processes from the 
elaboration of companies’ international strategies to their implementation. Firstly, at 
product line level, interviews were conducted with executives who had direct 
responsibility for international operations, namely the divisional head and his direct 
subordinates in key functions (finance, HR, production, marketing). In addition to 
divisional level, selected functions were covered at corporate level, depending upon 
the importance of this level in the definition of international strategies and 
companies’ corporate structure, so as to gain a high-level perspective on firms’ modes 
of functioning. Thus, within groups which had a well-developed matrix-based 
corporate structure, senior managers at Area level were interviewed, generally 
including general, marketing and / or HR. Within all groups, HR managers were 
interviewed at corporate level as it was a key level at which HR strategies were 
developed. This included at the minimum the head of International Human 
Resources, as well as managers responsible for management development; this was 
complemented by further interviews of HR managers in other functions, when 
specific IHR policies needed to be pursued.
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At the UK level, the senior management team was interviewed including the 
General Manager and the heads of the major functional areas, that is finance, human 
resources, marketing and production. In functions where it emerged during the 
course of research that French policies were implemented, middle managers were 
interviewed, for example plant managers and specific operational managers, in order 
to follow through in greater detail how policies were perceived and implemented 
within the operating company. Finally, French expatriate managers who had been 
assigned to the UK operating company were interviewed, as, being at the crossroads 
of both cultures, they were valuable sources of information in order to help 
understand group philosophies and policies as well as the issues surrounding their 
implementation in the UK.
Gathering information on each issue from the different view points within 
organisations, that is French corporate management’s, the British operating 
company’s as well as French expatriate managers’, has enabled us to define the gap 
between top managements’ intentions and the actual implementation of their policies 
and thus enabled a triangulation of evidence, thereby strengthening the empirical 
grounding of the French managements’ behaviour that was found.
In-depth interviews were complemented by examining secondary sources of 
information. We collected various internal company documentation, including 
internal news magazines, minutes and summaries of meetings, written reports as well 
as various statistical information. We also consulted newspaper articles, journal and 
book references on the companies, their industries and relevant themes concerning 
our study. In addition to the total number of interviews indicated above, a series of 
short follow-up telephone interviews were conducted with managers, when 
complementary information was required about specific issues. All together, this 
enabled us to complement and corroborate information received from interviewees. 
When a consistent picture emerged, through cross-checking several interviewees’ 
viewpoints a well as documentary data, we were satisfied with accepting the 
information collected as reliable.
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Methods of analysis
As many authors have emphasised, the process of moving from field data to 
the various stages of analysis is highly iterative where periods of openness and 
complexity alternate with a period of more structured understandings, through which 
research questions, variables and constructs are (re)-defined (Bacharach 1989, 
Eisenhardt 1989). However, there were a number of stages that were involved in the 
phase of data analysis.
Having gathered information upon specific themes, the first level of analysis 
was to reconstitute the path of French companies’ strategies over the time, therefore 
we began interpreting French companies’ behaviour. We aimed to draw French 
features, in other words we sought to formulate explanations for French 
managements’ actions abroad: what were the reasons behind firms’ specific 
responses? How and why did management come to act in the way that they did? 
What features of their character could be behind firms’ responses?
Firstly, the process focused on each case study. Once general patterns and 
differences were identified and tentative explanations elaborated, these were 
compared with the evidence of each other case, through a ‘replication logic’, which 
enabled us to extend them, qualify them or eventually drop them (Eisenhardt 1989). 
Systematic cross-case comparisons enabled us to ensure we identified French traits in 
an objective and exhaustive way, and went beyond the effects of each filter.
Thus, once data was collected, an analytical phase was involved, which was 
aimed at detaching ourselves from the practical level and drawing out French firms’ 
mode of thinking abroad. In addition to starting from the level of practices abroad to 
find firms’ underlying traits, we also followed the conventional method, that is, we 
sought to find whether French features we had identified in our study of the French 
business system could be directly found abroad. This enabled us to ensure no 
features were omitted in reconstituting French managements’ international behaviour.
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Conclusion
The study aims at drawing a pattern of behaviour, or set of features, which 
characterise French managements abroad, this being done firstly, through a sample of 
diverse companies, and secondly in an encompassing manner, by examining the 
perspectives of French managements, the operating company and French expatriates 
managers. The behaviour we draw out is unbounded in both space and time. In other 
words, it can be generalised to other French organisations as well as over different 
historical periods. Thus, the way in which French companies behave can be 
predicted. This predictability does not mean we can anticipate what French 
managements will do exactly, but rather is a tendency, a mode of thinking towards 
which they will lean, and which will express itself, if allowed to under the time and 
environmental conditions that are met.
50

Chapter IV
FRENCH MULTINATIONALS IN THEIR NATIONAL BUSINESS SYSTEM
Introduction
The country of origin is the departure point of multinational companies 
abroad. Firms are embedded in a distinctive institutional environment from which 
they develop characteristic features. As multinational managements share a similar 
and long experience in the same environment, these traits are likely to influence the 
way they will react in the international arena. Those features might in turn be a 
source of advantage or on the contrary a handicap on their ability to operate 
successfully abroad.
On the basis of an analysis of the French political and institutionalist context, 
this chapter seeks to define a set of characteristic features, which French 
managements has inherited from its domestic base. Management finds itself at the 
core of the political, economic and social spheres of a country, which together define 
a distinct ‘national governance regime’ (Hollingsworth et al. 1994). The concepts of 
‘societal effects’ (Maurice et al. 1984, 1986b), ‘national business system’ (Whitley 
1992) and ’industrial order’ (Lane 1989; 1995a; 1995b) conceptualise Nation States 
as systems constituted by a set of societal institutions, which are powerfully 
interconnected. National institutions, by forming a set o f constraints and 
opportunities on managements’ actions, exert a conditioning effect on their
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behaviour, thereby contributing to a certain ‘mentality’ or set of specific features, 
some tangible, others less so. Actors and institutions reinforce each other and the 
system tends to perpetuate itself.
The first section examines the characteristics of the predominant French 
production and innovation system led by the State, which emerged during the post­
war period and prevailed well into the 1980s. The following section looks at the key 
features of French companies’ internal system of power and control, as well as their 
employment system, namely their system of management development, the role of 
the personnel function and the system of industrial relations. Finally, the mechanisms 
of the internationalisation process of French companies which began in the late 1980s 
are analysed.
4.1. The State-led French system of production and innovation
France distinguishes itself from other countries in the extent to which it has 
relied on state-led rather than market-led mechanisms for industrial governance'. The 
French state has directly intervened in the economy, playing a developmental role, in 
particular from the postwar years to the early 1980s (Hall 1986). The French state’s 
keen interest in protecting and promoting the competitiveness of the domestic 
industry has its roots in a long tradition of interventionism in France; an embedded 
mistrust of economic liberalism, an ideology shared by the political and economic 
elite alike; and, a quite unique conception of industry as ‘an attribute of sovereignty’ 
(Cohen 1992). Driving state intervention in the economy in the postwar years were 
indeed, before pure economic criteria, the objectives of promoting national 
sovereignty, achieving technological leadership, and developing an industry capable 
of rivalring the Americans. 1
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1 There exists different kinds of governance mechanisms for regulating transactions between economic 
actors (Lindberg el al. 1991; Hollingsworth et al. 1994). Five mechanisms have thus been identified 
by the institutionalist strand: markets, hierarchies, the state, informal networks and associations.
From these deeply rooted beliefs, has resulted a strong attachment of the 
country to the nationality of its firms and the protection of its domestic base through a 
strong industrial policy. French industrial policy has consisted of the creation of 
‘national champions’ in selected industries, financial support to ‘lame ducks’, to any 
type of more specific interventions when the interests of the French industry were at 
stake (Hall 1986). The French state had historically important means of intervention, 
including a large public sector, control over the financial system and credit, as well as 
a centralised and formalised planning system.
The degree of involvement of the state and control over its firms has been 
particularly strong through the Grands Projets, national-wide technological projects, 
and the strategy of creating national champions. Thus, in a wide range of ‘high 
technology’ sectors (military-industrial complex, electrical and nuclear power, 
transport, aerospace, aeronautics, petroleum), one saw the state and firms developing 
close relations, thereby constituting a distinct production and innovation system" 
which prevailed until the mid-1980s (Cohen 1992). The system was characterised by 
three key elements. First, in each industry, the state constituted a R&D- 
manufacturing-procurement system under the quasi-hierarchical control of a specially 
created public agency. Second, the cohesion of the apparatus was ensured by an elite 
of civil servants and engineers from the Grandes Ecoles or the Grands Corps71. The 
third ingredient of the model was a supportive and protectionist policy of domestic 
industry: the state financed and conducted R&D and transferred its results to industry; 
guaranteed its firms’ domestic markets through public procurement; protected them 
from competition by limiting imports and foreign investments; whilst supporting their 
competititiveness abroad by subsidising their exports. Throughout this period 
therefore, it can be said that French firms had the support from the state and national 
institutions ‘incorporated’.
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2 Which Cohen (1992) named as 'industrial colbertism'.
3 The Grands Corps refer to the political and economic elite, who, after having gone through the most 
prestigious G randes Ecoles (Ecole Nationale d'Adm inistration, Ecole Polytechnique, Ecole National
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The telecommunications sector, from which the equipment manufacturer, 
Alcatel, emerged, is an illustration of the workings of this specific mode of industrial 
governance (Cohen 1992; Hulsink 1999). Alcatel was created by the merger of 
several national manufacturing firms, its technological base was publicly funded and 
developed by the national telecommunications research centre networks (CNET), the 
whole apparatus being under the control of a national operator Direction Générale 
des Télécommunications4 (DGT), which was invested with the mission of 
modernising the telecommunications infrastructure of the country and developing a 
competitive domestic manufacturing equipment industry. Alcatel was finally the 
main supplier of DGT.
This dirigiste mode of industrial governance functioned in a very effective 
way until the early 1980s. French industry and the state have worked together 
harmoniously, with the state controlling industry to achieve political and economic 
goals, and French industry benefiting from statist protection and resources for their 
development. French firms have thus enjoyed a very strong level of stability for a 
long period of time, enabling them to take a long-term view by investing in high 
technology and capital-intensive sectors, such as building materials (Saint Gobain); 
steel and aluminium (Usinor-Sacilor, Péchiney); cars (Peugeot, Renault); electronics 
(Schneider); oil (Elf and Total). This model of intervention has been successful in 
creating ‘national champions’ with a strong engineering base as well as scale and 
scope advantages, and enabling a rapid economic and technological catching up in the 
country’s infrastructure (telecommunications, transport, nuclear power, etc.).
The predominance of a scientific-technological logic in the French mode of 
production has conferred to French engineers a sacrosanct status within the French 
firm. The bastion of French industry, engineers from the Grandes Ecoles or the 
Grands Corps, have been a key element in the modernisation of French industry, and
Supérieure) join specialised institutions (Corps des M ines, Corps des Ponts for the engineers. 
Inspection des Finances, Cour des Comptes, Conseil d ’Etat).
4 DGT was to become PTT and France Télécom in 1990, after their change of status from 
administration to public enterprise.
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have dominated the management of French firms ever since. France has a long 
tradition, dating back to Napoleon, of training engineering experts in state-run 
Grandes Ecoles for the running of its government and industry. Being closely linked 
by their common education backgrounds, their membership in a Corps which confers 
a sense of identity and belonging, they created a homogeneous technical management 
culture, which was an essential element in the smooth functioning and structuring of 
the French system of production (Chesnais 1993). The Grands Corps have developed 
powerful cartel-like networks which have secured them the monopoly of top 
management positions within French firms. The Corps des Mines and Corps des 
Ponts et Chaussées are present in a wide range of industries, the Corps des Télécoms 
prevails in telecommunications industries, Ecole Nationale des Pétroles in petroleum 
industries, Ecoles Nationale Supérieure de l ’Aéronautique et de l'Espace in 
aerospace industry, etc. As a result the French engineer is not ‘only’ an engineer. 
His status, education and role within the French firm extends well beyond that. He is 
one who has received a high-level, broad-based scientific education in a Grande 
Ecole and who does not occupy only technical and production positions, but also 
other general management functions.
However, the French system of knowledge production, with its traditionally 
‘mission-oriented’ technology policy, the dominant focus on high technology and 
military industries, its vertically integrated R&D-production-procurement structure 
dominated by the state has not lent itself to technological diffusion across firms and 
industries nor the rapid commercialisation of technologies (Chesnais 1993), in 
contrast with the German and Japanese innovation models (Doremus et al. 1998; 
Womack et al. 1990). Process and product innovation as a result has tended to be 
limited. In addition, shielded from national and international competition for a long 
time, and evolving in an inflationary economic context, French industry has had little 
incentive to maximise productivity gains (Cohen 1992). Thus, during nearly thirty 
years of economic growth, French industry has long postponed organisational 
restructuring and rationalisation of their structures.
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Throughout the period, firms’ long-term financing needs were met through a 
credit-based and price administered financial system, under state control (Zysman 
1983). With their long-term financing being provided by parapublic institutions at 
advantageous conditions and by debt rather than through equity, the state protecting 
national capital from unfriendly takeovers, and national company laws enabling 
management to use all kinds of financial techniques such as double voting rights to 
keep minority shareholders at bay, French firms could pursue their development 
steadily without outside pressures from capital. On the other hand, in the absence of 
external control, via financial markets, and weak internal controls, as a result of 
political and business networks and interlocking directorships, the system has 
notoriously lacked transparency and maximisation of efficiency, which a string of 
high profile financial scandals threw light on in the early 1990s (for example Air 
France, Crédit Lyonnais, Alcatel).
The state-led system prevailed throughout the 1980s though it came under 
increasing pressures as the process of liberalisation and deregulation began in Europe 
from the late 1980s onwards. Given the centrality of the public sector in French 
industrial and social policy, as well as its overall success, there was little political, 
industrial and union support in favour of deregulation of sectors of the economy. As 
a result, France held onto its public monopoly model well into the 1990s delaying the 
privatisation of its firms as well as only incrementally deregulating monopolies.
Diversity o f French models
In spite of the generally high involvement of the state in the economy at 
national level, some French firms have fallen outside the dirigiste and public 
monopoly model described above and were part of the competitive sphere. Thus, the 
French water industry since its inception in the mid 19lh century has been maintained 
in the private sector under a system known as gestion déléguée, whereby 
municipalities retain ownership of water infrastructure and delegate its management 
to large private firms, the three major ones being Vivendi Water, Lyonnaise des eaux
French multinationals in their dom estic business system
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and Bouygues who together supply 70% of the water in France. French 
municipalities resorted to private capital in order to meet the large infrastructure 
investments required in this type of industry. Through a powerful political lobby, the 
French water companies were able to escape the post-war and 1982-1983 waves of 
nationalisation. As a result the French water sector can best be described as a kind of 
hybrid system between state and market where French companies are private but 
enjoy close relations with municipalities.
Similarly, food, luxury, cosmetics and retail, traditionally sectors of strength 
in France, although they have at times benefited from the protection of the state5, 
have generally had to rely on their own means of development to a greater extent than 
those belonging to the state-led system of production.
A significant element of French capitalism is family-owned and / or managed 
firms. Family capitalism was widespread in France up until the 1960s and after a 
period of consolidation of French industry, one typically saw original family 
members delegating power to entrusted managers, withdrawing completely or 
remaining partially involved (Lane 1989). Group Danone has been under the 
leadership of its founder Antoine Riboud from the late 1950s. Originally a small 
bottlemaker, the company grew rapidly and diversified into the food industry from 
the 1970s onwards, one of the major acquisition being that of Gervais-Danone which 
was then France’s largest dairy group, thereby transforming itself into the food leader 
in France. Peugeot is also family-controlled, though because of its very close ties 
with the Government, the firm shares many features of companies belonging to the 
Statist French system of production.
One can also distinguish an ‘entrepreneurial’ kind of capitalism. A new breed 
of entrepreneurs has emerged during the post-war period, who have built up entire 
groups. François Pinault has created one of the largest retail empires in France,
5 In the food sector, for example, the state has sought to keep foreign investment to a minimum and 
Danone was protected during a hostile take-over bid in the early 1990s.
58
\French multinationals in their dom estic business system
Pinault-Printemps-Redoute (PPR), in less than twenty years through aggressive 
acquisitions of major French retail companies including the retail group Printemps 
and the mail-order company La Redoute. Similarly, Claude Bebear has created the 
insurance group AX A, starting up from a small and medium-sized insurance 
company. The company grew gradually through acquisitions and in the late 1990s 
took over the number one state-owned insurer UAP, becoming the largest insurance 
group in France.
4.2. French companies' modes of control and employment systems
Firms ’ internal power and control structures
The large French firm’s internal structures of power and control are 
characterised by a concentration of the power at the top of the organisation, likened to 
the country’s presidential system where the executive is all-powerful; very 
hierarchical and segmented structures; dominated, as already explained, by a 
technical management structure.
Decision-making is highly centralised in the hands of the CEO, who relies on 
a clique of entrusted managers, who have been co-opted and extensively socialised 
within the firm (Bauer and Cohen 1981). Top management exerts an autocratic 
control, and maintains its power through a detailed control system and by nominating 
‘influential actors’ strategically throughout the group, in much the same way as the 
political elite in France is notorious for placing ‘their men’ after each round of 
elections. In addition to enjoying unshared powers within the firm, not being 
subjected to outside pressures from capital markets has meant that French CEOs have 
had largely unchallenged powers over their groups, more so than their US and UK 
counterparts, and this has been reflected in a stability in large French firms’ top 
management. This therefore makes the internal power structures of French groups 
highly characteristic, being very closed upon themselves, political and highly 
secretive, relying more than elsewhere on interpersonal rapport.
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Much has been written about the education and career background of those 
executives: they are systematically recruited from the most prestigious Grandes 
Ecoles or from the Grands Corps and from the outset at executive level, having often 
had a career spell as top civil servants (Suleiman 1978; Bauer and Mourot 1987). 
French elites’ common education and career background, which single them out from 
the rest of the firms’ management, has contributed to creating networks of trust within 
(and outside) the firm, but also served to widen the gap between the top and lower 
levels of the firm. Their passage through military Grandes Ecoles has with little 
doubt influenced their autocratic management style. If practices of parachutage 
whereby civil cervants are appointed as heads of companies by the Government 
especially in state-owned firms are resorted to, it remains that in many cases CEOs 
are selected by the firms themselves and then socialised for a long period of time to 
the group before accessing the top of the organisation, and therefore, they are men 
with an intimate knowledge of their group and its activities (Bauer and Cohen 1981).
Management Development
Firms’ employment practices are closely interrelated with the national 
education system and labour market structures. Three major factors at national level 
exert an influence on the French conception of employee development and, more 
specifically for our purposes, management development: first, the elitist nature of the 
education system which has produced a single path to excellence, the so-called ‘Vole 
Royale' via the Grandes Ecoles; secondly, as a result of the importance attached to 
general education, the lesser role of the firm in training compared with the education 
system (Maurice 1993); and lastly, the predominance of internal labour markets, 
which place emphasis on internal career evolution and integration within the firm 
(C.E.C. 1990).
Qualifications play an essential role in management development in France 
and the education system is strongly elitist (Barsoux and Lawrence 1990). The path 
via the Grandes Ecoles is considered as the single path to excellence, whilst other
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routes (universities, technical training) are considered second-rate. The Grandes 
Ecoles provide a curriculum aimed at developing a ‘model’ manager, and a 
homogeneous profile of management. Access to the Ecoles is achieved through 
concours6 and is based exclusively on mathematical performance. Providing a 
general and scientific education, as well as relying on teaching methods emphasising 
knowledge and theory rather than research-based methods, the system seeks to 
develop an état d ’esprit, a certain kind of social and intellectual conformity, more 
than diversity and individuality. French employers recruit their managers essentially 
from the Ecoles, usually from a small number of preferred institutions with which 
they develop close links.
The institutionalised rapport between the education system and the firm in 
France is such that the French system attaches a strong importance to qualifications 
gained compared with professional training, hence a lesser emphasis on training at 
firm level (Maurice 1993). French firms consider graduates, having been widely 
trained, to be sufficiently qualified and that they will be able to adapt to any 
challenges and be polyvalent. Thus, one finds that employers will even go to the 
point of asking for a specific school in their recruitment advertisements, and 
graduates from engineering schools are considered as being able to perform any type 
of functions whether engineering, finance or human resources. By expecting 
immediate operationality from graduates, employers seek to minimise their training 
costs. The 1971 Law on Vocational Training, which requires firms to spend a 
percentage of their total wage costs on employee training, has not enabled the 
establishment of an equitable, or strategic training system7: it is only from the late 
1980s, that French firms’ awareness of training as an investment has developed under 
the heading ‘gestion des compétences’.
6 The exams are taken after two years of ‘écoles préparatoires', based on an intensive curriculum.
7 A huge total of 170md FF is spent per annum, but in 1998, a third of the workforce did not receive 
any training (20% of management and 60% of employees). Le Monde, 'Douze années. Douze 
Chantiers', 6 January 1999.
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French firms’ employment practices are predominantly based on internal 
labour markets (C.E.C. 1990). Statuts guaranteeing rights to security of employment, 
as well as seniority-based promotions and remunerations, have been granted to 
employees in large public groups after the war, at a time of full employment, and as 
part of the national ‘Fordist compromise’ between management and unions, which 
aimed at providing social stability (Boyer 1985). Large private firms’ employment 
regimes have also been strongly influenced by public sector practices. Promotion is 
thus based on seniority, and other criteria including interalia qualifications, age and 
technical competence, and leads to a specific position or status in a job classification 
system, negotiated through industrial agreements. French managers’ ascension up 
through the hierarchy thus tends to be slow, continuous and predictable.
The management of ‘high potentials’ has to be understood in this context. It 
essentially concerns the population of executives, less emphasis being put on the 
development of lower managerial levels of the organisation (Roussillon and Boumois 
1998). Managers are seen as having ‘high potential’ from the point of recruitment, on 
the basis of their initial qualifications. Linked to ‘employment for life’ policies and 
the resulting strong stability in employment, French firms have a long-term vision of 
management development: they will carefully and gradually construct the career of 
those considered as high potentials, through succession planning, with the view of 
building up a durable career within the firm. In our case studies, an average of more 
than 80% of managers were coming through internal promotion. French 
multinationals are known to resort little to formalised methods and practices of the 
Anglo-Saxon type, instead relying on highly subjective methods and criteria 
(Roussillon and Boumois 1998; Shackelton and Newell 1991).
The Role o f the Personnel Function
The still largely administrative character of the employment regime in France, 
as well as the extensively regulated employment domain (see below) largely dictated 
the role of the personnel function which has remained administrative, despite a
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ygrowing awareness for a more professional approach in some firms from the 1980s 
onwards (Maurice et al. 1986a; Galambaud 1993a). The low status of personnel 
management has been further reinforced by the technical ethos of French firms: the 
human resources function is not uncommonly found to be staffed by engineers, who 
have tended to lack sensitivity to people-related issues.
As a result of the importance of internal labour markets in the face of weakly 
developed occupational markets and little active external labour markets, French 
firms have for a long time had little experience of inter-firm professional mobility and 
have known a strong stability of their emploment structures in particular at technical 
and managerial level, compared with countries such as the UK (47% of men were 
present in the same year for more than ten years in France, against 36% in the UK in 
1986) (C.E.C. 1990). One of the implications is that employees are strongly attached 
to their firms.
Industrial Relations
French firms follow a social model dictated by the state. In the French IR 
scene, the state has traditionally played a central role both through regulation and the 
large public sector, in the face of constitutionally weak and ideologically divided 
social partners (Goetschy and Rozenblatt 1992). Labour market regulation is 
extensive, and sets wages and employment conditions (dismissal rules, working-time, 
forms of employee representation at firm level - including the Comité d ’Entreprise, 
shop stewards, vocational and continuous training).
The basis of the French social system was drawn up after the second world 
war and was aimed at maintaining social stability. It saw the development of a well- 
developed social welfare system co-managed by management and unions 
(paritarisme), job security for employees, and union representation within the firm. 
French managements are thus part of a corporatist institutional arrangement and are
iTench multinationals in their domestic business system
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forced, by law and by the state, to be ‘socially responsible’8, and as a result, face a 
more constraining social environment as compared with their UK and US 
counterparts who follow their own rules of efficiency, as employment practices are 
mainly set at firm level and union / employees’ interests have not been 
accommodated at national level.
Whether at national level where all attempts at tripartism have failed and the 
state has taken the lead, or at firm level, French employers and unions have never 
been able to develop a culture of negotiation, in contrast with their German 
counterparts (Hall 1986). The social climate, in its most extreme form, is tense and 
based on a rapport de force, with, on the one hand, autocratic managements seeing 
unions as their bête noire, and on the other, unions ideologically repelled by anything 
nearing ‘co-management’. Durand (1990) captures the IR climate of a French car 
manufacturer:
‘Since 1982, union struggles have essentially concerned the defence of jobs 
and employment levels in the factory against the use of part-time and sub­
contract labour. (...) The unions and the workforce as a whole hardly 
participate at all in deciding on the organisation of work. Top managers or 
workshop directors inform the Comité d’Entreprise and shop stewards of any 
changes envisaged but there are not exchanges between the two sides on 
these crucial issues, simply expression of dissent or worker resistance when 
the changes seem to them to be unacceptable. In other words, there is no 
overt negotiation on work organisation but an informal power game of 
managerial proposal and worker acceptance or rejection.’ (Durand 1990 p. 
409).
Because of entrenched militant traditions, a level of action which has 
traditionally been at political rather than firm level, fierce inter-union competition 
encouraging ‘point-scoring’ type of behaviour at the expense of the development of 
shared responsibilities9, French unions have shown less ability to deal with business- 
level efficiency issues, and have tended to oppose any major organisational reform
8 For example, since the 1980s, when unemployment exploded, the state has forced companies to 
recruit young people and maintain their employment levels. French firms have widely resorted to early 
retirement measures to minimise the social impact.
9 All large firms are faced with union pluralism represented on their Comités d’Entreprise.
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(Groux 1998). In addition, conditioned by more than thirty years of growth where the 
workforce has benefited from general social policies ( ‘les acquis’) and where 
organisations have seen little change, French unions (in particular in the public 
sector) have mainly sought to preserve employees’ status and employment. The 
decentralisation trend in IR which took place in France from the mid-1980s onwards, 
under the effect of Auroux Laws which imposed firm-level bargaining, remained over 
issues set within the French legislative framework (wages and employment), rather 
than work organisation issues; with the firm level complementing rather than 
replacing the national and industry levels as the main spheres of IR governance 
(Hoan-Ngoc 1992).
Work Organisation
At workplace level, French firms are characterised by their rigid modes of 
functioning (Maurice et al. 1986a; 1986b). The Taylorist / Fayol division of work has 
been adopted more widely in the French context with structures being more 
hierarchical, more formalised, more segmented, with a greater distance between 
conception of tasks and their execution, further reinforced by the strong statutory 
separations between occupation groups (the ouvriers - workers, techniciens, cadres). 
This has tended to be created and reinforced by the broader societal context, the poor 
IR climate, and existing employment practices (such as job classification system, 
seniority-based promotion rules). Together these have impeded employees’ mobility 
and career progression, hence contributing to a strong stability in French companies 
employment structures.
Existing structural characteristics of organisations, partly influenced and 
reinforced by the broader socio-institutional context, have conditioned possibilities of 
innovation as well as the strategic manoeuvrability of the firm. In France, the 
evolution from a Taylorist model of organisation to a more functional / integrated 
model from the mid-1980s onwards has taken place within a more constraining 
framework than elsewhere, and firms have had great difficulties in extracting
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themselves from their entrenched patterns of work organisation (Maurice et al. 1986a; 
Durand 1990; Linhart 1991). Overall, the French institutional context has tended to 
limit the possibilities of process innovation, by hampering fundamental structural 
change. French firms have as a result experienced strong inertia in their organisation 
structures. Unless forced to, French management, whilst investing in automation and 
upgrading technical equipment from the 1980s onwards, has long tended to avoid 
touching organisation structures and employment structures.
4.3. The move of French companies abroad
Finally, this section examines French companies’ mechanisms of 
internationalisation, setting the backdrop against which their development in the UK 
has taken place. Because their strategies were mainly focused upon their domestic 
markets, French companies had little international exposure and it was not until the 
late 1980s that they began internationalising on a large scale. Whereas France held a 
prominent position as an international investor at the beginning of the 20th century, its 
position deteriorated thereafter. As indicated in table 4 —1, France held 4.7% of 
world FDI stocks in 1980 whilst it accounted for a mere 5% of total investments 
flows made annually over the period 1982-1986, significantly lagging behind the US, 
Japan, Britain and Germany. French companies’ international presence was limited 
to Southern Europe, and former African colonies where French foreign diplomacy 
was traditionally focused upon. These regions accounted for around 30% of French 
foreign investments in the late 1960s before beginning to decline trom the 1970s 
onwards (Michalet 1997). French companies remained notably absent from the UK 
and had little presence in the US following a string of unsuccessful attempts to 
establish themselves in the market (Wilkins 1993).
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Table 4 - 1 :  G5 countries' international position compared'1
FDI flo w s Stocks
1982-1986b 1980
United States 20 43.5
Japan 13 3.3
UK------------------------ 19 15.9
Germany 10 8.5
France 5 4.7
Total G5 67 75.9
World (level in $bn) 100(55) 100 (507)
‘ Percentage share of world FDI flows / stocks. 
b Annual average.
Source: Adapted from Tersen and Bricout (1996), p. 96.
A number of reasons lie behind the belated internationalisation of French 
companies. It is clear that the French system was a closed system and tended to be 
hostile towards the outside world. French political thinking has long included a 
critical vision of international trade which was associated with de-localisation of 
production centres, and it failed to consider the broader dynamics of trade and 
benefits it could bring (Berger 1995). This line of thinking was embodied, as late as 
1993, in an official report by Arthuis which denounced the negative effects of global 
trade on the location of production and employment in particular in the manufacturing 
sector, and advocated protectionist measures thereby fundamentally questioning 
international trade. So little was internationalisation integrated into French people’s 
minds, that each international acquisition of French groups raised outrage among 
unions and workforce alike.
From the mid-1980s onwards, a number of factors both linked to the broader 
world dynamics and domestic factors prompted French companies’ departure abroad 
(Sally 1996; Tersen and Bricout 1996). Firstly, the liberalisation trends which began 
in the late 1980s as well as the process of European integration provided a major spur 
to their development. Whilst in the first half of 1980s, only a quarter of their 
investments were targeted in Europe, French firms radically re-positioned their
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investments and Europe represented more than two thirds of their total flows between 
1988 and 1994 (Tersen and Bricout 1996).
Within a world context which was beginning to open up, according to Sally 
(1996), the French government and its firms began to realise they were lagging 
behind in particular their German counterparts: this realisation triggered an explosion 
of FDI from the late 1980s onwards (figure 4 -  1). French firms’ departure abroad 
has thus been interpreted as a ‘catching up’ process. From a low yearly average of 
20bnFF in the first half of the 1980s, FDI flows increased tenfold between 1986 and 
1990, reaching a record of 197.3bnFF in 1990; as a percentage of GDP, FDI flows 
increased from 0.43% in 1984 to 3.03% in 199010.
Sources: Bulletins de la Banque de France, Les Flux 
d'investissem ents Direct de la France avec l ’Etranger. (May 1998 
Nb 53) (June 1999 Nb 66).
Figure 4 - 1 :  French investments abroad, 1988-1998
Other general factors were also at play in explaining firms’ departure abroad 
at that particular time. In the context of public financial crises, the French 
government’s role in the economy was beginning to change. 1984 is seen as a turning 
point where, following its failed Keynesian programme which was to lead to a severe
10 After this first wave of investments, French companies made a pause in their investments before 
significantly increasing them again in the latter half of the 1990s. We will go back to this evolution in 
latter chapters.
economic crisis, the French government was forced to gradually retreat and begin a 
reform process steering the country towards a more liberal economy (Schmidt 1996). 
A period of intense restructuring of French industry, which was overburdened with 
debt and in very poor financial conditions, followed and was orchestrated by the 
State. The period saw a first wave of privatisation in 1986, whilst the French 
government enabled many state-owned firms to raise finance through financial 
markets to help finance their international expansion. As French companies’ 
financial position eventually improved significantly, and the domestic economic 
climate improved (thanks to the upwards development of the Paris stock exchange, 
the strength of the franc and the downward trend in interest rates), firms gained the 
financial clout to be able to expand abroad.
Thus, a first broad-brushed overview of the mechanisms of 
internationalisation of French companies in the late 1980s shows that, inward-looking 
and focused upon their home markets, French firms were slow to awake to 
globalisation and its challenges. More than a voluntary international development 
process, it is their lagging behind major industrialised economies that prompted them 
to expand abroad.
Conclusion
French companies thus began internationalising on a large scale in the late 
1980s, emerging from a state-led and quasi-autarkic system. The table below 
summarises the characteristic features of French management and its system of 
innovation and production. The question we now turn to is the extent and manner in 
which these features might influence French managements’ responses abroad.
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Table 4 - 2 :  Features of the French management system
Domestic Industrial Order Interventionist state; 
Protectionism;
Long-term stability;
Lack of transparency; 
Conservative, traditionalist.
Institutionalised Business Priorities Retaining ownership and control of national firms; 
Technological leadership;
Scale and long-term market share.
Innovation and Production System Engineering expertise;
Low competitive efficiency; 
Manufacturing-dominated.
Hierarchy Authorities ‘Head cut off from the rest of the organisation’;
Very hierarchical and segmented structures; 
Trust-based management system (co-optation and 
socialisation);
Technical management culture;
Secrecy;
Static, cumbersome organisation structures.
Management Development Practices Well-defined, homogeneous profile of management 
expected;
Pre-determined career path;
Focus on top managers;
Internal labour markets (seniority; employment for 
life);
Subjective management system.
Employees' Social Identification Attachment to one’s firm.
Role of the HR function Administrative; 
Low status.
1R Climate Societal ‘corporatism’, state-led IR, extensive 
employment regulation;
Autocratic management style and antagonistic 
management-union relations at firm level.
As French companies pass from their domestic environment to the UK, they 
will encounter a number of filters which may act as barriers on their initial features. 
Britain has followed a radically different path to capitalism since the late 1970s from 
France. As France remained attached to its political, economic, social and cultural 
traditions and the country was painfully moving towards a more liberal economy, 
Britain, under a Conservative government with a strong liberal ideology, was 
embracing free market theories and conducting radical reforms of its system:
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internationalisation, privatisation and liberalisation were the watchwords, and British 
firms were confronted with a very different economic reality. One could foresee that 
French firms will have difficulties adapting to a model of capitalism fundamentally
different from their own.
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Chapter V
FRENCH MULTINATIONALS AND THE INTEGRATION OF THEIR RRITISH 
ACQUISITIONS: NATIONALITY’ VERSUS HOST COUNTRY EFFECTS
Introduction
When French multinationals set foot in the UK in the late 1980s, they had 
internationalised little and for the major part were not familiar with the UK where the 
bulk of them had no presence. Therefore, they have had to discover the British 
system. For many years Britain had pursued a very different path towards capitalist 
development from France and had achieved a high degree of marketisation. The key 
question is therefore how French firms, themselves the product of a state-led regime, 
have evolved in such a highly advanced capitalist system.
The examination of French companies’ adaptation to the British environment 
is further prompted by the fact that French multinationals have entered the UK market 
mainly by acquisitions, and not by establishing greenfield sites. They have thus been 
confronted with problems concerning the cultural integration of their acquisitions, 
which multinationals from other nationalities such as Japanese and Americans have 
not had to deal with to such an extent. The question of how French firms have 
handled those and whether their management approach carries distinctive features is 
thus of salient interest. As studies have widely claimed that cultural differences
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across borders are an obstacle to the transfer of management practices, it is important 
to assess the extent and manner of its influence.
We wish to determine whether and to what extent French firms have exported 
their features to the UK thereby assessing their ability to adapt themselves to the UK 
environment. By looking at how they have approached the British market, we aim to 
trace the evolution of national features as French firms have emerged on the 
international scene from an introspective and ethnocentric state.
This chapter opens with a presentation of an analytical framework outlining 
the intermediate variables which might affect the continuity of French features as they 
pass from their domestic environment to the UK (section 5.1). It then proceeds to 
review the specificities of the British institutional environment, specifying the 
fundamental differences of British and French management models (section 5.2). 
Section 5.3 examines the strategic motives underlying French multinationals’ 
acquisitions in the UK and characteristics of their modes of entry. The processes of 
adaptation of five of our case study firms are then presented, to illustrate the interplay 
of national and local forces (section 5.4). Conclusions are finally drawn as to the 
similarities in the behaviour of French multinationals and their underlying features.
5.1. An analytical framework for examining ‘nationality’ and ‘host country’ 
effects
This section outlines an analytical framework in order to examine the 
adaptation of French multinationals to the British environment, and the extent to 
which elements of their system has been transferred, specifying the initial conditions 
that can shape the processes.
In order to examine the issue of adaptation of multinational firms to the host 
environments in which they operate, we introduce a multi-level conceptual model, 
derived from Rosenzweig and Singh’s (1991) theoretical framework based on
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institutionalist concepts. Rosenzweig and Singh conceive of multinationals’ national 
units as facing a set of conflicting pressures. One the one hand, the operating 
company is under pressure from the parent to conform with the corporate ways of 
doing things. The parent company might exert pressure upon the operating company 
to comply with its approach, as a result of its desire to duplicate its management 
approach and / or establish a means of control over the operation. On the other hand, 
as the parent seeks to impose its will, the operating company is being dragged by 
multiple forces within its own environment to adopt specific working practices. 
Those local pressures for becoming ‘isomorphic’ with the local environment might 
for example arise from local laws and regulations, or via other organisations 
(competitors, suppliers, etc.) with which the operating company interacts1. As each 
side, disposing of key resources and conditions that determine their respective 
position of strength, pulls in each direction, there might be tensions in the process: 
the balance of power might ultimately tip in favour of the parent or towards the 
operating company.
Rosenzweigh and Singh’s model offers the benefit of simplicity whilst placing 
multinational companies in their institutional contexts. For the model to be 
operationalised, there is a need to specify the variables under the two main constructs. 
Figure 5 — 1 depicts a number of factors which we have identified both through an 
examination of the literature on cross-national managerial transfers as well as our 
own observations as defining the overall ‘size’ so to speak of the parent versus the 
operating company’s.
1 The concept of 'isomorphism' is drawn from the ‘new institutionalist’ perspective which sees the 
environment within which a firm is embedded as the overriding influence upon the organisation 
patterns firms adopt, and which has identified various ways in which the environment exerts 
homogenising pressures upon firms (Dimaggio and Powell 1983).
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Operating
Unit
- Strategy
- Experience
- Level of advancement
- Period of 
internationalisation
- Features of the UK
context
- Management receptivity
- Nature of industry
- Level of advancement
Figure 5-1:  Variables filtering French features
In order to understand the parent’s approach we need to consider two 
dimensions, which are its strategy, that is the approach chosen to approaching as well 
as integrating the foreign operation, and its international experience. The literature 
has tended to overlook the parent’s features aside from its national context, thereby 
providing only a partial view of the conditions surrounding management transfer, 
because, as we shall see, both parent and operating company’s responses depend upon 
and interact with one another. By ‘international experience’, we refer specifically to 
familiarity with the rules of behaviour of an Anglo-Saxon system not only because 
French firms are examined in Britain, but also because these rules dominate today’s 
global environment. A company’s ‘strategy’ should be the fruit of the parent’s 
experience and its degree of knowledge of the host environment. Theoretically, those 
elements must be in harmony with one another, that is a company’s strategy should 
be adapted to one’s experience and level of knowledge of the local conditions it faces: 
for example, an aggressive, unilateral strategy by a multinational that has little 
international experience and / or operates in a host context with which it is unfamiliar
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is likely to raise problems in relation to the transfer of management practices. A 
further filter which has to be borne in mind and which is likely to have an impact on 
the approach adopted by the parent towards the operating company is the period at 
which it joined internationalisation, but, whilst reference will be made to it here, the 
effects of this variable will be looked at in greater detail in latter chapters.
The filter ‘host environment’ can itself be divided into several components. 
The first is constituted of the national features of host companies, which have been 
shaped by the host country’s distinctive nation-wide institutional setting. As 
countries differ in their institutional settings and thus managements’ characteristics 
differ, the transfer of practices by a MNC from one environment to another can be 
affected. Features of the British institutional and cultural context are defined in 
Section 5.2.
The second component one needs to assess is local management attitude 
towards multinational management (Szulanski 1996; Kostova 1999). Yet rarely 
acknowledged in the transfer process by the management literature, we see it as an 
important variable in facilitating or preventing French features to become established, 
because, as Kostova (1999) argues, it is management which acts as the ‘bridge’ 
between the parent and the host environment and, having control over key resources, 
ultimately has the power to enforce changes upon the operating company as a whole. 
An important element, which can be considered as a sub-component of local 
management’s attitude is the trust towards the parent company, which contributes to 
definining the quality of the ‘relational context’ between the parent and the operating 
company (Kostova 1999).
The third factor on the operating company’s side likely to exert an influence 
upon the passage of French features is the nature o f  the industry: the literature 
broadly distinguishes between ‘multi-domestic’ sectors, which are strongly attached 
to the local context in which they are situated, from ‘global’ industries (Porter 1986). 
In the former case, local rules and regulations by and large dictate the organisation of
77
The integration of British acquisitions
the industry, whilst the latter are mostly dependent upon the parent for their resources 
and are thus under less pressure to conform to local institutional norms. A parent 
company’s features are thus likely to be affected to varying degrees depending upon 
the nature of the industry it operates in.
An additional element on both the parent’s and the operating company’s sides 
which is likely to affect the passage of the parent features is the level o f advancement 
of each side vis-à-vis the other. A firm’s ‘competitive advantage’ might be situated at 
several levels, for example the firm’s social capital, technical or commercial assets or 
may include more intangible aspects such as a willingness to innovate or to take the 
long-term perspective (Hu 1995). Firms’ competitive advantages are themselves 
shaped by national, sectoral as well as other firm-specific variables (Porter 1990; 
Hollingsworth et al. 1994; Quack and Morgan 2000).
In order to fully appreciate both the parent’s and operating company’s 
relations, a final element that needs to be taken into account is the timing of the 
acquisition which can affect each variable and consequently their actual effects upon 
French features. The temporal dimension of each variable has rarely been touched 
upon in the managerial literature. First, one needs to consider the international 
context within which acquisitions have taken place, in our case the late 1980s where 
national borders were only beginning to open up and cross-border M&As were a new 
phenomenon. The second important time-related elements are the economic cycles o f 
both nations as well as the business cycles o f their firms. In the early 1990s, at the 
heart of the integration process, Britain entered one of its worst recession, whilst 
France’s economic situation was more favourable.
In total, we regard those variables as being key potential influences upon the 
transfer process, whilst retaining a degree of generalisability to allow meaningful 
comparisons to be made across firms. It has to be noted that these variables can be 
analytically separated, though one has to recognise that in practice they are not fully
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independent from one another: for example ‘management receptivity’ or ‘firms’ 
competitive advantages’ are shaped by the host national and sectoral contexts.
The model will enable us to reframe the problematics as set out in the 
literature and allow for a more refined analysis of how multinationals’ nationality 
interacts with host contexts. Firstly, it moves away from the simplified dichotomy 
betweeen ‘adaptators’ and ‘importers’ by throwing light upon firms’ processes of 
adaptation. Secondly, it breaks with the culturalist perspective and the concept of 
‘cultural distance’ which almost invariably led to conclusions of the need for 
adaptation by the multinational firm to the host environment, and did not explain the 
forms and mechanisms of firms’ adaptation to host environments. The model enables 
us to locate both the parent and operating company within their national and sectoral 
institutional environments, and to separate the effects of institutions from economic 
and behavioural factors. Finally, to our knowledge, the application of institutional 
theory to the study of the adaptation of multinationals to host environments, as 
advocated by Westney (1993) and Rosenzweigh and Singh, has so far only been made 
at a theoretical level and / or been tested through surveys, providing little insight into 
how each variable might impact upon the parent features. We will test those 
variables and their effects upon nationality effect through case study techniques.
Through our case studies, we examine French firms’ strategies in a dynamic 
way: French firms’ policies upstream, the ways and extent in which the various 
filters mediate the passage of French features, and the outcomes downstream. The 
independent variables might amplify, moderate or in the extreme bar French features 
from passing through and the results might be on one extreme that French companies 
are able to impose a French approach, and on the other that a British approach may 
dominate, whilst a more hybrid arrangement might be found as a compromise 
between both sides.
Comparing five of our case studies which have gone through widely different 
experiences, will enable us to weigh the impact of these initial conditions upon the
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passage of French features in each case: it will also illustrate what we see as 
commonalities in how French firms respond to the filters encountered, which will be 
interpreted in the following section. The cross-case comparison is also a way of 
considering the problems companies may face when they transfer strategic practices 
to an Anglo-Saxon environment, and point to the factors that can potentially have a 
significant influence and thus should not be underestimated in a process of cross­
national integration.
5.2. The British institutional environment
Britain has followed a radically different economic path as compared with 
France and reformed its system to a market-regulated governance regime at a much 
earlier stage and in more fundamental ways. The British experience in turn has 
evolved out of a distinct institutional pattern characterised by a long tradition of arm’s 
length relations between government and industry, an internationally exposed and 
open economy, the prominence of the financial and business services sector over 
manufacturing, as well as a true commitment of the British political and economic 
elite to free trade and economic liberalism (Hall 1986). Further, the arrival in power 
in 1979 of a Conservative government with an economically liberal ideology, saw a 
systematic programme of privatisation of state-owned firms, deregulation of the 
economy and labour markets, and reduction of public spending, which enabled the 
transformation of the British institutional framework into a highly advanced market- 
based system in the space of fifteen years.
Britain has privatised extensively from the early 1980s onwards including 
entitites such as British Petroleum, British Aerospace, British Airways. The UK was 
one the first countries to carry out deregulatory reforms of its public utilities, first in 
the telecommunications industry in 1984, followed by gas and electricity, water and 
rail. In each sector, three key processes were undertaken: privatisation, the 
introduction of competition, and the setting up of independent administrations with a 
role of regulating the conduct of industries, which replaced government intervention
so
in nationalised industries (Armstrong et al. 1994; Helm and Jenkinson 1998). We 
shall briefly review what liberalisation policies have entailed for the governance of 
industries as well as the behaviour of British firms in two sectors in which French 
firms have been involved, namely telecommunications and water. In the 
telecommunications industry, the national operator BT was privatised in 1984. 
Whilst competition was initially limited with the maintenance of a BT / Mercury 
duopoly, from 1991 onwards, full liberalisation of local networks and international 
services was introduced which led to the entry of many new foreign 
telecommunications groups. The reforms of the telecommunications industry are 
widely regarded as having revived British industry and made the UK one of the most 
competitive and advanced markets in Europe.
The deregulation of the telecommunications industry has, in turn, led to the 
introduction of competition in the British telecommunications equipment industry 
(Cawson et al. 1990; Hulsink 1999). On a global level, as a result of liberalisation of 
telecommunications taking place from the 1980s onwards, the telecommunications 
equipment industry, traditionally organised along national lines in which each main 
telecommunications equipment supplier was dependent upon national operators for 
business, was beginning to consolidate in order to find economies of scale outside 
their borders in order to meet escalating R&D costs. Britain was prompt in adjusting 
its governance regime in recognition of the changes in the international environment. 
The newly privatised British Telecom, under strong imperatives of financial 
profitability, was allowed by the telecommunications regulator, OFTEL, to turn to 
more competitive foreign suppliers over its traditional domestic suppliers STC, GEC 
and Plessey in 1985, illustrating the British government’s priority to promoting 
competition and innovation in the UK over favouring national industry. The British 
telecommunications governance regime thus evolved differently from the French, as a 
result of its radically different statist tradition: at the same time as Alcatel received 
institutionalised support from the French government and France Télécom at home 
and abroad and eventually established itself as a major European telecommunications 
manufacturer, the British telecommunications manufacturing industry was left having
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to adjust to competition by itself and eventually became subject to foreign ownership 
(take-over of GEC / Plessey by Siemens in 1989 and STC by the Canadian Northern 
Telecom in 1990).
Other utilities followed suit, adopting the model introduced in the 
telecommunications sector. The privatisation of water companies was initiated in 
1989 (Armstrong et al. 1994; Cowan 1998). Prior to privatisation, the UK water 
industry was made up of ten large regional water authorities (RWAs), who cumulated 
responsibilities for water supply and sewerage as well as water regulatory functions, 
and twenty-nine small private companies, called statutory water companies (SWCs), 
who co-existed along the RWAs having a regional monopoly for the distribution of 
water. A legacy of Victorian private enterprise, the small SWCs were private 
companies and had escaped the nationalisation of the industry in 1973, although they 
were in fact run like public companies in that they were subject to strict controls by 
the government on their investments, profits and dividends, which they had to 
redistribute in the form of lower charges to the customers. Under the 1989 Water 
Act, the RWAs were privatised but continued to own their networks2; an independent 
regulator, the Office of Water Services (OFWAT), was established with powers to set 
price and quality controls; the SWCs were brought into the same regulatory regime 
as the large water companies.
As a result of privatisation policies, clear-cut liberalisation, the suppression of 
government subsidies as well as the opening up to foreign investors in particular from 
the US and Asia3, British capitalism has been hit by fierce competition and subject to 
a radical and rapid rate of change. The institutional environment has imposed upon 
British firms a logic of improving performance and efficiency as well as customer 
service. British companies have also had to meet the demands of financial investors, 
as they, unlike French firms, have long resorted to the stock market for their 
financing, which has in turn sought high rates of return on capital invested (Lane
2 After privatisation, the RWAs were renamed ‘water and sewerage companies’, and the SWCs 
‘water-only companies’; but for clarity, we will keep referring to them as RWAs and SWCs.
3 In the 1985-1995 year period, Britain received 40% of foreign direct investments directed to Europe.
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\1995b). Whilst the institutional environment has encouraged firms to maximising 
efficient use of their assets, the counter-side has been that long-term industrial 
restructuring has been neglected in segments of British industry (Hutton 1996). Thus 
capital-intensive industries in particular, such as car, building materials or water, have 
suffered from chronic under-investments in their infrastructure.
The relationship between British firms and their employees has also been 
profoundly affected by the changes within the broader political and economic context 
(Edwards et al. 1998). Under the Conservative government’s neo-liberal programme 
of reform, the labour market was radically deregulated, and a systematic anti-union 
campaign was embarked upon which saw the withering away of many of their legal 
rights. Over time, bargaining has shifted from industry to firm level, and British 
unions are widely regarded as having been stripped of their institutional and 
ideological legitimacy, and their role as credible counter-powers in the employment 
relationship significantly undermined (Dickens et al. 1995). They are now regarded 
as acting in a kind of ‘partnership’ with British employers in helping to ensure the 
competitiveness of the firm whilst protecting rights of sections of workers. As a 
result, British employers are operating in a highly permissive social environment 
compared to continental European standards, and, under intense competitive 
pressures, and the influence of foreign firms’ management methods, such as lean 
manufacturing methods from Japan, they have pursued various forms of flexibility as 
well as more direct forms of communication (e.g. Clark and Winchester 1994; Oliver 
and Wilkinson 1992).
Today, the employment relationship is thus largely dictated by the rules of the 
market, and British firms face a more dynamic labour market than on the continent. 
Thus, the deregulation of the labour market has led to the increasing individualisation 
of employment as reflected in the development of contracts and performance-related 
pay (Kessler 1994). As employment protection has been reduced, British firms have 
little institutional and legal constraints in making their employees redundant, but on 
the other hand, practices of poaching employees are widespread in Britain, and, when
The integration of British acquisitions
83
labour markets are tight, employers face strong pressures to retain their key staff. The 
typical British employee especially at managerial level, as a result of having little 
security of employment, of being remunerated and promoted predominantly 
according to his performance, but also because his skills are portable as they are 
validated and recognised by professional bodies, such as the Association of Chartered 
Certified Accountants, tends to be more ambitious and mobile than its typical French 
counterpart, as he identifies with his profession rather than the firm he is working for 
(Child eta/. 1983; CEC 1990).
Given its strong cultural differences with the French system, Britain would 
seem to be a particularly unreceptive environment to French methods and the 
question is how French firms, having no experience of such system, have responded. 
A specific issue that needs addressing is also how French firms react as they pass 
from a highly regulated to a less regulated social environment, and the extent to 
which, as some observers have argued, they would wish to escape the constraints of 
their environments, though it will be examined in chapter 8 for reasons that will 
become clear.
5.3. Characteristics of the modes of entry of French multinationals in the UK
The motivations behind French multinationals’ investments in the UK
As part of the take-off of their investments abroad in the late 1980s which 
took place under the combined effects of deregulatory trends worldwide and 
government-led pressures to start becoming more international, French firms began 
making significant inroads into Britain, a country in which the bulk of them had no 
presence. Table 5 - 1  presents details of French investments in the UK. A first wave 
of investments took place from 1987 onwards, from quasi-inexistent investments in 
1985 (0.9 bn FF); at the peak of French investments, the UK accounted for nearly a 
quarter of the total in 1990, standing at 25.7 bnFF. France was the third most 
speculative investor in the UK with 7% of total FDI stocks, behind the United States
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with 41.4% and the Netherlands, with 13.4%. It then declined from the mid-1990s 
onwards, along with a general slowdown in foreign investments as French firms took 
time out from their investments, partly due to domestic recession. In the latter half of 
the 1990s, as French multinationals stepped up their investments, this time within a 
worldwide context of industry consolidation, the UK again attracted a significant part 
of their investments, a period examined in latter chapters.
Table 5 - 1 :  French investments in the UK, 1987-1998
UK (bnFF) % UK of EU
1987 9.2 32.4
1988 12.6 25.9
1989 14.3 19.8
1990 25.7 25.1
1991 9.6 13.1
1992 8.1 10
1993 6.2 15.5
1994 1.2 4.4
1995 2.7 13.3
1996 8.5 11.2
1997 39 37.8
1998 24.6 23.7
Sources: Bulletins de la Banque de France, Les Flux 
d ’investissements D irects de la France avec l'Etranger. (May 
1998 Nb 53) (June 1999 Nb 66).
OECD International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook, 
1997.
In the economic context of the 1980s, barriers to national markets were still 
high and internationalisation was taking place within national contexts as opposed to 
a global environment. In contrast with US and Japanese firms which accounted for 
40% of cross-border deals in Europe and were intent on building a European 
presence4, internationalisation for French firms was not part of an international 
strategy, and there was a diversity of motives behind each firm’s acquisitive 
operations: thus some of deals were inspired by the ‘1992 effect’ and the prospects of 
a single European market; in other cases, firms responded to developments specific to 
the UK context and aimed to establish a presence whilst other moves were part of a
4 F in a n c ia l  T im e s , ‘Ventures without frontiers’, 18 October 1990.
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broader industry trend. Three main causes for making an acquisition are ‘horizontal 
expansion’ - that is acquiring a competitor, ‘product extension’ and ‘market 
extension’ - which is when the firm seeks to complement its product range or 
penetrate new markets (Sudarsanam 1995).
As the UK was one of the first European countries to engage itself on the path 
to deregulation, the privatisation of its state-owned firms and deregulation of 
monopolistic industries gave French firms the opportunity to establish a presence in 
the country. Thus, the water pipe systems division of Saint Gobain, Pont-a-Mousson, 
acquired Stanton in 1984, which was sold off by the newly privatised British Steel as 
the latter was re-focusing on its core businesses. By acquiring its major competitor 
which was a market leader in the UK and the second largest group in Europe, Saint 
Gobain, itself the world leader, could set foot in the UK market in which previously it 
had no presence. The move of the French group was also indicative of a shifting 
away from a traditional export-led strategy to a strategy of local implementation in 
the countries.
In the telecommunications sector, the submarine division of Alcatel acquired 
STC Submarine Cable in 1992/3. Alcatel, because of the globalisation of its industry 
taking place in the context of deregulation, was strongly internationalised, having 
acquired major poles including the European operations of American ITT. The 
acquisition took place in the context of deregulation of the telecommunications 
market in Britain, resulting, as we saw, in a rationalisation of its telecommunications 
manufacturing industry and ultimately the exit of British-owned telecommunications 
producers. The Canadian group Northern Telecom, who had taken over STC two 
years earlier, sold it as it faced financial difficulties5. By acquiring STC, Alcatel 
aimed at doubling market share and reinforcing its position in the American market.
'  F in a n c ia l T im e s , "Foray leaves buyer poorer but wiser’, 30 July 1993.
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In the water industry, the three major French utility companies, Vivendi 
Water6, Lyonnaise des eaux and Bouygues -  through its water division SAUR - made 
significant investments in the late 1980s as part of the privatisation of the industry. 
As the regional water authorities (RWAs) were hostile to the entry of French water 
companies, it was through the statutory water companies (SWCs) that French firms 
managed to penetrate the market. French managements overcame management 
resistance of SWCs by promising cooperation in industrial management, and were 
aided by the fact that the small SWCs feared losing their independence and being 
taken over by the large RWAs after privatisation. Thus in 1988 and the early part of 
1989 prior to the privatisation of the industry, Vivendi Water, Lyonnaise des Eaux 
and SAUR launched a total of twelve bids for British SWCs. But as they stepped up 
their investments, the British government, under the pressure from the lobbying of the 
RWAs to stop French inroads, enacted legislation which forbade a water company 
already present in Britain to take over a water company without referral to the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission. In addition, at the time of privatisation of the 
RWAs, the government kept a golden share for five years, which prevented any take­
over. Thus, as the market closed upon themselves, French water companies had to 
restrict their investments to the SWCs and were blocked from expanding further. 
Vivendi Water’s planned take-overs of three SWCs in which it already held stakes 
and which it intended to merge to form Three Valleys, was referred to the MMC in 
1990. The merger, the first to be referred, was eventually authorised after a long legal 
procedure and mainly thanks to the support of the British managements.
6 The utility group Vivendi took advantage of the opportunities presented by UK privatisations, 
investing not only in the water industry but energy (acquisition of AHS Emstar), transport (Connex) as 
part of the privatisation of rail companies, telecommunications (Yorkshire Cable Corporation), 
healthcare (BMI Healthcare), waste management (Onyx), consultancy services (Psec) and construction 
(Norwest Holst). All these divisions pursued their international expansion independently from each 
other, as Vivendi was loosely structured through a holding. From having no presence in the UK, the 
British market has become the group’s main market outside France with a turnover of 20bnFF and 
more than 20 000 employees, accounting for around 30% of the group total sales abroad and 10% of 
the group total turnover.
HI
\French water companies were the only foreign investors to take part in the 
1989 privatisation of the industry, and the water industry remained largely untouched 
for the subsequent ten years as the law remained in force7. In 1995, as the 
government sold its golden shares, Lyonnaise des eaux was able to acquire 
Northumbria Regional Water Authority. Today the three French groups together own 
twelve of the twenty-nine SWCs as well as two RWAs, representing nearly a fifth of 
the water supply market, while Lyonnaise des eaux has also a presence in the water 
treatment industry with a market share of around five per cent (cf. Table 5 -  2). We 
studied the integration of Three Valleys, the largest water company owned by 
Vivendi Water, and the seventh largest water supplier in the UK ahead of four 
regional water authorities, with more than 1.000 employees.
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Table 5 - 2 :  French water companies' investments in the UK
VIVENDI WATER LYONNAISE DES EAUX SAUR (BOUYGUES)
Lee Valley“ East Anglian Mid Southern
Rickmansworth3 Newcastle & Gateshead Eastbourne
Colne Valley“ Sunderland & South Shields Mid-Sussex
North Surrey 
Tendring Hundred 
Folkestone 
Bristol 
Mid Kent
South Staffordshire
Bristol
Anglian (RWA) 
Northumbria (RWA)
West Kent
a: The three SWCs were merged in 1990 to form Three Valleys. 
Source. Company reports.
If French multinationals water companies were the only foreign investors in 
the British water market, the reason is to be found in their domestic pattern of 
industrial governance. As explained in chapter 4, whereas in most countries water
7 To justify preventing mergers, the government and OFWAT have since invoked the necessity of 
maintaining a large number of companies to apply ‘yardstick competition’. In 1997, SAUR and 
Vivendi Water attempted to take over Mid Kent Water, but the MMC rejected it on comparative- 
efficiency grounds. The most significant change since privatisation has taken place recently, as the 
German utilities group RWE was allowed to buy the largest UK water authority Thames Water in 
September 2000, thus signalling a change in attitude among the UK industry and the British 
government, in the face of the necessity for British water companies to gain the scale to be able to 
expand abroad in the changed water environment of the 1990s.
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companies were part of the traditional monopoly-based model - even in the US - in 
France, in a marked contrast with the prevailing statist governance regime, water 
companies have always been maintained in the private sector under a regime of 
gestion déléguée, in which the management of water networks was delegated to 
private water companies whilst the infrastructure remained in the hands of 
municipalities. Through their century-old experience as water operators, French 
water companies have gained the scale, an expertise in the design, construction and 
the management of large water projects. Further and perhaps foremost, as they were 
used to fighting to win management contracts to provide water services, they had an 
ingrained entrepreneurial spirit which was a fundamental reason behind their 
international ambitions and their willingness to take risks, first in the UK, and as 
worldwide deregulatory trends have proceeded, internationally. Thus, the pattern of 
industrial governance Vivendi Water and its French counterparts inherited at home, 
has conferred upon them a source of international competitive advantage, which 
water companies from other countries were slow to acquire: one would have to wait 
for more than ten years for British utility firms or newly deregulated European 
companies such as the German utilities RWE, to firmly begin expanding 
internationally and begin developing an operational capability.
Turning now to the construction group Vinci and the retail group Redoute, 
their movement into the UK was partly triggered by developments in the Single 
European market. Vinci, together with other French construction groups (Bouygues, 
Dumez, Spie Batignoles) were traditionally very active à la grande exportation in 
Africa and the Middle East and among the largest international groups, but began re­
deploying their foreign investments away from Africa towards Europe, in response on 
the one hand, to declining demand as a result of the region’s economic situation as 
well as fierce competition from construction companies from emerging countries, and 
on the other hand, the prospects created by the European single market and the 
development of Private Financing Initiatives projects (OECD 1995). As an 
opportunity arose in the UK with the civil engineer Norwest Holst, whose 
management was looking for a financial partnership and to gain access to the
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European market, Vinci bought the majority of the firm’s capital in 1989 and the 
remainder in 1992.
The mail-order group Redoute acquired Empire Stores in 1991, one of the 
largest five mail-order companies in Britain behind Grattan, Littlewoods, GUS and 
Freemans. The acquisition was aimed at penetrating the UK market, and was partly 
driven by the creation of the single European market in 1992 which opened up the 
prospects of elimination of trade barriers. Whilst the retail industry at the time was 
not internationalised at all, the mail-order business was regarded as a segment of the 
retail sector where economies of scale could be achieved in procurement and 
distribution. The move of La Redoute was finally accelerated by the entry of its 
German competitor Otto Versand in the UK market who acquired Grattan. Table 5 -  
2 summarises key characteristics of French firms’ UK acquisitions that will be 
examined in this chapter.
Table 5 -3 : Presentation of UK acquisitions
Year Acquiror UK Target Sector UK 
rank“
Nb
bemp
1984 Saint Gobain 
(Pont-à-Mousson)
Stanton Water
pipe systems
1 2.500
1989 Vinci Norwest Holst 
(52%)
Construction - 2.000
1990 Vivendi Water Three Valleys Water distribution 7 l.(XX)
1991 PPR (La Redoute) Empire Stores Mail order 5 2.500
1992 Alcatel (ASN) STC Telecommunica­
tions submarine 
cables
1 1.500
4 Ranking vis-à-vis major competitors in terms of market share.
b Staff numbers are approximative. As these are the figures at the time companies were acquired, 
going back over ten years, it was difficult to obtain exact figures from companies.
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The integration of British acquisitions
During the 1980s, French multinationals expanded abroad mainly through 
acquisitions. Two thirds of total growth was achieved through mergers and 
acquisitions between 1985 and 1988 and three quarters in the period 1988-1992 (Sally 
1996). In the UK specifically, our findings show that French multinationals have 
entered the market mainly by acquiring existing companies. This contrasts with the 
internationalisation pattern of Japanese firms, which in the same market, have opted 
for organic growth, or American firms who are known to rely on a diversity of entry 
modes from acquisitions, to alliances through to organic growth. Several factors 
account for the asset-acquiring investment strategy pursued by French firms, some 
linked to their nationality as well as the specific nature of the UK market.
The highly competitive nature, as well as maturity, of the UK market has 
influenced their choice of means of entry. In some sectors, French companies had 
little choice but to proceed through acquisitions. In the home-shopping sector for 
example, the market was dominated by the ‘big five’, and La Redoute made 
unsuccessful attempts to enter the UK by its own means in the late 1980s, before 
opting for the take-over route. Other French retailers, such as Carrefour, also sought 
unsuccessfully to penetrate the British market in the late 1980s, whereas they 
succeeded in the less mature markets of Southern Europe8.
However, factors related to the UK market alone, do not explain French firms’ 
pattern of internationalisation, as multinationals of other nationalities have managed 
to enter the UK market through other ways. Organic growth is a high-risk start-up 
strategy which requires both strategic and financial muscle, as well as the availability 
of resources and capabilities to compete effectively in the host market (Sudarsanam 
1995). From the start, Japanese implementation of manufacturing operations in the 
US and subsequently in Europe aimed to circumvent trade barriers in order to secure 
bridgeheads in the US and the European marketplace (Dunning 1994; Sachwald
8 F inancia l T im es, ‘France's new foreign legion’, 27 November 1995.
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1995). For French multinationals however, the stakes were different as the UK was 
simply a European market as opposed to a gate to the European market, and thus 
growing organically was a risk they might not have felt worth taking.
Further, French firms lacked experience of the UK marketplace and 
knowledge as to how to proceed to enter it, which in the face of competitive market 
conditions, has acted as a deterrent to ‘going it alone’. The building group materials 
Saint Gobain, who had no presence in the UK prior to the mid-1980s, first proceeded 
through acquisitions in the UK but, as its presence grew and reached more than 26 
firms and 10.000 employees by the late 1990s, its glass division announced the 
building of a manufacturing unit in 1997, reflecting that through its greater 
experience of the UK market it was confident enough to build a manufacturing unit. 
Thus, a lack of strategic muscle together with a lack of international maturity in the 
face of a highly competitive marketplace have combined to explain French firms’ 
pattern of entry.
A cautious approach to entering the UK market
Many French firms started by taking partial stakes in British firms, reflecting 
a cautious approach to international expansion. Vinci bought 52% of Norwest Holst 
in 1989, whilst La Redoute acquired 26% of Empire Stores the same year. In 
addition, during this period mergers and acquisitions for the most part have been 
completed by consensus rather than through hostile take-overs. In 1985, Acquisitions 
Monthly recorded that out of the 22 bids for UK companies launched by French firms, 
18 were successful and all were recommended whilst three out of four hostile bids 
failed. Hostile approaches were rare and the bulk of each was defeated as French 
firms were inexperienced to the sophisticated public financial markets. One of the 
very few contested bids to be won in this period was the take-over by La Redoute of 
Empire Stores in 19929.
v Acquisitions M onthly, ‘The cross-channel delivery’, October 1991, pp. 30-31.
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Further, their pattern of development suggests that French companies were not 
driven by financial considerations but rather sought to set a foot in the market and 
seize opportunities in order to gain an international experience. Their stake- 
investments in UK companies was of a wait-and-see kind.
The examination of the course of events that led to the establishment of 
Vivendi Water in the UK illustrates in more detail the then vision of French 
management. Vivendi Water adopted a low-key approach as it entered the UK 
market and slowly developed its approach over time. As the British government 
announced its intentions to privatise and deregulate the water industry in the mid- 
1980s, senior managements from Vivendi Water were given the remit to investigate 
possibilities of investment in the market. As they were unfamiliar with the UK 
market, the group having no operations in the UK, senior managers spent more than a 
year making contacts throughout the British water industry in order to get acquainted 
with the system, and eventually decided to invest in the SWCs in the face of RWAs’ 
opposition. The company began timidly, by buying minority stakes in the water 
companies, and systematically consulted with the companies before investing, as one 
of the French senior managers explains:
‘Initially, we did not judge feasible to mount a full take-over. We were not 
used to making acquisitions in France, take-overs are familiar nowadays, but 
at the time it was not the case. And we also feared that a brutal approach 
might trigger off hostile reactions. (...) The very first investments we made 
(in the UK), we were entirely in the dark, we only had a hazy idea of where 
we were heading. I remember sarcastic notes (circulating in the management 
team) ‘it will never make any money this thing, but carry on a little, we shall 
see’. It was entirely based on feeling.’
Thus, behind managements’ step-by-step approach, lied a lack of experience 
of carrying out take-overs, mixed with an apprehension of operating in a foreign 
environment they did not know. This manager also points to a certain skepticism 
among French executives regarding the viability of a pan-European expansion which 
we found to be characteristic among top French managements in our other case 
studies, and which goes some ways towards explaining the slow approach of French 
firms at the time.
93
T h e  integration of British acquisitions
It is thanks to Lyonnaise des eaux, which broke a taboo by launching an 
immediate take-over bid of Essex Water in 1988 (though after having secured the 
management’s consent), that Vivendi Water was persuaded to move from a stake­
holding position to a full blown take-over. Lyonnaise’s blunt move was in fact the 
result of a U-turn in its initial intentions of waiting for the privatisation of the large 
RWAs rather than investing in the SWCs unlike its counterparts Vivendi Water and 
SAUR, as it later realised that the soon-to-be-privatised RWAs would oppose French 
involvement.
Like Vivendi Water, all companies eventually moved to take full control of 
the companies. They realised that partial ownership yielded little benefits in the 
Anglo-Saxon world, as it did not enable them to weigh significantly upon strategic 
decisions and in some instances power-sharing with other shareholders led to 
disputes. Vivendi Water management was confined to a passive role in the 
management of the SWCs. The shareholder’s agreement the construction group 
Vinci entered with the managers of Norwest Holst, left it with limited authority even 
though it was a majority shareholder and British management retained a significant 
autonomy on the day-to-day management, giving French managements little 
influence upon operations. Three years later, in 1992, Vinci management bought 
back the remainder of the shares. Similarly, La Redoute who initially took a 26% 
stake in Empire Stores had strong disagreements over strategy with the two other 
main shareholders British GUS and an Italian retail company which, as events 
accelerated in the UK home-shopping market with the entry of Otto Versand, 
eventually led La Redoute to launch a bid in 1992.
Conclusion
One can thus speak of an internationalisation by progressive stages for French 
multinationals. Their lack of experience of internationalisation, together with the lack 
of centrality of internationalisation in the overall economic context of the 1980s, help 
explain that French firms began internationalising timidly and slowly. Their
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internationalisation was not driven by a reasoning of building a global presence as is 
the case today: French firms of the 1980s were clearly looking to the long-term, but 
were opportunistic more than strategic, as reflected in the lack of coherence behind 
their pattern of international expansion. Vivendi Water responded to the deregulation 
of the UK market and was looking to gain some international experience. The move 
of La Redoute to take over Empire Stores in 1992 was motivated by the entry of its 
German competitor Otto Versand in the UK who bought another home-shopping 
retailer, Grattan. Vinci wanted to set foot in the market and seized the opportunities it 
found in the UK market.
5.4. Case studies: processes of adaptation to the UK market
This section examines how French firms have approached the integration of 
their British operations, pointing to initial conditions that have influenced the 
outcome of the integration in each case and the extent to which French features have 
ultimately been exported. As the French companies of the 1980s entered the UK 
market with a variety of motivations and little international experience, this has had 
a profound influence upon the way the integration process has evolved. Because they 
had no mode of integration to follow, they were unable to anticipate initial conditions 
that were thrown at them and thus have had to deal with them as they went along. As 
a result, firms proceeded very progressively, through trial and error, and the process 
of integration of their acquisitions was slow and hazardous.
However, a common feature across French firms has been their willingness to 
retain their identity, as they have tried to duplicate their approach or, more precisely 
in the bulk of cases, to establish a means of control over the operation. In the face of 
their lack of experience of the UK environment and the resulting strong impact of 
initial conditions, there are varying degrees to which each firm has ultimately 
managed to export elements of its system. The eventual outcomes of French firms’ 
strategies are summarised in figure 5 - 2 ,  which is adapted from Rosenzweig and
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Singh's model (1991) and depicts the two conflicting pressures for consistency with 
the multinational and those for ‘isomorphism’ with the host environment.
In the case of Saint Gobain one can speak of an ‘exportative strategy’, whilst 
the arrangements found in Vinci and La Redoute can be characterised as ‘controlled 
autonomy’. Vivendi Water and Alcatel have yet adopted a different approach which 
could be characterised as an ‘adaptative strategy’.
Figure 5 -2 : French multinationals' modes of adaptation to the UK environment 1
1. Saint Gobain and Stanton
After the take-over by Saint Gobain of Stanton, the group from the outset took 
Firm control over the operating company, sending a French General Manager together 
with a Finance director to head the operation. In the first few years however, the 
process of integration remained very gradual and slow and there was some floating 
time before some strategy was drawn with regard to the role of the British subsidiary 
within the group and any investment decisions made. A restructuring process was 
eventually decided at headquarters aimed at improving the efficiency of Stanton and
High Controlled autonomy Adaptative strategy
(Vinci, La Redoute) (Vivendi Water, Alcatel)
Pressure for 
isomorphism 
with the local 
environment
Exportative strategy
Low
(Saint Gobain)
Low High
Pressure for consistency 
with the MNC
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in particular modernising factories’ production capacity, as the British firm’s 
competitiveness was found to be significantly lagging behind other parts of the group, 
as a result of years of under-investment under the ownership of British Steel10. This 
was symptomatic of the ills of the British manufacturing industry described above.
As part of the restructuring, Saint Gobain proceeded to implement the group 
management systems within the UK operating company. The first element the parent 
focused upon were financial management and reporting systems. In France, the 
parent’s management systems and procedures were characterised by a high degree of 
centralisation and detailed level of reporting. The financial and cost-management 
systems, which analysed in a great amount of detail plant performance, were 
implemented within each single factory within the UK. Under the parent system, 
issues of budgets, and follow up of plant performance were no longer the direct 
responsibility of UK plant managers alone, but the corporate finance function in the 
UK who had detailed knowledge of plant performance. The parent corporate 
management systems were implemented in their entirety, giving Saint Gobain 
management at headquarters full knowledge and control over Stanton’s operations.
At operational level, one of the major changes undertaken in the production 
function by Saint Gobain was the merger of technical and production departments: 
the philosophy behind the move was to exert greater control over capital expenditure 
decisions and implementation of investments projects. Saint Gobain had found 
British general management little involved in the definition of the content of major 
capital expenditure decisions, their role consisting mainly of validating decisions, a 
characteristic which, as we shall see in the other case studies, turns out to be a 
widespread feature in British industry. Typically in the British firm, technically 
related strategic decisions were under the responsibility of the production director, 
who himself extensively relied on external technical consultants. This was in marked 
contrast to the French mode of internal governance, where as key decision-makers 
were engineers by background and the production function was still central to the
10 ‘A Will of Iron’, Business Matters, BBC2, 23 July 1992.
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organisation, the decision-making process over technological choices as well the 
technical expertise was strongly retained within the firm and was seen as a priority 
task of top management, as we saw in Chapter 4. In order to put in place the changes, 
Saint Gobain sent French engineers, to oversee the start-up and installation of major 
investments programs. The move thus enabled Saint Gobain management to be 
closely involved at technical level, thereby enabling it to duplicate its domestic 
technological approach.
The process of overhauling Stanton’s manufacturing capability took a total of 
five years including around two years of making major capital expenditure decisions 
and around three years of implementation. By the mid-1990s, under the combined 
effects of strong investments, a reduction in headcount of 50%, a rationalisation of 
the factories into very lean units specialised by product lines, as well as the adoption 
of flexible working arrangements, Stanton had achieved a 50% productivity increase 
and surpassed the productivity of other operations in the group.
Because of very weak filters on the side of the UK operating company, Saint 
Gobain faced few obstacles from the host organisation to implement corporate 
management systems, and as a result made very few concessions. Firstly, the 
‘industry’ filter weighed little in the balance of power between the parent and Stanton 
because the industry is global and functions in an integrated fashion, as production 
processes are standardised. The UK operating company is mainly dependent upon 
the parent for its strategy and resources rather than being oriented towards its local 
market.
In addition, the UK operating company was at a technical competitive 
disadvantage vis-à-vis the parent, as Saint Gobain, maintaining close links with the 
French state until its privatisation in 1986 and even after, had benefited from long­
term investments. Saint Gobain thus found it easier to transfer its approach, as it was 
highly beneficial to the local company.
<>8
A significant filter that also facilitated the process was the flexibility and 
capacity of change of Stanton management, who made many efforts to implement 
successfully the restructuring process. Saint Gobain benefited from the support of the 
then British CEO, a francophile, who had supported the bid by Saint-Gobain against 
British Biwater as he saw a long-term future for Stanton within the French group.
At lower managerial level, there is evidence that French managers faced 
resistance from British managements: in our view, this was partly linked to the 
strategic hesitations of the French group in the early stages of the process creating a 
vacuum at operational level, and also the clashes of culture given Saint Gobain’s 
strong identity. This may have delayed, but not did significantly hamper the process 
of transformation affecting Stanton.
It is indeed clear that an important factor behind British management’s drive 
to succeed was that the outcome of the change process would decide the future role of 
Stanton within the group. As mentioned above, the UK operation and its sister 
manufacturing units served both their national and export markets and competed for 
orders with each other. British managements feared Stanton would become a plain 
assembly plant after the take-over. Thus, the threat of the carrot and the stick was 
powerful enough for them to comply with parent requirements. The literature has 
emphasised the strong bargaining hand of the centre in integrated multinational firms 
(Lucio et al. 1994). Kostova (1999), drawing on resource dependency theories 
(Meyer & Rowan 1977; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), interprets as follows the attitude 
of the operating companies:
'(...) under such conditions of dependency and intraorganizational 
competition, a recipient unit will try to become internally legitimate with the 
parent company and the corporate headquarters and will try to gain their 
favourable judgements. Becoming isomorphic with the parent company (....) 
will be one of the strategies subsidiaries could use to achieve intra­
organizational legitimacy. Complying with the requests of headquarters is 
also a strategy that will be viewed positively by the headquarters, and which 
could consequently increase the degree to which the unit is perceived as 
cooperative and committed to the organization’. (Kostova 1999: 319)
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In conclusion therefore, the pressures upon Stanton for consistency with the 
parent’s modes of functioning clearly outweighed those to adapt to the institutional 
demands of the local environment. In the absence of constraining filters, Saint 
Gobain was able to duplicate its approach. Its financial systems, production approach 
were implemented in their entirety, without significant adaptation to the local host 
environment.
2. Vivendi Water and Three Valleys
Compared with Saint Gobain, the French water company was confronted with 
a very different kind of industry, which acted as an obstacle upon the parent’s initial 
strategy of taking control of its newly acquired British operation. The water industry 
is a multi-domestic industry, whose organisation in the UK is dictated by a regulatory 
framework, which as mentioned above, was set up in 1989 as part of the privatisation 
of the industry. Price-setting - subject to the RPI+K formula11 - and quality controls 
are the responsibility of the water regulator OFWAT and a string of other public 
bodies. As the monopoly of water services is difficult to break given the nature of the 
water industry, pressures for greater efficiency upon water companies have been 
applied by OFWAT, instead of competition, through what is known as ‘yardstick 
competition’: that is, through using comparative information on a wide range of 
indicators, and forcing companies to align themselves with the most efficient firms. 
OFWAT’s involvement in the strategy of the water companies takes the form in 
particular of an ‘Asset Management Plan’, which involves a thorough review of the 
companies’ operations every five years, out of which decisions are being made 
between the regulator and water companies, regarding investment plans and the 
setting of the K company-specific number. Thus, the overall sectoral setting within *
" Water companies are allowed to raise prices each year by RPI+K, where RPI stands for the 
percentage increase in the retail price index and K is a company-specific number. The K factor reflects 
increases in the costs of meeting quality obligations and the scope for operating cost efficiency 
(Armstrong et al. 1994). Until the late 1990s, in contrast with other utilities, water prices were allowed 
to rise to allow for the massive investments required to catch up under years of investments, as, being 
in the public sector, the water companies had been subjected to strong budgetary constraints.
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which British water companies are embedded, strongly limits their room for 
manoeuvre for setting their strategies.
Vivendi Water has thus had to contend with a highly restricting filter. As we 
saw, from an early stage, the company being unfamiliar with the UK setting and 
realising the strong cultural differences between both countries, proceeded very 
carefully in approaching the British water companies. Once it acquired Three Valleys 
however, it undertook to take control over the operation, but as the ‘industry’ filter 
stood in the way, the group decided to establish a small structure within the UK, 
General Utilities (GU), to ensure the management and control of the water 
companies. In addition, it grouped the technical resources of the UK water 
companies into a single structure, General Utilities Projects (GUP), which was 
responsible for technical design, screening major capital expenditure decisions as 
well as overseeing their implementation, whilst water companies were left with the 
operational responsibility of running the water networks. It placed French expatriate 
managers as heads of both those structures. By doing so, French managements had 
thus developed two arms of influence (Figure 5 -  2): through GU it controlled key 
decision-making processes at strategic level and through GUP, it was able to involve 
itself in operational matters.
Figure 5 -3 : The organisation structure of Vivendi Water in the UK
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One of the reasons behind the creation of GUP was indeed similar to Saint 
Gobain, that is gaining greater control over capital expenditure and major 
technological decisions than was the case in the British system, thereby making up for 
what was seen by French engineers as shortcomings in the production life of the 
British firm. In addition, as heavy investments were being launched by Vivendi 
Water following the first regulatory review in 1990 to meet government requirements 
to modernise the networks, centralising the technical function enabled Vivendi Water 
to create synergies and steer water companies in the same direction. GUP was 
constituted by taking British engineers from the water companies, a French engineer 
was appointed to start up the function whilst other engineers were regularly sent to 
GUP. The process of establishing GUP and developing an in-house expertise in the 
key technical fields of water took over three years. The group was able to transfer its 
technical competitive advantage and expertise in particular in the domains of water 
meters, commonly applied in France but very rare in the UK and now progressively 
implemented to respond to problems of pricing raised by the new regulation12; in 
waste-water treatment, pipework installation and rehabilitation. Through GUP, 
Vivendi Water was thus able to impose its French operational vision upon the 
operating company.
In transforming the British operation, Vivendi Water also benefited from 
favourable initial conditions, which contributed to smoothing the process of 
integration. The SWCs it acquired were rigorously managed and financially healthy. 
French managements also found at senior levels an open-minded British 
management, a legacy of the long tradition of international financial involvement of 
British water industry abroad and its pre-eminence in the 19th century, and who was 
thus receptive to French managements’ perspective13. In addition, water companies 
were pre-disposed to change, firstly because of the profound changes which were 
underway in the industry as the new governance regime was established. Secondly,
12 Households in the UK are charged according to the rateable values of their properties (Armstrong et 
al. 1994)
13 Vivendi Water, which we recall was a private firm, was partly funded by British capital in 1853 
(interview notes).
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the UK water industry, in contrast with the French water companies which as we saw 
emerged from a market-led sectoral governance regime, had always evolved within a 
public model of governance under which it had remained fragmented, sheltered and 
long under-invested. As a result, the British water companies were relatively less 
advanced than their French counterparts in particular from a financial and technical 
point of view, and thus saw benefits in tapping French management expertise as a 
water operator. This overall context provided French managements with the 
opportunity to have a significant influence upon British operations.
Two restructuring operations were carried out aimed at improving the 
efficiency of the company. Both were imposed by OFWAT, the first were part of the 
conditions attached to the clearing of the Three Valleys merger; the second took place 
following the 1994/5 regulatory review. Interestingly, in the second restructuring, the 
company was re-organised in small geographic areas along the lines of the French 
model, though the idea of re-organising the firm did not come about as a result of any 
corporate policy but emerged within the UK between British and French engineers.
In conclusion, whilst in the early stages Vivendi Water adopted a cautious 
approach to the SWCs, it subsequently took fairly rapid control of the operations, but 
in contrast with the heavy-handed approach of Saint Gobain, it took control in two 
stages, as, faced with high pressures for local isomorphism arising from the industry 
it was operating in, it was forced first to adapt its structure to the local market. Thus, 
whereas in pipe systems manufacturing the sectoral variable was not constraining and 
Saint Gobain was able to impose its model, here the sector’s influence was more 
prominent. However, the French utility company found an ingenious compromise 
between the need to fit the requirements of the sector locally and its desire for 
controlling the operation. By establishing decision-making structures within the 
country, Vivendi Water management gained proximity to the sector that enabled it to 
understand the specificities of the UK water industry and, as a result make informed 
decisions. Within the UK, the company subsequently duplicated its approach upon 
the operating company, and thus a French approach has overriden the British method.
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Thus, whilst at first French features were muted, they subsequently re-appeared in the 
host environment.
3. Vinci and Norwest Holst
Two phases can be identified in the integration of Norwest Holst. From 1989 
to 1992, the parent began by buying the majority of capital in Norwest Holst (52%) 
with the intention to co-manage with the British incumbents of the company. Like 
other French firms, it was unfamiliar with the UK environment and thus began 
cautiously. However, during this period, Vinci was left with limited influence over 
the operations of Norwest Holst by the British management team, and Vinci bought 
back the remaider of the shares in 1992 and subsequently appointed a new British 
CEO. As Vinci began to assess the situation, it found Norwest Holst in a critical 
situation, as it uncovered problems of wrong valuations of assets as well as an 
extremely complex and opaque structure of many construction companies each 
having a considerable degree of autonomy. The industry is particularly prone to this 
kind of risk for construction companies have few fixed assets and their value lies in 
the ability to secure its contracts, but it also revealed the dangers of lacking either a 
strategy or a pre-acquisition study when setting foot in the UK market. As a French 
senior manager of Vinci recalls:
‘Evolving in an Anglo-Saxon environment very sophisticated from the legal 
perspective, we had not realised the dangers in negotiating the take-over, for 
it requires such a knowledge and culture to be able to evolve in this type of 
environment. (...) we were crushed by the legal Anglo-Saxon environment’.
Vinci undertook a drastic restructuring of the company which was to last over 
four years, in which tens of companies were closed, and the organisation structure 
streamlined. After the restructuring, the parent was confronted with a problem since 
the British company was still losing money as some building sites were persistently 
overrunning on cost and time. Puzzled by the continuing problems of Norwest Holst, 
the parent sought to gain control over day-to-day operations, but was confronted by
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an industry where pressures upon the British company for local isomorphism were 
high.
In the British contractual system, design and construction are separated, unlike 
the continental model where the contractor is responsible for the building process 
from beginning to end (Hillebrandt 1988). Thus in Britain, the design as well as the 
monitoring of the construction process are in the hands of a ‘design team’ appointed 
by the client, whilst the contractor’s role is restricted to the execution of the building 
work. Central to the British contractual system is what is called the ‘claim’, whereby 
the client engages itself on the product to be built but not on the actual price, in 
contrast with the continental model whereby the bill of quantities is fixed from the 
outset and it is the contractors who absorb all the costs and risks involved. As the 
cost is entirely borne by the client, parties involved have little incentive to cooperate 
or to share the costs and risks involved, by seeking to manage more effectively the 
building process. One thus sees frequent and wide variations between initial and final 
costs on a building contract, and claims are settled between client and contractors 
through negotiations and often go to arbitration14.
As a result of the broader differences in the contractual system and structure 
of the industry in each country, the role of building managers, who are in charge of a 
construction project on building sites and are thus key actors in the construction 
process, tends to vary greatly between both countries. Whilst French contractors 
manage the process from design to construction and thus have broader 
responsibilities, British contractors are largely implementers and follow instructions 
from designers however high the costs or difficulties they might entail. Further, a 
strong specificity of the British construction scene which contrasts with the French
60% of the industry projects overrun significantly on timescale and costs. It is estimated that 
between 9% and 12% of management time is spent on commercial and contractual work, and as 
recently as 1996, construction firms were spending 7% of their turnover on conflict and making profits 
of just 1%; the Government has long been concerned at the industry’s working practices, and made 
several attempts to reform the system but unsucessfully (Financial Times, ‘Share ‘pain and gain' on 
road to enlightment’, 14 September 1999). The nature of the contract in the US system also separates 
design from construction, but in contrast variations from the initial quantity of bills are penalised, 
thereby preventing some of the excesses of the British system (Hillebrandt 1988).
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system - itself the result of the centrality of the claim, is that the management of costs 
on building sites is not under the responsibility of building managers, but the 
responsibility of ‘quantity surveyors’, highly qualified accountants and lawyers, who 
are in turn responsible for establishing the claims for increased costs to clients.
Vinci, accustomed to the continental model, was unfamiliar with the workings 
of the British system and had difficulties comprehending it, in particular, the little 
weight of building managers in heading construction projects. Management initially 
attempted to gain a means of control and transparency over Norwest Holst through 
two ways. At corporate level, it sought to implement management and reporting 
systems and, at operational level, to provide British building site managers similar 
cost-management tools as in France, thereby trying to transfer its continental vision of 
the organisation of the industry and in particular of the pivotal role of building site 
managers.
In doing so, Vinci faced obstacles as Norwest Holst was under strong 
pressures from its local environment to comply with local customs and practices. On 
the ground, French expatriate managers met strong centripetal forces in seeking to 
change building managers’ working practices, arising from the resistance of quantity 
surveyors and the construction industry at large who have interests in maintaining the 
system, and their resulting inhibiting effects upon building managers. Implementing 
French reporting systems and management systems for British contractors proved 
impossible because of the vast differences between British and French contractual 
models.
An additional strong obstacle faced by the parent was the reluctance of British 
managements to cooperate with the parent. In spite of the change in key members of 
the local management team, a strong climate of suspicion reigned on both sides in a 
difficult financial context and, as the parent was still wary from its experience with 
the previous management team in which it had put its trust at its expense. Several 
expatriate managers sent on specific missions were rejected by the British
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management structure, but as they lacked an understanding of the intricate workings 
of the industry in order to be able to act in a management role, expatriate managers 
and corporate managements had little bargaining leverage. In Vinci more than any 
other of our case-study firms, local management cooperation weighed significantly in 
the relationship with the centre, for as the parent could not establish a means of 
control over the operation, it was entirely dependent upon the goodwill of local 
management to be open and transparent. Whilst the openness to change of British 
management had been a key ingredient in the successful change process in many of 
our case study firms, here local management’s attitude turned out to be a handicap.
The French parent in seeking to transfer its systems thus suffered significant 
setbacks in the face of the strength of pressures for local isomorphism, and was 
forced to retreat and leave local management teams with full autonomy. British 
building site managers’ role and behaviour was part of a much wider institutional 
structure, which had its own rules and regulations, in which each party (architects, 
other contractors and quantity surveyors) had a specific role and interacted strongly 
with the other in highly complex, formal and informal ways. As a French manager 
explains, the move reflected a greater tolerance from the parent for the specificities of 
the UK sector and an admission that it had to change its approach:
‘The acknowledgement of the impossibility of harmonising information and 
reporting systems, essentially because of cultural differences, was an 
important step in the relationship between France and Britain. At last,
France was recognising that Britain was different, but that what the British 
were doing was not stupid. And it enabled the British to say ‘at last they 
respect what we are doing’.’
After several failed attempts, Vinci was nonetheless able to transplant three 
expatriate managers into the system, at corporate level and at operational level, who, 
although they did not have control over the operation were able to provide the parent 
with a day-to-day understanding of how operations were evolving and of the financial 
state of Norwest Hoist, whilst strict capital expenditure approval guidelines were set. 
Further, French management, through sustained efforts of convincing senior British
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\management and the presence of engineer expatriate, has been able to introduce some 
modifications to the information systems building managers use, so as to make them 
concrete and accessible to them as opposed to only quantity surveyors. The exercise, 
according to French and British management alike, made some progress in instilling a 
greater sense of ownership in the organisation and cost-management of the 
construction process, and was aided by the introduction of a new type of contract in 
the UK industry closer to the continental model, under which contractors are involved 
at an earlier stage in the design process so as to encourage all parties to work in a 
more integrated fashion.
In conclusion, the lack of experience of the UK market of Vinci, together with 
the highly local nature of the construction industry has meant that the process of 
establishing a means of control upon Norwest Holst has taken place through a great 
deal of trial and error, and a much more laborious process than in the case of Saint 
Gobain and Vivendi Water. First opting for a cautious approach in line with its 
limited experience of the UK market, the approach eventually failed as the then 
Norwest Holst management team turned to be uncooperative with Vinci, which also 
revealed French managements’ lack of a clearly defined strategy when taking over 
Norwest Holst.
When taking back control, Vinci attempted to put in place its management 
tools and methods upon the British operation, but was eventually defeated by the 
nature of its industry and has had to remain humble in the face of the customs and 
culture of the local environment. In this case, the sector variable acted as the main 
filter upon French features eventually preventing them from filtering through. 
Though some minor improvements have been achieved in terms of bringing in a 
French view of operations management and responsibilise building managers, one 
can not speak of a transformation of British working methods a la Saint Gobain.
The outcome of the integration process was thus that Norwest Holst was 
operating with full autonomy within the parent’s trust. As managers on both sides
urn
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had gradually learnt to work and understand one another over the years, and Norwest 
Holst’s financial situation markedly improved under the combined effects of the 
drastic restructuring and the UK economic recovery, trust had gradually been gained. 
In addition, relying on three expatriate managers enabled the parent to have some 
visibility over the operation. However, trust remained precarious and the parent 
constantly feared returning to an opacity.
The comparison with Vivendi Water’s experience points to a further 
distinction as to how multi-domestic sectors may affect the transfer of management 
practices. The water sector is regulated through market mechanisms and thus lends 
itself to clarity and predictability, but the construction industry, being based on 
customs, informal and complex networks with many parties, is much more difficult to 
penetrate and control. The construction sector remains an exceptional case due to the 
extremely high pressures for local isomorphism it imposes on companies as compared 
with other multi-domestic industries. The difference in the nature of both industries 
dictated different methods of accommodation in order to meet the requirements of 
their industry: Vivendi Water was ultimately able to find a control arrangement, 
while the mode of internal governance of Vinci was working but remained inherently 
unstable.
4. La Redoute and Empire Stores
Group Redoute had no clearly defined international strategy as it set foot in 
the UK; this was at a time the retail industry was still little internationalised. An 
earlier attempt by the group to launch two of its home-shopping catalogue brands 
through its own means had seen one failure, whilst the other made a cautious and 
sluggish start, partly hampered by the parent’s lack of belief in the UK market.
The pressures for local isomorphism are high in the home-shopping retail 
business, as mail order shopping meets very different customer needs across 
countries, in turn dictating different product strategies. Thus in the UK, for a
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complex set of historic and social reasons, mail order shopping was largely confined 
to customers at the lower end of the income range, whereas in Latin countries such as 
France and Southern Europe, home-shopping was relatively less developed and more 
a commodity than a necessity as it was targeted at a much broader and 
undifferentiated customer base15. A strong specificity of the traditional UK mail 
order scene was the distribution methods companies used, which were based on what 
is known as ‘agency sales’ whose principle is the sale of goods through a large 
number of individuals acting as agents, who take orders from a small circle of 
neighbours. French mail order companies relied on distribution methods through 
direct sales, where catalogues are distributed to potential customers, with orders being 
returned by them directly to the company. Since the late 1980s however, in order to 
respond to the decline of the traditional home shopping market, the UK mail order 
companies were shifting their strategies increasingly along the lines of the 
Continental model, in the hope of widening their customer base. The competition in 
the UK market was also much fiercer than in France, with five major home-shopping 
retailers (GUS, Grattan, Littlewoods, Freeman in addition to Empire Stores) 
dominating the market as compared with two in France (La Redoute and Les Trois 
Suisses) owning between them more than ten different catalogue brands. Against this 
background, British companies strategies were highly developed on the service side, 
and operated a higher segmentation of the customer markets than on the continent. 
One of key sales drivers was free long-term credit, which was the principle attraction 
for customers using mail order shopping, whereas in continental home shopping, free 
credit of this kind was non existent.
Following its early unsuccessful attempts at penetrating the UK market, La 
Redoute had proceeded cautiously by taking partial stakes in Empire Stores before 
taking full control. Similarly, after having taken over Empire Stores, La Redoute 
adopted a prudent, hands-off approach to the process of integration. At the time of 
the take-over, Empire Stores was losing money, hit by the early 1990s’ British 
economic recession and more fundamental problems of competitiveness, the result of
ls Acquisitions M onthly, ‘The Cross-Channel Delivery’. October 1991, pp. 30-1.
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Vyears of under-investments in management systems and distribution systems, as a 
result of a short-term management approach as the company was public prior to the 
take-over and thus under pressures from the stock market. French managements 
agreed to a three year restructuring plan, but the design and implementation of the 
plan was by and large left to the discretion of British management. Only one 
expatriate general manager was sent by the parent to lead the restructuring, and was 
parachuted in the UK with little group infrastructural backing other than financial.
Key elements of the restructuring involved large investments to overhaul the 
company’s financial and customer management systems, and distribution logistics, as 
well as a drastic reduction in headcount of around 25%. Within less than two years, 
the company was breaking even. Although the French parent was concerned about 
Empire Stores practices of granting long-term free credit to customers, from the 
outset it bowed to the specificities of the UK industry and maintained a British 
approach. Thus, the British management team launched two of La Redoute 
catalogues using British marketing techniques, namely free credit and other 
marketing practices widespread in the UK such as call centres and free returns. The 
launch proved highly successful, partly because of the product quality of the parent, 
as well as local management’s ability to position the French brands in the rapidly 
expanding segment of the mail order business based on direct sales techniques and 
targeting customers on higher levels of income.
In addition to the parent resources, a key element in the successful turnaround 
of Empire Stores was the UK managements and employees’ general orientation to 
change and innovation, which greatly contributed to speeding up the implementation 
of the turnover plan as well as the introduction of the French brands into the UK. 
Boosted by the successful tum-around of Empire Stores, a new, confident British 
management team convinced the French parent of the potential market for its French 
catalogue brands, and, taking all the financial risks, launched a large-scale and 
aggressive marketing strategy, which proved highly successful as sales took off very 
rapidly.
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In this case therefore, the pressures exerted by La Redoute upon Empire 
Stores to comply with its own ways were not great and, as Empire Stores faced strong 
imperatives for conforming to the local environment, a British approach has 
dominated and few French features have filtered through. La Redoute’s hands-off 
approach was fundamentally linked to its very young age internationally and the 
resulting lack of strategy, management resources, and confidence to be able to impose 
any approach. The parent company, which did not have a defined strategy and means 
to impose its way upon the market, has had to remain humble in the face of the local 
specificities of the UK environment. The comparison of La Redoute and Vivendi 
Water’s strategic approach to adapting to the UK market, although both were 
operating in multi-domestic industries, reveals striking differences. Whilst the former 
did not impose any management ethos, the latter transferred its management 
approach.
5. Alcatel and STC
After the take-over of STC by Alcatel, the initial strategic approach of the 
French group to the integration was cautious, as French management decided to leave 
the British operation independent and ‘respect the cultural traditions of the company’. 
Alcatel, compared with other companies, was highly internationalised, as it had 
grown extensively through the acquisition of major poles (American ITT in 1986 and 
Italian Teletra in 1990) and, in contrast with other groups’ ethnocentric approach, the 
philosophy of the group was in being sensitive to each company’s culture. The 
submarine telecommunications division of Alcatel was not familiar with the UK in 
which it had no significant presence and thus maintained a hands-off approach 
entrusting British management of the UK operation.
In the first six months of the acquisition however, the telecommunications 
submarine market, an industry which is global in nature, collapsed, which radically 
changed the initial conditions that Alcatel was faced with. According to interviewees, 
the market downturn occurred as the direct consequence of deregulatory trends which
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were accelerating worldwide. In the UK, which was at the forefront of those trends, 
the liberalisation of the telecommunications market was becoming effective in the 
early 1990s with the ending of the BT / Mercury duopoly, and the arrival of many 
new licensed telecommunications operators on the market. Newly deregulated 
telecommunications firms, unaccustomed to submarine telecommunications systems, 
paused their investments, hesitating between investing in the systems by themselves 
or leasing from the national operators which led to a temporary halt in demand. The 
far-reaching changes the industry was undergoing globally also coincided with the 
natural ten-year low point of the submarine telecommunications market, an industry 
characterised by ten-year long business cycles, further exacerbated by the economic 
recession in Britain. This overall economic context created a two-year operational 
vacuum for the newly formed Alcatel Submarine Networks (ASN) during which no 
contracts were won.
Thus the ‘industry’ filter moved right at the time of the acquisition. As a 
result of the collapse in the market, Alcatel’s initial strategy suffered two reverses, 
which forced the group to effect a U-turn. Firstly, the market downturn exposed the 
very high duplication of functions between both companies: both had the same 
customers and were manufacturing the same products. Under the initial approach of 
the parent, high duplication could have been sustained had both companies been kept 
busy, but in a context of a zero-order book, duplication became obvious and 
untenable. Management was forced to radically change course of action after six 
months, and to proceed with the integration of both companies.
The second implication of the market collapse was to force out in the open the 
need for formulating a long-term business strategy in order to respond to the 
deregulatory trends taking place in the global telecommunications submarine market 
and which were profoundly changing the traditional relations between national 
telecommunications operators and their manufacturing suppliers. Indeed, in a more 
opened and complex telecommunications industry, manufacturing suppliers could no 
longer rely upon national operators for orders, and were forced to target other
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telecommunications groups. A Franco-British conflict erupted over which approach 
to adopt, as both STC and Alcatel diverged on their perceptions of the global 
telecommunications industry dynamics and as a result over appropriate business 
strategy, itself the result of their respective experience of deregulated markets. 
British managements advocated the deployment of proactive commercial strategies 
towards the new entrant telecommunications groups to sell them the benefits of 
submarine telecommunications systems. But, Alcatel’s management remained 
reluctant to change its approach.
The British company was further ahead on the road to deregulation and thus 
had a higher level of commercial expertise than the French group. STC had long lost 
institutionalised support from British Telecom or the British government for its 
markets, and, in order to ensure its survival, was dependent upon developing business 
opportunities by itself. Alcatel, still being in the bosom of the State and France 
Telecom machinery, was slower to wake up to the far reaching changes that 
deregulation was bringing to the industry on a global scale.
In Britain, as the acquisition was in turmoil, STC began to see an exodus of its 
younger managers in particular in marketing and technical functions. The crisis 
reached its climax when members of the British senior management team attempted 
to derail the integration process. Their attempts eventually failed after Alcatel found 
out, and key members were sacked. British management’s lack of cooperation has 
also had a strong impact upon the outcome of integration as Alcatel, once its trust was 
breached, took firm control of the operation. National rivalries have with little doubt 
played their part in explaining British managements’ refusal to cooperate with Alcatel 
as both companies were competitors. Furthermore, STC had suffered from the 
Northern Telecom regime which led to the dismantling of some of its R&D activities 
at the time of the sale, and local management was keen on integrating what remained 
of the company as much as possible16. But, British management’s resistance was also
16 Financial Times, ‘Foray leaves buyer poorer but wiser', 30 July 1993.
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\fuelled by disagreements with French management and Alcatel’s perceived lack of 
expertise.
After two years, the industry eventually came out of the deadlock it found 
itself in, when one of the new American telecommunications groups proceeded to 
directly purchase telecommunications submarine systems rather than leasing them 
from national telecommunications operators. Thus, as the global market picked up 
again, Alcatel changed its long-term business strategy by adopting a more proactive 
approach, which involved looking into supplying submarine systems to invigorated 
telecommunications companies. Alcatel management also decided to split its 
international marketing department between France and the UK in order to address 
the needs of the large number of global telecommunications customers who were 
based in the UK, thereby reflecting an adaptation of its approach and an appreciation 
of the UK market specificities and its more advanced state.
In conclusion therefore, the case of Alcatel marks a strong difference from our 
other case studies, as its strategy evolved over the course of the integration, first from 
a hands-off approach to re-gaining firm control, and finally aligning its business 
strategy to the requirements of the industry. In this case, it is the filter of the global 
telecommunications industry which caused the integration crisis and forced Alcatel to 
reconsider its initial approach. Here, the filter ‘industry’, because the market was 
global and dynamic, moved during the acquisition process, and thus put itself in 
between both sides.
The case also suggests that the ‘level of advancement’ filter played a 
significant role, but in the other direction than in the case of Saint Gobain or Vivendi 
Water for example. The latter, because of their sectoral domestic pattern of 
governance, were more advanced in technical terms than their British counterparts 
and, as a result, subsequently faced little difficulty in imposing their model. In the 
telecommunications industry however, the British operation had greater expertise of 
deregulated markets because of the more rapid evolution of its domestic sectoral
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setting towards a market-led system; nor was STC at a significant competitive 
technological disadvantage with Alcatel for, in contrast with other British 
manufacturing firms, it had benefited from Government investments in defence and 
related industries together with GEC, Plessey and British Aerospace (Walker 1993). 
The British and French companies’ respective levels of advancement in turn 
complicated Alcatel’s task in taking control at STC.
The comparison with the retail group Redoute shows two very different 
results from adopting similarly cautious strategies to the local market. The hands-off 
approach of La Redoute was successful because its market was mainly national and 
was thus lending itself to a strong degree of autonomy. However, in the case of 
Alcatel, what could have been an appropriate strategy given Alcatel’s limited 
experience of the UK market, was in fact not sustainable because of the global nature 
of its industry and the duplication between both companies.
In spite of an arduous integration process however, the company was 
eventually fully integrated. Alcatel emerged as the world leader and ultimately 
successfully adapted its strategy to the requirements of the global industry.
5.5. A mode of adaptation to the UK environment in a French way
This section attempts to identify the underlying traits behind French 
companies’ responses to the UK environment. In spite of lacking a clear strategy 
towards their acquired operations and thus groping their way along through a lengthy 
and sometimes arduous path to integration, it is noticeable than our case study firms 
have ultimately succeeded in establishing some means of control and have been able 
to ‘fit in’ their systems into that of the operating company as well as to successfully 
overhaul their own operations. Thus, in the absence of constraining filters, Saint 
Gobain duplicated its approach, whilst Vivendi Water has successfully overcome the 
local nature of its sector in order to impose its approach upon the operating company. 
Vinci, whilst not having been able to establish a means of control because of the
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\peculiar nature of its industry, has nonetheless gained a vision of the UK construction 
company. La Redoute, lacking international experience, has adapted from the outset 
to the UK environment. Similarly, Alcatel has ultimately adjusted its long-term 
strategy to the deregulated telecommunications environment. How are we to explain 
French firms’ ultimately successful adaptation to a host environment as different and 
unfamiliar as the UK?
French companies have firstly exported a long-term vision to the UK. French 
managements, even though they had no experience, have had a primary concern in 
ensuring the long-term viability of the businesses they have taken over which has 
guided them through the restructuring of their operations. Thus, even though many 
have ended up with acquired firms which were in a poor state, all our case study firms 
have taken it upon themselves to overhauling them and have committed long-term 
financial and management resources as well as technological know-how in the 
operating company.
French companies’ long-term vision and product-centered philosophy have 
implied a desire from French managements to involve themselves in the running of 
the operations. With the exception of La Redoute whose relative youth meant it did 
not have the means to impose an approach in the UK, and Alcatel at first because of 
its strong degree of internationalisation, none of our case study firms has left their 
operating companies without direction and most have introduced an overall set of 
philosophies and resources in the operation. Through expatriates, French 
managements have been able to involve themselves in all aspects of the management 
of the operating company, not only at strategic level, but also at operational level and 
in particular at technical level. This hands-on management style has its roots in their 
embedded engineering ethos, and also French managers’ strong attachment to their 
firm which implies a genuine commitment and dedication to their businesses. In this 
respect, French managements, to varying degrees depending upon the filters they 
have encountered, have ultimately been able to influence their operations. However, 
the French style of management is not constituted of a set of well defined
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management methods in the same way as the literature has found with Japanese and 
American firms. Rather it is a distinctive way of managing and controlling, which 
can best be characterised as a hands-on management style.
But this interventionist style has a counter-side of an excess desire to control 
and retain a sense of identity at the risk of lacking an open-mind to different 
approaches. Thus, initially our findings show some French firms arrived in Britain 
with colonial inclinations and sought to impose their group methods which sometimes 
proved ill-adapted to the Anglo-Saxon environment. This desire to impose group 
methods can partly be explained by the fact that French firms were inexperienced and 
had a stereotypical view of Britain for some time. For example, French firms’ 
product vision collided with the British prevailing logic of short-term profit 
maximisation, innovation and customer service. Vinci having a continental view of 
the organisation of the construction life, sought to put in place a product-driven 
approach but which was rejected by the local market place. Vivendi Water promptly 
restrained from imposing its way as it recognised the specificities of the British water 
industry. La Redoute, in contrast with other firms, did not impose an approach 
because of its very young international age as we noted, and thus quickly accepted 
that French fashion would not sell in the British retail market without credit and other 
customer services advantages. In the case of Alcatel, strategy was fundamentally 
evolving in the telecommunications industry as a result of deregulation, away from a 
product-led approach towards a sophisticated customer-driven strategy, in which the 
French group had lacked expertise.
As Hu (1995) points out, the sources of competitive strength of a firm in its 
domestic environment will not necessarily ensure its success in a different host 
environment because the firm has to take account of local market rules, and thus 
methods are not necessarily transferable from one country to the other. Free credit in 
the retail sector, the claim in the construction industry, and the absence of water 
meters in the water industry are market practices which remain quite resilient in 
Britain as French companies have had to learn the hard way.
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The way French companies initially sought to impose an ethnocentric 
approach was also evident through the issue of the management of human resources. 
French managements, used to a strong stability in their employment systems at home, 
lacked sensitivity to the issue of staff retention at times of changes in ownership 
which were critical in the dynamic UK labour market, and were not able to stop the 
haemorraging of British staff. Thus, we saw that Alcatel management were faced 
with an exodus of British middle managerial staff. Our findings have pointed to other 
similar cases. Shortly after having acquired the UK bank Alexander and Croushank, 
Crédit Lyonnais experienced a dramatic loss of senior staff, when the group took 
control through sending in expatriates.
However, in spite of the strong setbacks they have had and the mistakes made 
by some, our case studies reveal that all French firms made a long-term commitment 
to the UK. French management’s desire to succeed in the integration of their 
operations and get involved in the management of operations has implied a persistent 
attitude to their work which has enabled them to overcome difficulties encountered. 
The construction firm Vinci did not throw in the towel in the face of adverse 
conditions: whereas the operation it acquired was in a state of near bankruptcy, 
probably taking several years to be able to turn it around, it still did not sell it. 
Through its perseverance, the group managed to find a way to deal with the local 
nature of the sector and has used its initial lack of adaptability in order to adjust itself 
to the industry. Norwest Holst eventually broke even and the group managed to gain, 
if not control at least a degree of transparency over Norwest Holst operations thanks 
to its expatriate managers. Vivendi Water did not admit defeat in the face of the local 
sector and established a control arrangement in order to overcome the alien conditions 
of the UK market. The process of overhauling Stanton took over five years as Saint 
Gobain proceeded gradually, and the group was able to transfer its model upon 
Stanton with only minor adaptation. La Redoute, as we know, found an immediate 
adaptability to the UK. Whilst going through a difficult integration, Alcatel and STC 
have nonetheless merged their operations, and Alcatel has ultimately showed some
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\receptivity as reflected in the adaptation of its business strategy to the new 
telecommunications context.
Thus, French managements’ determination to find solutions to the problems 
arising from the tensions between national and local cultures has enabled them to 
overcome critical situations and ultimately be able to gradually introduce their 
perspective whilst adapting to the UK environment. French managements have 
gradually become more integrated into the British system, they have begun to 
understand its rules and modes of functioning, and in the process have gradually 
reconsidered their stereotypes about Britain and opening up their hitherto inward­
looking view. Thus, even though they lacked a well-defined strategy, thanks to their 
perseverance, together with their desire to be actively involved in the management of 
the operations — even though there has been a perverse side to their control approach 
which has led some companies to impose elements o f their systems inappropriately, 
French firms have ultimately developed a capacity o f adaptation to the host 
environment.
Whilst it is generally estimated that one out of two mergers fail, in the 
acquisitions carried out à la française, the success rate here is 100%. Within our 
sample, none has exited the market, even when their operations were losing money. 
Only recently, some American energy groups have been deserting the UK electricity 
market just two years after having bought a number of regional electricity companies 
following the privatisation of the electricity industry: one of the key reasons being 
given is that returns on investment have not met their standards, as a result of 
operating in a context of tougher regulation on prices, the imposition of a windfall tax 
and insufficient prospects of cost-savings within the businesses17. As a result of 
differences over investment and product strategy, a conception of profit-maximisation 
which is not as heightened as American firms’, and an overall process of integration 
which is very gradual and longer-term, French multinationals after an initial delay in 
the integration phase, have managed to successfully overhaul their operations.
17 Acquisitions Monthly. ‘Hungry for Power’, December 1998, p. 19-21.
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The management approach that characterises French multinational companies 
is a kind of ‘third way’ as compared with the management style of Americans and 
Japanese multinationals’. In the case of American firms, more clearly defined 
strategies in particular with regards to maximising profits in the short-term, well 
established and recognised efficient management methods, huge financial clout and 
scale are all factors that place them from the outset, in a position of considerable 
strength to impose their approach and override the specificities of local environments. 
Similarly, Japanese car manufacturers have set up greenfield sites, thereby reducing 
the impact of local conditions, in order to be able to import their superior 
manufacturing systems. In both cases, because of the features they inherit from their 
domestic environments, these companies are able to exert strong pressures to conform 
internationally. French firms, lacking those characteristics, have had to compensate 
their strategic weaknesses through a durable, hands-on involvement of their 
managements, which has enabled them eventually to introduce their perspective into 
the host environment.
We shall make a number of points regarding the effects of international filters, 
which our study has highlighted. Firstly, our findings enable us to put into 
perspective the claim made by the management literature that the culture variable is a 
major cause of failure in cross-national mergers (Cartwright and Cooper 1992). If 
cultural differences were indeed a critical issue, French companies would not have 
been able to survive in England, for the culture of both countries could not be more 
opposed. Yet, none of our case studies has withdrawn from the UK, and many other 
Franco-British alliances have successfully leaped the cultural hurdles as evidenced by 
the success of the alliance between GEC and Alcatel Alsthom which has since 
merged into one single company, SEMA or Camaud-Metal Box. Numerous factors 
enter the equation and the success or failure of an integration cannot be reduced to 
mono-causal explanations.
We argue that culture, whilst being an important variable in the success of an 
acquisition, is not the decisive influence, and its actual role needs to be considered
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against other factors. Thus, the interpretation of the clashes between STC and Alcatel 
was not cultural but fundamentally linked to the economic crisis that hit the industry, 
the managerial crisis resulting from Alcatel’s lack of initial strategy which was 
further exacerbated by British management’s unwillingness to cooperate. Whilst not 
being the initial cause of the problems therefore, cultural differences can amplify a 
financial crisis or bad relational context between the parent and local management, 
and risk becoming a barrier. Eventually however, firms can adapt to local 
environments: cultural clashes are not set in concrete and firms can eventually 
overcome them. This point is further demonstrated by the evolution of relations 
between French and British management in Alcatel as other initial conditions 
evolved. Within ASN, British and French engineering teams gradually got to know 
one another and are now working effectively together and whilst there are cultural 
differences, ranging from language to product specifications through to management 
style, there are strong counter-balancing forces which regulate the working 
relationship arising from the fact that teams work towards common objectives and 
share common professional interests. This has enabled them to find ways in which to 
overcome and even exploit cultural differences.
We have also noted the importance of two initial conditions upon the transfer 
of the parent management approach, which is often under-rated in the management 
literature, firstly the synchronisation of firms’ business cycles at the time of the take­
over and secondly the mentality of host management. Our case studies demonstrated 
how a poor financial climate can have an overwhelming impact upon the integration 
of an acquisition, as it exacerbates all other issues related to the integration and 
complicates the task of building trust, a crucial element between both sides. Further, 
whilst French multinationals have benefited from the support of key British 
managers, at middle management level we found that British management were 
generally reticent to French management’s approach and it has been an important 
factor in delaying or preventing the integration process.
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In addition to an inevitable loss of power and control resulting from the take­
over, other factors have affected local management’s mood. First, it is a function of 
the expertise and experience of the acquiring management. As revealed in many of 
our case studies, as French management lacked the experience of integrating 
acquisitions, British management perceived a lack of leadership and was not inclined 
to cooperate. Secondly, the hospitality of local management is to varying degrees 
dependent upon the nationality which it is facing. There is a history of antagonism 
between the British and the French, and without being able to assess precisely its 
actual influence, this perception may have made the initial task of developing trust 
more difficult. Further, it has become evident through our observations that French 
management style is little known and not recognised aside from its engineering 
expertise as compared with American multinationals’ state-of-the-art management 
methods or Japanese's manufacturing methods, and thus British management was not 
motivated to challenge its approach. The receptivity of local management was finally 
linked to the period of the acquisition: thus, in an international context where national 
borders were still closed, the Britain of ten years ago was more reluctant than it is 
today.
A further point is that it is often argued that lesser-regulated countries such as 
the UK and the US are more hospitable to foreign practices than those with dense 
institutions such as France and Germany for the latter limit managerial autonomy. 
However the permissiveness of the Anglo-American model should not be confused 
with the fact that these countries are regulated by the rules of capitalism, and as our 
findings have clearly shown, they prove to be extremely difficult environments to 
operate in for the inexperienced firm. In less mature and culturally closer countries of 
Southern Europe such as Spain yet which are still densely institutionalised, French 
firms were able to impose their approach without significant hurdles, but the British 
context has acted as a stronger filter upon their management features.
Our study has also shown that a company’s sector can have an influence upon 
cross-border transfers in two ways. The first is linked to the local character of the
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sector. Thus, as is now well-established by the literature, global sectors tend to be 
less constraining than multi-domestic ones. Our study has nonetheless highlighted 
significant differences across multi-domestic sectors and their influence (in particular 
between water, retail, and construction). As an increasing number of so-called 
‘multi-domestic’ industries are becoming global, the distinct ‘multi-domestic’ label 
might not account for the variety of sectors. The second aspect through which a 
company’s sector can exert an influence is their level of advancement vis-à-vis the 
other, which in turn can facilitate or prevent a parent from transferring its approach. 
French companies were generally more advanced than their British counterparts in 
terms of technicity, explaining the overwhelming direction of influence from the 
parent to the operating companies in this function. However, firstly, there were 
differences across British firms depending upon the firms’ sectoral evolution (for 
example STC was competitive), and secondly, where a company might be more 
advanced in one function, it might be lagging behind in others. Thus, the Franco- 
British comparisons show that British companies tend to have a greater expertise in 
terms of finance and commercialism.
As to the approach of the literature on cross-national transfer of practices, our 
approach has emphasised processes of adaptation which are the result of the interplay 
of a range of variables. The literature, by failing to examine the full picture of cross­
national management transfers, that is who transfers what under which conditions can 
lead to obtaining wrong conclusions when it comes to generalising about the role of a 
single variable, for in a different context a variable can have different effects. For 
example, the debate about the role of the host country’s culture takes place to a 
certain extent in a vacuum and might well over-estimate (Streeck 1996) or under­
estimate (Womack et al. 1990) its importance if taken out of its larger context. 
Indeed, although we agree with institutionalists that a firm can not fully divorce itself 
from the local environment in which it operates as our findings clearly show, some 
American, Japanese or global firms such as ABB have nonetheless the capability to 
significantly minimise the impact of local contingent factors (Bélanger et al. 1999).
The integration o f British acquisitions
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Conclusion
I he integration of British acquisitions
The examination of the sequence of events from the time French companies 
set foot in the UK reveals that they have gone through an inevitable transitory phase 
of adaptation to the host environment with which the bulk of them had no past 
history, and some of their national features have evolved through the process. Thus, 
their absence of a clearly thought out strategy, as well as their caution and ‘colonial’ 
approach are features which companies have exported in the early stages but which 
they have now abandoned. This form of adaptation in turn implies a learning process 
undergone by French managements, an issue that has turned out to be of importance 
and will be examined in detail in Chapter 8. Whilst some national features 
characteristic of a time period have disappeared, and others have persisted, 
identifying them is relevant for they remain part of French firms’ behaviour and could 
potentially re-emerge under a different context.
As French multinationals have gained in international experience, they have 
first and foremost adopted a strategy of globalisation by setting foot in all major 
markets, and further, they are more likely to be able anticipate critical variables and 
mould them in order to reduce their impact. Other variables are themselves evolving 
too. Thus, local management resistance, strong ten years ago in a worldwide context 
which was significantly less opened and internationalised, has lessened during the 
1990s as the necessity of being part of a large group in order to be able to flourish and 
survive is acknowledged. All those factors contribute to facilitating the process of 
integration of acquisitions and French firms are more likely to be able to ‘clone’ these 
groups more rapidly; those evolutions will be examined in latter chapters.
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Chapter VI
GLOBALISATION OF CORPORATE STRUCTURES
Introduction
In response to the globalisation of competition, French companies have since 
the late 1990s pursued global product strategies and begun a process of adaptation of 
their structures characteristic of an international organisation model, as identified by 
Ohmae (1990) and Bartlett and Goshal (1989). However, these general trends do not 
easily sit with existing characteristics of French companies. This chapter seeks to 
establish the degree and manner in which French companies have adopted features of 
a global model, as well as characterise the specificities of their model abroad.
It is the telecommunications equipment firm, Alcatel which has undergone the 
most significant transformation of its existing model and achieved the highest degree 
of globalisation, as compared with our other French companies. The first section will 
thus examine the case of Alcatel separately given its level of international maturity. 
The key international tendencies which are adopted by French companies will then be 
looked at, focusing upon their product strategies, corporate structures and modes of 
control. The final part discusses the French features which have influenced their 
transition towards a global model.
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6.1. Alcatel: The transformation from a French multinational to a global firm
Over the last decade, in response to the globalisation of the 
telecommunications industry, Alcatel has rapidly evolved from a traditional 
telecommunications equipment manufacturer mainly focused on its domestic market 
to a global, re-focused telecommunications group. Since the mid-1990s, Alcatel has 
focused on high-growth telecommunications markets such as internet data networks 
and mobile telephones. In response to the changing nature of demand from 
traditional national operators who have become sophisticated service providers as a 
result of liberalisation, Alcatel has shifted the focus of its strategic development 
towards software, systems and services and away from product-based projects, 
becoming a provider of complete solutions from conception, design, manufacturing 
and installation to financial engineering.
The group also operates on a global basis. Following the acquisition of the 
European operations of ITT in 1986 and Italy’s Teletra in 1990, the group had 
inherited a strong European presence, with its main technological centres spread 
across Germany, Belgium and Spain. Since the mid-1990s, in line with its policy of 
focusing on key strengths, it has pursued an aggressive internationalisation with a 
strong focus on the US market (acquisitions of DSC, Packet Engine, Internet Devices, 
Xylan, Assured Access, Genesys, Canadian Newbridge), where the group was absent 
from and which has now become its major market accounting for about a quarter of 
group turnover.
Accompanying this strategic repositioning, Alcatel has begun a process of 
reforming its management structure and culture in order to gain in efficiency and 
agility. Alcatel transformed its corporate structure of loosely integrated national 
operations into market-oriented, integrated worldwide product lines or business 
divisions (BDs). Under a vigorous three year cost-cutting programme, the group 
drastically reduced its organisational bureaucracy. Thus there was only one layer 
between the group Executives and the operating units; central functions were very
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lightly staffed and operated through networks rather than by concentrating teams at 
headquarters level.
At corporate level, the holding structure was transformed into a specialist 
operational Centre, as a small Executive Committee was created to oversee each 
division more closely, and corporate functions were strengthened while new ones 
were created - in particular in business process and engineering, marketing and global 
procurements. The Centre’s role was to set and disseminate strategic objectives and 
monitor performance, create a group culture as well as provide specialised services to 
the BDs. Key decisions were decentralised to regional headquarters that were created 
in the major markets of the triad. Global BDs were made responsible for product 
strategy worldwide, and as a result country managers, who were renamed Country 
Senior Officers (CSO), saw their autonomy greatly reduced and their proximity to the 
centre has become much more marked. The role of the CSOs, who reported to the 
regions instead of the Centre, shifted away from decision-making and control to one 
of finding synergies across BDs at national level. The heads of the most important 
countries were given responsibilities for the international development of the group in 
their geographic areas. Similarly, the role of Areas became solely one of support, and 
consisted in particular of harmonising methods and processes within countries as well 
as maintaining a cohesion across business divisions at national level. Because of their 
proximity to the Centre and their knowledge of countries’ specificities, the Areas 
played an active part in diffusing corporate culture and policies. Figure 6 -  1 
summarises the key dimensions of Alcatel’s global product line structure.
In addition to the business divisions and the Area levels, Alcatel appointed 
global Key Account Managers (KAMs), who became responsible for addressing the 
needs of major customers worldwide. Headed by very senior managers, often country 
managers, and operating in networks, their task was to follow large customers’ 
demands and pool together group resources where needed. Alcatel was thereby able 
to have a single point of interface with its global clients and meet their demands in all 
countries, as well as provide a complex and diversified service.
Globalisation of co
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In total, the streamlined, market-oriented structure enabled fast operational 
decision-making compared with the traditional two-dimensional matrices, whilst 
maximising the potential for vertical synergies within the BDs, as well as cross BD- 
synergies at national level, through the Areas and country managers. Thanks to the 
KAM structures, who were bringing a global vision and expertise of the Centre to the 
national units, Alcatel was able to handle international projects which were adapted to 
local countries’ specificities, thereby being able to reconcile ‘global’ and ‘local’ 
demands. Underpinning the structure was also a strong international outlook: the 
composition of the group’s management was highly international, with 70 per cent of 
the top 500 managers being non-French, the result of its historical expansion. The 
CEO also set up a supervisory board, regrouping experts from a variety of 
backgrounds and nationality thereby bringing to the firm, a global and diverse 
expertise.
Figure 6 -1 : A schematic model of Alcatel’s worldwide product line
Globalisation o f corporate structures
Having established its worldwide product lines and streamlined its corporate 
structure, Alcatel has moved into a regime of international consolidation, which is 
still continuing. It has entailed a re-organisation of its operations worldwide, leading 
to significant downsizing and the re-grouping of its dispersed operations into global 
centres of competence; a simplification of legal structures at national level together 
with a re-alignment of national units’ structures to be market-focused; the 
rationalisation and standardisation of key business processes worldwide, in particular 
customer order fulfilment, financial information system and the supply process. 
Alcatel has also launched a vast programme, entitled ‘hi-speed’, aimed at 
transforming its engineering-driven management culture and ways of working to 
make it more efficient, flexible, team-worked based and market-oriented in outlook. 
This has particularly involved a dramatic emphasis upon the marketing functions, the 
creation of powerful KAMs and the creation of a support service strategy.
Further, the centre has become actively involved in developing an Alcatel 
culture through corporate programmes, a trend which has been identified in 
international firms (Bartlett and Goshal 1993; Beckman 1996; Bélanger et al. 1999). 
Benchmarking is also a central element of the group strategy to reforming its ways of 
operating and harmonising key business processes to improve its productivity. The 
management process has evolved away from a ‘command and control’ to softer forms 
of control, including ‘self-regulation’, extensive performance measurement, 
negotiation and influence, which allow the BDs and national units to retain the 
initiative and be market responsive, though within a centrally defined framework, 
which a manager at headquarters characterised as ‘forced democracy’
‘The decision-making is with the Business Units, they have the last word, 
they carry the Profit and Loss, we (the centre) are a coordination. If they 
want to ignore what we propose, they can. But they can not do this three of 1
1 Our findings also qualify trends claimed by the management literature that the new multinational has 
become a ‘heterarchy’ with centres of power being dispersed and decisions decentralised (Hedlund 
1986, 1994; Handy 1992). With the adoption of global product lines, one sees a definite evolution 
towards greater formalisation with centres of powers being clearly located within the Business 
Divisions. However, central programmes were driven locally by the national units for the end 
philosophy behind the product line is transparency. But, a two-way relationship is not synonymous 
with dispersion of decision-making powers.
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four times in a row with bad results, you must justify your choice: either we
do things wrong and we should take things from them; either they follow us,
it is as simple as that. So, it is a sort of forced democracy’.
Through the active role of the centre, the gradual harmonisation of business 
processes, a culture of continuous improvement, self-regulation and performance 
management, but also the strategic mobility of managers enabling the development of 
networking within the organisation, a distinctive culture appears to be emerging, 
though the process of reforging it is likely to take many years.
Through its far-reaching and aggressive corporate restructuring, Alcatel has 
transformed its previous model to become a lean, efficient, highly market responsive 
global organisation. One can see that these traits are antithetical to French culture 
and that Alcatel has almost lost its nationality. Whilst other French firms are seeking 
to emulate this model, they have changed to varying degrees as we shall now see.
6.2. Evolution towards an international model
This part outlines the major trends within French companies as they evolve 
towards a global model with regards to their product strategies, their corporate 
structures and modes of control.
Globalisation o f corporate strategies
Since the latter half of the 1990s and in response to global competitive 
pressures, French companies have pursued a strategy of focusing upon key areas of 
competence and internationalisation. Firms are strengthening their core business 
expertise and global presence through mergers and acquisitions whilst disengaging 
from activities considered to be outside their mainstream businesses. For example, 
Vivendi has shed its construction and healthcare businesses, and recently floated its 
environmental service arm, traditionally core sectors of the group, to build up a media 
and telecommunications group considerably strengthened through the acquisition of
1 .'2
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the Canadian production company, Seagram. Danone is pursuing a global strategy in 
three key high-growth product lines namely dairy, beverages and snacks, which has 
led it to sell its containers and groceries units and pursue an active acquisition policy 
in the major markets of the Triad. Total has actively taken part in the recent wave of 
consolidation affecting the oil industry, acquiring the Belgian oil company, Fina, and 
its French competitor. Elf.
French companies are seeking to establish a presence in the US market, seen 
as the largest and most innovative market, as well as in the high growth markets of 
the Pacific Rim and emerging markets of Eastern Europe and Latin America. This 
marks both a qualitative and quantitative shift from the late-1980s internationalisation 
phase, as the bulk of their FDI was essentially smaller in scale and centered upon 
Europe. The building materials group Saint Gobain has pursued a strategy of 
focusing on three key business areas (glass, high performance materials, housing 
products) where it holds a leading position, and has stepped up its international 
expansion with a focus upon Latin America and Asia. The retail group La Redoute 
has placed a priority upon internationalisation since the mid-1990s, which has risen, 
from being virtually nil, to over 50% of the group turnover.
In parallel with this new philosophy of focusing on core strengths, one sees 
companies diversifying into new businesses, thereby responding to the blurring of 
traditional sector boundaries brought about by liberalisation. The environmental 
service arm of Vivendi is deploying a multi-utility strategy in water, electricity and 
waste management. Total is actively developing into other forms of energy such as 
gas.
Peugeot has also begun pursuing a global strategy since the mid-1990s, but 
has remained distinctive from other companies who have largely proceeded through 
mergers and acquisitions. Whilst the group has for many years been resisting
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globalisation of competition2, it has committed itself to an international expansion 
under a new leader, but has sought to retain its identity and remain an independent car 
manufacturer. Thus, it has kept out of the recent wave of consolidation which has 
swept the industry and instead has proceeded through alliances with other 
manufacturers, notably, it has developed multi-purpose vehicles with Fiat, and has 
cooperated over diesel engines with Ford. Judging by Peugeot’s current strength in 
Europe and rapid catching up in other parts of the world, the group’s singular strategy 
of being a ‘small but strong’ car producer seems to represent an alternative to 
globalisation.
French companies are thus in the process of transforming themselves into 
highly specialised firms, deploying their product strategies on a global scale, and 
increasingly diversifying into services. This represents a profound strategic shift 
which has matured over the last ten years, when French companies begun 
restructuring themselves in order to enhance their profitability and meet their growing 
needs internationally. Their search for productivity gains has intensified since the 
latter half of the 1990s however, as they face powerful international competitive 
pressures, arising on the one hand from the growing opening of markets resulting 
from market liberalisation, and on the other, from a context of escalating R&D costs 
as a result of technological innovations. Shareholders’ pressures for maximising 
financial profitability are a further factor behind firms’ relentless pursuit of growth 
and productivity.
Thus, one sees an increasingly short-term vision amongst French 
management, as firms are forced to react quickly to market demands and to maximise 
their profitability. A noticeable trend is that, in today’s fast changing international 
markets, firms’ responses are by and large dictated by the global environment and 
they have less and less control over the horizons of their strategy. As a result,
2 Under its nationalistic leader Jacques Calvet who headed the group for thirteen years, Peugeot long 
sought protectionist measures against Japanese competition, and never firmly committed itself to an 
international strategy. The group's overall performance, in terms of profitability and sales, compared 
with the rest o f the industry gradually deteriorated in the 1990s.
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increasingly, the distinction between long-termism and short-termism is blurring, as 
firms have to combine both gaining market shares and maximise efficiency in order 
to survive in the competitive marketplace.
Nonetheless, French firms’ long-term focus remains. For example, having 
decided to pursue global strategies, firms are now allocating significant means in 
order to achieve this successfully. Further and relatedly, time horizons are strongly 
dictated by the industry of the firms and therefore one sees variations in our sample. 
Thus, in the case of Total, the oil sector is characterised by long-term horizons 
whereas the telecommunications sector and the car market are highly volatile.
Evolution towards worldwide integrated organisation models
French companies are all introducing worldwide product line structures, 
supplanting the old multi-domestic model. However, changes in their structures and 
modes of control take place at different speed and with varying difficulty. Table 6 -  
1 illustrates the great variety amongst firms’ responses.
The companies that transformed their structures to a lesser extent and more 
slowly were those that had legacies of centralised bureaucratic structures. Saint 
Gobain, Peugeot and Total have retained cumbersome and hierarchical structures. 
This in turn implied that they remain highly centralised. In Saint Gobain for instance, 
the centre exerted a close control over the UK operating company, through strong 
functional relations, by relying on expatriate managers and through a highly 
centralised and detailed information system which gave French managements full 
knowledge over the operations. The Centre was involved in key strategic and 
operational decisions, whilst operating companies were implementing central 
decisions and policies with limited room for manoeuvre. In these companies, 
information flows tended to flow upwards and there was little consultation with the 
operating company in policy-making.
Globalisation o f  corporate structures
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Table 6 - 1 :  O rgan isa tion  struc tu res  and modes of co rpo ra te  control“1
Degree o f  
Centrali­
sation
Corporate
structures
M gt style Links
(Info. fIo w b;
E xpat.; 
Form alism )
Definition & 
Devolution
o f
responsib.;
Clarity
A bility to 
change
Alcatel Move from 
holding to 
stronger, spe­
cialised
Matrix,
strong
product lines
Negotiation,
Influence
Two-way; 
No expats; 
Formalism
Defined;
Devolved;
Clarity
Quick
evolution to 
respond to 
markets
centre
AXA Devolved
authority
Matrix,
independent
national
Consultative Two-way; 
No expats; 
Manuals
Defined; 
Devolved; 
Some clarity
Proactive
Danone Operational 
autonomy, 
creation of a 
group culture
Country- 
based, recent 
move to 
product lines
Influence T wo-way 
Expats;
No manuals
Not clear; 
Devolved; 
Some clarity
Proactive
Peugeot Highly Move Move from Upward; Bureaucracy; Incremental
centralised towards an
integrated
structure
relative 
autonomy to 
authoritarian 
imposition
Expats;
Bureaucracy
No
devolution;
Secrecy
change
La Devolved Setting up No Two-way; Defined; Proactive
Redoute
(PPR)
authority international
structures
imposition No expats; 
No manuals
Devolved; 
Some clarity
Saint Highly Matrix, Authoritarian Upward; Bureaucracy; Incremental
Gobain centralised strong
functional
departments
imposition Expats;
Manuals
No
devolution;
Clarity
change
Schneider Financial Complex No Upward; Not clear; Incremental
holding: no 
involvement 
in operations
matrix, still
powerful
countries
imposition,
negotiation
Expats;
No manuals
Complex;
Secrecy
change
Total Highly Highly Imposition, Upward; Bureaucracy; Incremental
centralised internationa­
lised matrix
Inflexible Expat;
No manuals
No
devolution;
Secrecy
change
Vinci Financial
holding,
independent
divisions
Independent
national
markets
Autonomy, 
with few 
central 
guidelines
Very few 
links, mainly 
financial
Devolved,
with
precarious
trust;
Clarity
Proactive
Vivendi Financial Independent Imposition of Two-way; Increasing Proactive
Water holding,
independent
divisions
national
markets
French 
expatriates in 
the UK
Expats;
No manuals
transparency 
between 
France & UK 
In the UK, 
recreation of 
French mgt 
culture.
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Notes:
a: The case of Crédit Lyonnais is not presented here, because the financial crisis of the group from 
1993 onwards has drastically disrupted the group's modes of functioning and thus no generality can be 
drawn. Prior to this, it shared features of a typically French regime of control with little devolution of 
responsibilities, with a strong degree of centralisation and an expatriate-based control system. 
b: Upwards flo w s  o f  information: the information flows upwards for the Centre to make decisions. 
Top-down: the information is communicated from the top to bottom and implemented, this
characterises the typical American firm. When the information flows both ways, the operating 
company takes part in central decision-making and is kept informed from the Centre, more 
characteristic of the ‘global’ firm.
As Peugeot began opening up to internationalisation, it moved towards a 
policy of common platforms and of integrating its international manufacturing units. 
At home, the group had long operated on a highly centralised mode of control under 
an autocratic leader. As the group moved towards a functionally integrated corporate 
structure, it exerted tight control over the operating company, thereby replicating its 
domestic structures.
Total is illustrative of the difficulties encountered by French companies to 
reform their organisations, as it made an unsuccessful attempt at decentralising its 
traditionally highly hierarchical structures. In the mid-1990s, the group attempted for 
the first time a major reform of its organisation in order to enhance its market- 
responsiveness and efficiency. Management brought in Anglo-Saxon consultants and 
embarked upon a process of decentralisation. However, the group decentralised 
decision-making throughout the organisation without considering each operating 
company’s specific situation. Thus, it gave greater autonomy to operating companies 
which were coming to maturity and which presented little investment opportunities. 
General managers as a result used their autonomy in a way that did not fit group 
strategy, and the group was eventually forced to withdraw its financial delegation. 
Following this unsuccessful attempt, the group went back to its previous mode of 
control.
Similarly, Schneider attempted to move towards a product line structure in the 
1990s but did not vigorously try to reform its old multi-domestic structure and 
integrate its foreign operations. The group was managed by a financial holding
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detached from the management of operations which lacked understanding of market 
trends. Thus, whilst the BDs were officially given a global remit for product strategy, 
in reality they did not have full powers, as they were denied profit and loss 
responsibility which remained in the hands of the regions, whilst countries retained 
significant decision-making powers. As a result, the matrix structure remained highly 
complex, half-way through a country-based structure, and was riddled with conflicts, 
lengthy decision making processes and poor communication. The global business 
divisions were unable to assume effectively their role of optimisation of their 
businesses worldwide: within the UK for example, no fundamental re-organisation 
was undertaken to align itself on the product lines, as the country was faced with a 
legacy of structures which had piled up over the long history of Schneider in the 
country3. In this case, one thus sees a strong continuity in existing structures4.
Whilst some companies experienced difficulties introducing product lines 
structures and moving away from their centralised hierarchies, others had leaner 
structures and smaller centres. Thus, AXA, La Redoute and Vinci were generally 
non-interventionist and the role of the Centre was one of coordination rather than 
control. Operating companies benefited from a large degree of autonomy in the 
development of their strategies, and the British local management team had been left 
in place. The main link with the parent remained through financial control, and major 
investment decisions required approval from France. There were very few central 
guidelines, though they were gradually developing as groups were implementing 
product line structures. Similarly, Danone’s operating companies had a long tradition 
of operational autonomy as the group was up until recently organised along country- 
based lines, but the organisation was distinctive in that the group was exerting strong
3 Schneider UK was composed of many companies, which had been acquired since the 1970s. Group 
Schneider acquired two major French electrical equipment suppliers, Merlin Gérin and Télémécanique 
in 1976 and 1988 respectively, who each expanded in the UK as early as the 1960s. In the UK, 
Schneider also acquired Yorkshire Switchgear in the late 1980s and inherited the UK subsidiaries of 
the American group Square D which was acquired by Schneider in the early 1990s.
4 At the time of writing, the group was beginning to evolve its headquarters towards a more specialist 
centre, closer to markets, as it included the heads of Business Divisions in the group executive 
committee.
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control over its human resources policies, which contributed to creating a certain 
cohesion within the group.
Vivendi Water also showed market-responsiveness, as reflected in its ability 
to adapt its structures to local markets. As will be recalled from Chapter 5, Vivendi 
Water delegated significant decision-making power to the UK operation by 
establishing a small structure within the UK, General Utilities (GU), whose role was 
the management and control of the water companies. In addition, the technical 
resources of the UK water companies were grouped into a single structure, General 
Utilities Projects (GUP), which was responsible for major capital investment 
decisions whilst water companies were left with operational responsibility for their 
implementation and the running of the water operations. The UK operation 
functioned through a kind of triangular relationship with strategies elaborated through 
a negotiation process between GU, GUP and the water companies, and financial 
control of water companies exerted by GU. Therefore, the arrangement was such that 
key decisions were driven by GU within the UK and validated with the Centre, which 
enabled decisions to be tailored to the local market needs. However, Vivendi did not 
fully devolve responsibilities within the UK as key functions were in the hands of a 
few expatriate managers.
Figure 6 - 2 :  The organisation structure of Vivendi Water in the DK
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The strong diversity in structures and control approach of firms studied was 
linked to several factors. It was partly the result of the variety of companies’ 
domestic structures. It indeed appears that firms have tended to duplicate their 
approach and retained their strong corporate cultures. For instance, Saint Gobain, 
Peugeot and Total who were monolithic entities and had legacies of hierarchical and 
bureaucratic structures, have tended to impose their approach upon the operating 
companies. In contrast, Vivendi was a holding structure, each operation having a 
certain degree of independence and having its own management methods; this is a 
factor which explains the group’s adaptative approach to the UK market.
The domestic sectoral governance regime is a further factor that explains 
some of the variations in firms’ responses. Those that emerged from the predominant 
state-led institutional arrangement such as Peugeot and Total have had greater 
difficulties adapting themselves, for the rules of their domestic markets contradict 
those of international markets. Companies that were in the private sphere displayed 
different kind of features from their counterparts and have shown greater agility. 
Thus, one sees a strong flexibility in the family group Danone for example, reflected 
in the rapid structural changes it has undertaken. Similarly, Vivendi Water retained 
an open-mind, as, from the outset, it found an arrangement to remain close to the UK 
market.
Globalisation o f  corpora te  structures
The period in which firms internationalised plays a fundamental role by 
shaping their international vision, which in turn underpins their control philosophy. 
Total and Schneider, internationalised for decades, have retained a kind of colonial 
mentality and still view their operating companies as subsidiaries as opposed to 
international entities. They have inherited long-established and cumbersome 
international structures, which they have had greater difficulty reforming to adapt to 
today’s fast changing international environment. By contrast, new international 
entrants, such as the retailer La Redoute and the insurer AXA, are unencumbered by
NO
any international baggage. Their youth abroad has enabled them to keep an open 
mind and to remain close to local market needs5.
Key Account Management
In line with their strategies of globalisation, companies have begun creating 
divisions that cut across product divisions and focus on providing a range of services 
to their large industrial customers. French companies are beginning to evolve 
towards the concept of a ‘one-stop’ shop where their customers can easily buy an 
integrated service from them. Schneider for example has recently created a cross­
functional structure which serves its major industrial clients internationally and offers 
complete solutions from design to the installation and maintenance of its products. 
Saint Gobain has also begun expanding into distribution and services through 
acquisitions.
The setting up of key account managements is a significant development 
amongst French firms and is reflective of a gradual shift away from a producer-led 
towards a more customer-driven approach. The creation of key account 
managements is part of a broader logic of expanding into the service side of their 
business, itself the corollary of companies’ repositioning strategies. By doing so, 
companies are seeking to enhance profits by concentrating on the high margin 
business of large clients, which in many cases, account for the bulk of growth of 
turnover. Companies also aim at gaining greater control of their market shares by 
being present downstream, and meet increasingly diversified and global demands of 
their clients. In addition, key account managements are a means of creating a group 
identity by enabling the development of synergies and sharing of expertise across 
divisions.
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Creating a group identity
Accompanying the introduction of global product lines, French firms have 
been seeking to create a group identity. These changes have taken place more or less 
rapidly and easily and multinationals are at different stages of advancement.
All companies have introduced a number of initiatives as part of a drive to 
create a coherent company. This includes efforts to build up an internationally 
recognised brand. Companies have worked on remoulding their corporate image. 
Thus, Danone, previously called BSN, is seeking to apply its main brand name to an 
increasing product range. Compagnie Générale des eaux changed its name to 
Vivendi to mark the group’s evolution towards media and telecommunications away 
from the traditional environmental businesses of the group. One also sees an 
increasing coordination of functions at corporate level, which were previously 
organised on a national basis, and whose role is to create group-wide synergies. For 
instance, many companies are creating procurements functions. The creation of 
KAMs, detailed above, also takes place within this objective of seeking to developing 
a global, consistent and more efficient approach towards large customers.
By doing so, companies are firstly seeking to be recognised as a global and 
powerful group to respond to the demands of their customers which are becoming 
increasingly global. They also seek to achieve economies of scale in marketing and 
other functions, as well as simplify the internal management of the organisation by 
concentrating on a few brands.
Whilst all companies are seeking to develop a common group identity, they 
are at different stages of maturity because of their historical development and the way 
they control their organisations. There exists different kinds of corporate culture 
amongst companies. We saw through the case of Alcatel that the fully globalised 
firm is integrated through a strong, international corporate culture, strongly driven by 
the Centre, which is neither home nor host dominated (Ohmae 1990). On the other
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hand, one finds companies that are bound by a strong culture internationally but 
which is not the fruit of a strategy but rather the result of history. For example, Total 
has a long-established, powerful corporate culture which has developed as a result of 
a history of having long relied upon expatriate managers, and a Centre which was 
strongly involved in the management of its operating companies. Similarly, through 
their centralised mode of management, Saint Gobain and Peugeot have developed 
strong corporate cultures. Thus, in these companies, a kind of innate, natural 
corporate culture has developed over the years, which is strongly marked by French 
culture.
Other companies encounter difficulties in creating a group culture because of 
their young age internationally. AXA and La Redoute for example do not have an 
international culture. Previously their main focus was upon domestic markets, and 
they have grown extremely rapidly in the space of a few years mainly via 
acquisitions. They thus remain constituted of disparate organisations with very little 
synergies. The lack of an international corporate culture in these companies is also 
due to the highly local nature of their sector which means companies remain more 
centered upon their local requirements than the benefits of the group.
French companies’ legacies do not facilitate the creation of a common group 
identity. Developing a group identity implies a culture of transparency, of developing 
collaboration and trust within the organisation. French firms’ long secretive nature 
runs counter to internal and external openness and organisation-wide information 
circulation, and remains a major obstacle to developing synergies within companies. 
All firms encountered strong internal resistance from managers exchanging 
information about their practices, for fear of consolidation and rationalisation which 
might follow.
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Benchmarking, characterised as the ‘process of continually searching for the 
best methods, practices, and processes and either adopting or adapting their good 
features and implementing them to become the ‘best of the best” (Bélanger et al. 
1999: 52) is an indicator of a firm’s international maturity. Global firms, in their 
search for optimum productivity, use systems of benchmarking, in tandem with 
worldwide management programmes of international standardisation, in order to 
achieve global standards of performance throughout the organisation.
We noted that Alcatel had a well developed system of international best 
practice. Central functions had a responsibility for searching for the most efficient 
practices internally and externally. Each department was functioning as a kind of 
communication forum, where policies, methodologies and processes were developed 
and tested by international project teams drawn from throughout the group and 
operating in networks. Once a consensus was reached on what was regarded as the 
most efficient method, those were standardised and formalised in manuals, before 
being implemented within BDs under the monitoring of the Centre. When exchange 
of practice did not lead to full standardisation, at the very least standards were set in 
the Centre, for example in terms of inventory ratios, time-to-order, etc., towards 
which BDs were expected to converge. Central experts provided large flows of 
information and guidance to the operational managements, in the form of internal 
performance league tables and benchmarking against competitors, and the business 
divisions were expected to *self-regulate’ themselves and decide upon the most 
appropriate course of action to improve their productivity.
Benchmarking remains largely underdeveloped in other French companies, as 
none had a well-defined policy of systematically exchanging best practice throughout 
the corporation. Often brought in by Anglo-Saxon consultants, this management 
practice was introduced in the 1990s, but evidence shows that it was implemented 
very slowly and unsystematically. For example, what some companies called
W o r l d w i d e  m a n a g e m e n t  p r o g r a m m e s  a n d  b e n c h m a r k i n g
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benchmarking was in fact an exercise of collecting data concerning competitors, but 
which was not furthered by analysis of lags in firms’ performance internally or by 
exchanges of information among operational teams: benchmarking therefore 
remained largely sterile. In other firms whilst there were some exchange of ideas 
through meetings or visits to various sites, this was done on an ad hoc and piecemeal 
basis. There was a lack of coherent strategy from top management in implementing 
this type of method. No French groups had dedicated central functions to perform 
this role, nor had they developed the expertise to be working on business processes.
Further, benchmarking is tightly linked to business process analysis (Hammer 
et al. 1993), which in turn is underpinned by a philosophy of minimising costs and 
maximising efficiency. French firms are still in the embryonic stage of maximising 
the efficiency of their modes of operations, and, although they put increasing 
emphasis upon maximising profitability, their notion of profit maximisation is not as 
heightened as American firms’. Further, as we noted above, French companies are 
not used to circulating information throughout the organisation, and this is required 
for a policy of exchanging best practice to function effectively.
Control through expatriate managers
We have noted above that companies do use expatriate managers to control 
their operations. This constitutes a common feature. As indicated in Table 6 - 2 ,  
over half the companies studied use home nationals in key management positions, 
usually those of general managements, finance, and, to a lesser extent, production.
Apart from the case of Alcatel as discussed above, the exceptions to this 
pattern are AXA, La Redoute and Vinci. AXA and La Redoute, as a result of their 
young age internationally, did not have the philosophy nor the means to deploy 
expatriate managers. In the case of Vinci, the nature of the industry barred it from 
using expatriates. Construction, being a sector which is very local in nature, based on 
traditions and customs, requires an intimate knowledge of the local marketplace,
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leaving no other option but to rely on local nationals. The sector variable thus does 
have an influence on companies’ approach, but where it is less constraining, French 
firms’ preferred mode of control is through expatriates. Given the centrality of 
expatriate managers in French firms, it is important to examine in greater detail their 
roles.
Table 6 - 2 :  Companies’ prevailing approach to staffing
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E x p a tr ia te s  in  k e y  
p o s i t io n s
N o  p h i lo s o p h y  o f  
u s in g  e x p a tr ia te s
Alcatel X
AXA X
Crédit Lyonnais X
Danone X
La Redoute X
Peugeot X
Saint Gobain X
Schneider X
Total X
Vinci X
Vivendi Water X
The common denominator behind their use is that they enable central 
decisions and policies to be transmitted to the operating company as well as 
information to be communicated back to headquarters thereby giving the parent a 
vision of the operating company’s activities. Their use is also linked to maintaining 
the French trust-based management system. Finally, they are the key means through 
which the group culture is created within companies.
A strong characteristic of the use of expatriate managers within French 
companies is that they cumulate roles and responsibilities. Thus, one often finds a 
high concentration of powers in the hands of a few key individuals in the UK 
operating companies. Thus, in one instance, a French expatriate manager was 
heading a global business division whilst managing the UK operating company and 
handling various international projects. In another, a French expatriate manager in 
addition to his responsibilities as general manager of the UK operating company, was
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representing the group operations in the UK, was responsible for the international 
development of the group in parts of the world and was overseeing the integration of 
major group acquisitions. The numbers of expatriates is thus not proportional to the 
power they exert. Whilst logically a greater number of expatriates tend to be 
associated with greater influence within the operating company, in fact a single 
individual could weigh heavily upon the firm’s management.
The concentration of decision-making in the hands of a few in some cases led 
to tensions with British managements who did not feel fully integrated within the core 
management process, as a British manager explains:
‘In fact the majority of the Board was French. And there was certainly, what 
we called the A team and the B team. The A team was alleged to have 
detailed discussions on how to run the company after 6.30 at night when the 
English had gone home. And there was the B team, which was me and the 
marketing director. (...) It was the French that decided the important things’.
This also led to problems of communication with the rest of the organisation, 
as information did not flow well throughout. This was further heightened by the fact 
that, in contrast with American multinationals, who are known to be highly 
formalised, with a qualified, detailed, explicit management style, relying upon formal 
authority hierarchy and procedures, French firms’ management style was informal. 
Indeed, French companies did not tend to resort to formalised manuals to 
communicate information downwards and expatriate managers remained the key link.
Whilst there were common reasons behind the use expatriate managers, no 
general conclusion could be drawn as to the role these managers play, as we found 
that firms used them in various ways depending upon a number of factors. Three 
roles have been identified ranging from ‘strategic control’, ‘operational control’ or 
‘gate-keeper’. The table presents a simple two-by-two matrix, positioning firms 
identified in the table above as tending to operate through expatriate managers. The 
two main contextual variables include the degree of integration of the national unit 
within the group and the country’s role within group strategy, bearing in mind that in
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reality the picture is akin to other circumstances so that one may find variations 
within those roles.
High
Centralisation
Low
Operational control 
(Peugeot, Saint Gobain, Total)
Strategic /  operational control
Strategic control 
(Schneider, Vivendi Water)
(Danone) G ate-Keeper
(Vinci)
Low High
Country's Strategic Importance
Figure 6 - 3 :  The roles of expatriate managers
Expatriate managers’ role will focus upon having ‘strategic control’, that is a 
decision-making role in the management of the foreign operation, in cases where the 
operating company benefits from a large degree of autonomy and represents a major 
market for the group, as in the case of Schneider and Vivendi Water. French 
managers make key decisions about the operating company regarding business 
development, investments and conveys the country’s perspective to the Centre, who 
mainly acts in a validating capacity.
The expatriate will play a role of operational management, if the national unit 
is integrated within group operations. Three cases fall within this definition, namely 
Saint Gobain, Total, and, more recently, Peugeot, which all exert a high degree of 
centralisation over the operating company and strong control over their expatriate 
managers. French nationals dispose of few powers, their role is essentially that of an 
implementer of corporate strategies and policies and a day-to-day interpreter of the 
local market situation, eventually having some input into central decisions. Their 
proximity to the Centre tends to be more marked than the strategic controllers’.
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Finally, the French expatriate manager will act as a ‘gate-keeper’ when the 
firm cannot rely on any other means of control upon the national unit, as in the case 
of the construction sector where the French parent was forced to rely on British 
management. Vinci was dependent upon three French managers to transmit 
information over the running of the operation, and have an understanding and a 
transparency over the operations. Whilst two were operating at corporate level, the 
other kept an eye on the production costs of construction sites. However, in this type 
of situation, the expatriate managers have no decision-making power, their role being 
limited to maintaining a link between France and England, contributing to creating 
trust between both sides, and, at most, influencing local management in their 
decisions.
Within those categories, depending on other factors, one will find various 
degrees within those roles, some being more or less strategic or more or less 
operational. The evolution of corporate structures towards integrated worldwide 
product lines described earlier implies that expatriates’ role is shifting away from that 
of country ‘barons’ towards that of an interface between the Centre and the national 
unit, and which is becoming increasingly ‘operational’ rather than ‘strategic’. At 
present in many firms studied, the model is still in the process of evolution, with 
‘operational’ and ‘strategic’ control co-habiting.
Two further particular instances have been identified, which take place in 
specific circumstances, the first, from the perspective of developing managers, and 
the second, at key strategic times. We found that French companies do use their 
British operations as a development ground for their managers. Many groups studied 
send their managers for a temporary assignment in the UK with a view to exposing 
them to an Anglo-Saxon economy6. The second case where a firm might send a 
greater number of expatriates than otherwise is at a time of significant change within 
a national unit, for example the integration phase of a newly acquired firm, an
6 The important role of Britain as a learning platform for French managements will be the subject of 
more detailed examination in chapter 8.
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overhaul of an operation in financial difficulty, or the transfer of specific competence. 
Expatriates in this case bring a professional competence and their knowledge of group 
methods. We saw for instance in Chapter 5 that French firms sent many expatriate 
managers in technical functions after having acquired their British operations.
6.3. National traits
We argue here that the historical and cultural background of French firms 
exerts an important influence upon the ways in which they internationalise. This 
section discusses the traits which appear to characterise the ways in which French 
companies evolve towards an international model.
As part of the general evolution towards worldwide product lines, all firms 
have strengthened the role of the Centre. Yet, a characteristic feature of this 
evolution is that it is has taken place within a mindset of controlling foreign 
operations and imposing a French approach rather than devolving responsibilities. 
This trait is most manifested in Peugeot, Saint Gobain and Total, where managements 
retained key decision-making power and managed through a core of French expatriate 
managers. Whilst Vivendi Water did not impose its approach from the outset, as it 
first adapted to the UK market by decentralising strategic decision-making, it has 
nonetheless retained control by subsequently placing expatriates in key positions.
This has led some firms to impose their group methods inappropriately. In 
Peugeot and Saint Gobain, for example, the tight control from the parent has at times 
led to tensions with the local teams as companies lacked sensitivity to the specificities 
of the local market (cf. also Chapter 5). This need for imposing group methods is 
partly linked to French companies’ single vision, centered upon their firm. As French 
firms have long been closed upon themselves, not only from an external point of view 
where they have long lived in a quasi state of autarky, but also internally, with French 
managements being imbued in the same culture and having spent their career within
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the same group, this has contributed to creating an inward-looking vision among its 
management.
This points to the potentially contradictory logic of relying on expatriate 
managers. Whilst on the one hand they can facilitate the implementation of group 
policies, on the other hand, they can restrict the local company’s thinking. The 
expatriate can facilitate the integration of the operating company into the parent. On 
the other hand, he can impose group methods ill-adapted to local circumstances, for 
he lacks sufficient distance from the parent ways of operating, to be able to strike a 
balance between the need for integration and the need to adapt to the local situation.
Nonetheless, this trait itself is lessening as companies evolve towards a global 
model and are beginning to devolve responsibilities to foreign operations, reflected in 
the establishment of centres of competence outside France in some cases. This is 
indicative of a growing awareness by French managements that a global corporation 
cannot be managed from the Centre and an increasing legitimisation of a diversity of 
perspectives. Together, this constitutes a sign of maturity as French companies 
proceed towards globalisation.
A further characteristic trait that emerges is the weight of managers in French 
companies’ mode of functioning. Our evidence has shown French multinationals’ 
strong tendency to operate through expatriate managers, with comprehensive powers 
and responsibilities. It is through managers that foreign operations are controlled, 
that group culture is created and know-how transmitted. Even when firms relied on 
manuals and procedures to transmitting their policies, expatriate managers were used 
to transmit the reporting for example in Saint Gobain. We also came across cases 
where expatriate managers even occupied functions of operational control, rather than 
highly strategic positions.
Underlying French firms’ mode of management is thus the presence of a 
strong, informal and implicit culture amongst French managements, based on trust,
\which has developed through expatriate managers, their internal labour markets and 
job-for-life policies. This type of culture, which has developed naturally, contrasts 
with the Anglo-Saxon type of corporate culture which the organisation purposively 
creates so that the organisation as a whole conforms, and which is explicit and 
formalised7. The key advantage of the presence of this strong culture is that it allows 
for effective communications amongst management. However, lack of transparency 
results from companies’ informal mode of management, as power being in the hands 
of a few, means that responsibilities are not clearly defined. As they are strongly 
identifying with their group culture and operate in closed networks, French 
managements have had little need for integrating British management as stated by this 
British manager:
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‘That is difficult, in the lack of discipline of French business atmosphere, 
they tend to have informal meetings that occur, people just congregate in a 
corridor or an office, and talk about something and make a decision amongst 
the people that are there. Whereas the English would put up some agenda 
and would summon people to a meeting and that group of people would be 
considered to be the right group to make a specific decision. There will be 
no minutes, the only way you will actually know that it happened is to have 
been there or subsequently talk to somebody who was there. That’s why it is 
actually very important to spend a lot of time in France at Head Office, 
because the only way you actually find out what is going on is to be there’.
Further, because French firms rely upon trusted managers, one does not find a 
well-developed culture of performance management in the Anglo-Saxon sense where, 
senior managers are given significant autonomy and are evaluated mainly on the basis 
of their financial performance. If targets are not met, managers are given a set time 
scale within which to put the operations back to profitability or else face being 
sanctioned. In our sample of companies, when financial results of an operation 
deteriorate the group takes necessary action, but rarely are sanctions taken against 
executives. Managers are fully trusted by the Centre and as they monopolise 
responsibilities, their authority is not questioned within their group.
7 Peters et al. (1982) have for example cited the case of Disney, which through its recruitment 
procedures, its apprenticeship programme, its numerous formalised and detailed rules, informal 
socialisation mechanisms, strong performance management system, as well as mission statements, 
inculcated Disney values.
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The analysis of how French firms adapt themselves to the demands of the 
global environment reveals a limited ability to integrate international methods in their 
structures. This was apparent in Peugeot, Saint Gobain, Schneider and Total which 
faced difficulties reforming their cumbersome structures. French companies, having 
emerged from a stable institutional context, have not been used to reacting quickly. 
Alcatel for instance was forced to create a flexible culture through a corporate ‘hi- 
speed’ transformation programme to try and instill change in the behaviour of its 
employees, and gain in agility. French firms’ reluctance to undergo fundamental 
change was also evident in their tendency to duplicate their structures abroad. As 
already noted, except from Vivendi Water, which did not hesitate to create new 
structures in order to be close to the UK market, we saw that Peugeot, Saint Gobain 
and Total implemented their group methods unilaterally in foreign operations, 
sometimes without sufficiently taking into account the specificities of the local 
environment.
Our findings show that it is often under outside pressures that French firms 
engage in the change process, such as a crisis situation or under the influence of a 
dynamic company leader or a powerful new acquisition. Thus, Alcatel was surprised 
by the changes in the telecommunications market in the mid-1990s, and it was the 
shock of a financial crisis, together with a change in leader that forced it to undertake 
a radical corporate restructuring. In the same way, after resisting globalisation for 
over a decade, Peugeot begun changing its strategy under a new leadership. In other 
cases, the acquisition of a major pole has forced firms to initiate change. In 
Schneider, the acquisition of a major American firm, Square D, has challenged the 
status quo that existed between the different companies that Schneider acquired, 
which up until then fiercely sought to maintain their independence, and forced greater 
cooperation amongst each other. In group Total, it is managers who were brought in 
from outside who were behind the introduction of the organisational reform, whereas 
hitherto the group had remained inward-looking. Those external factors acted as 
catalysts, provoking change within the firm.
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One sees, in addition to a reluctance to undertake fundamental change, a 
partial vision amongst French managements of how to integrate certain kind of 
international management methods. This is demonstrated in the case of Total, in the 
way the decentralisation exercise was approached. Whilst management rightly 
pointed to the need for evolving its structures in order to face changing international 
markets, the exercise was implemented in a piecemeal fashion, reflecting a partial 
understanding of the philosophy behind the practice of decentralisation. Management 
attempted to follow consultants’ Anglo-Saxon methods and to decentralise overnight 
without first adapting its structures and the behaviour of employees, who had 
operated in a highly centralised fashion for decades. The exercise, being 
incompatible with the group’s existing structures was eventually counterproductive. 
Similarly, we have come across companies that, in their search for more rigour, have 
radically shifted their approach and adopted highly structured financial control 
systems. As this manager points out, a too radical shift could go against the grain of 
the existing system and be detrimental:
‘One should not fall into the other extreme, one can have very good
reporting and nonetheless lose sense of the business’.
These traits are not immutable however. Our findings point to a clear 
tendency towards a global model of organisation in French firms’ strategies and 
structures. All have gained an increasingly global vision of their business. This in 
turn denotes an increasing market-responsiveness amongst previously insulated 
French companies, and a growing awareness and openness to the outside world, in a 
now global and competitive environment. French firms are also seeking to gain a 
more structured, rigorous, transparent and performance-oriented mode of 
management. However this takes place painfully, and goes against the grain of their 
established ways of operating. In some extreme cases, there is incremental change 
and a strong continuity in firms’ modes of functioning as exemplified in the case of 
Schneider, which faced difficulties clarifying its corporate structures.
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6.4. Conclusion
French multinationals’ internationalisation clearly takes place within a broad 
pattern of Anglo-Saxonisation. Indeed under strong global competitive pressures, 
French firms have deployed global product strategies, re-focused on core strengths, 
reflecting a new concern for maximising profitability. They have also in the process 
evolved their structures towards an integrated worldwide organisation model. 
However, our findings have also shown that within this overall evolution, they have 
retained a number of distinctive features. We can thus conclude to an 
internationalisation à la française.
Whilst they retained marked French specificities, the international French 
model is highly diverse. Companies have tended to duplicate their structures and 
retain strong corporate cultures abroad, and thus, one does not find a systematic 
French management model, in contrast with the standardised American model or the 
Japanese lean manufacturing model8. The lack of a well established management 
model can be traced to the French business context, as noted in Chapter 4: because 
the French firm has remained relatively insular and has been developed under the sole 
authority of their CEOs who managed their group in a highly personal way; because 
French firms do not have the benefit of a vast domestic market unlike US firms, 
which had led them to standardise their management methods to benefit from 
economies of scale; and finally, as their management model has not been subjected to 
strong competitive pressures, the French domestic model has evolved in its own 
ways9. The emerging international French model is thus complex.
Whilst French firms are seeking to emulate the global model, they remain far 
from attaining the attributes of this model. Only Alcatel has reached a high level of
8 Even though these are idealised abstractions, they none the less capture key features of the American 
and Japanese cases.
9 We will note that this point contradicts the predominant view within the institutionalist strand, 
which argue that the US-UK model is more diverse than the continental model because it is less 
regulated. In reality, the UK-US model is governed by the rules of markets and hence impose a 
common logic of efficiency upon fims, ultimately leading to a standardisation of their practices.
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\globalisation, but this in turn is explained by many factors. First, in contrast with 
other French firms that have internationalised from a strong French base, Alcatel was 
propelled to a position of a highly internationalised group thanks to the acquisition of 
the European telecommunications arm of the American group ITT in 1986. Its R&D 
centres and productive capacity were overnight dispersed throughout Europe, with 
France no longer being the technological centre of the group nor its main market, 
representing under thirty per cent of group turnover. Still the product of the French 
statist high-technology system, this enabled Alcatel to escape the rigidities of its 
home environment and effect drastic changes as it did not have the weight of a 
predominant French base on its shoulders, unlike the majority of others.
The extremely rapid evolution which has taken place in the 
telecommunications industry has been another key driver for change. 
Telecommunications has evolved from a traditionally protected and national industry 
into a highly competitive, global and complex industry in the space of ten years, as a 
result of the liberalisation of telecommunications markets worldwide and extremely 
rapid technological developments. The sector has imposed significant pressures on 
firms to be innovative, market responsive as well as highly efficient. This has forced 
a radical overhaul of Alcatel’s modes of functioning in order to be able to survive. 
Except from the highly competitive car industry, the other firms have not been 
subjected to the same kind of constraints, which in turn partly explains the slower 
pace and lesser degree to which they have undergone change. For example, unlike 
the telecommunications industry, the oil sector is characterised by an oligopolistic 
environment, and a much longer and stable cyclical business pattern spanning more 
than five years.
An additional element behind Alcatel’s organisational transformation is the 
influence of stock markets, which is itself partially linked to the industry. Large 
financing needs explain the fact that telecommunications firms are particularly 
dependent on financial markets and thus under strong pressures to maximise short­
term profitability. These new, real constraints were brought into perspective during
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September 1998, as the group fell victim to attacks from financial investors and saw 
its share price plumet by forty per cent in one day, on the announcement of less than 
expected yearly profits by the CEO. Following that traumatic day for the group, 
quarterly reporting of financial results and new internal information systems were 
introduced, enabling faster and more accurate flows of financial information.
Further, the profitability crisis which hit the group in 1994 was a catalyst to 
the change process. As we saw in the previous chapter, Alcatel’s profitability was 
severely hit by changes in the competitive environment of telecommunications in the 
early 1990s, which saw the end of the exclusive and long-term relationships of 
telecommunications manufacturers with national operators as a result of 
liberalisation, with the latter considerably reducing the overall level of their 
investments as well as putting strong downward pressures on prices. On top of the 
financial crisis, a management crisis erupted as Alcatel’s then CEO, Pierre Suard, was 
brought under investigation by the French justice department into allegations of 
corruption which eventually led to its resignation. This created an emergency 
situation and gave the incoming CEO the opportunity to instil change among 
disoriented management and staff.
Finally, the leader has played a fundamental role in the successful 
transformation of the group. Alcatel has pursued a rigorous, coherent and energetic 
policy in terms of reforming its organisation culture since the mid-1990s, with the 
introduction of a market oriented product line, a radical cost-cutting programme, 
together with the implementation of an ongoing programme of transformation of the 
group culture. Its new CEO, Serge Tchuruk, who took the helm of the group in 1995 
is French, but having spent a major part of his career in American groups, had 
experience of managing according to Anglo-Saxon principles. In France more than 
anywhere else, the leader exerts a strong influence upon the performance of their 
group, given their highly centralised nature and, for a long time, their relative 
insulation from outside pressures.
157
Globalis
Historical background, degree of internationalisation, industry, financial 
investors, top management: there are many conditions which have made possible 
Alcatel’s break away from its national model. The features of the global firm are 
incompatible with French companies’ national features, and as a result are not 
automatically transferable to the French model. In creating a genuinely global entity, 
there is thus an issue of possibility as well as management will, which the proponents 
of the ‘global model’ such as Ohmae (1990) tend to overlook. Alcatel therefore is 
likely to remain the French exception. The most likely way that French companies 
may evolve is towards a hybrid model, which will have both international traits and 
French specificities. However, this model remains successful, as, Saint Gobain for 
example, continues to manage in a French way, but, given the competitive conditions 
it faces, remains appropriate.
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Chapter VII
THE MANAGEMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES IN FRENCH COMPANIES 
THROUGH THEIR INTERNATIONAUSATIOH
7.1. Introduction
This chapter examines French multinationals’ approach to managing their 
human resources through their international development. We have mentioned in 
previous chapters that French companies began internationalising at different stages. 
This notion will be examined here in greater detail, for it appears that French 
companies’ international development pattern exerts a significant influence upon their 
current behaviour, and in particular the management of their human resources. The 
concept of a staged approach to French companies’ internationalisation is also 
strongly linked to their national character, as French companies tend to be reactive, 
often responding to outside pressures rather than being trend-setters, hence a pattern 
of stage-by-stage evolution.
We have identified three main chronological stages in companies’ 
international development, as indicated in Table 7 —1. The first phase took place 
prior to the 1970s, in a context characterised by lesser competition and limited 
internationalisation. Internationalisation took place with a colonial frame of mind 
towards the host environments as, typically, companies imposed their home products 
and methods, and sent their home country nationals to head their subsidiaries which
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were subsequently ran like a fiefdom. The oil group Total, which internationalised in 
order to exploit natural resources, established an operation in the North Sea in the 
early 1960s. In electrical equipment, Group Schneider was internationally active in 
the UK as early as the 1960s through its two main divisions Télémécanique and 
Merlin Gérin1, the former having developed mainly through acquisitions and the 
other, via internal growth. Though not part of an international expansion strategy, 
Peugeot also shares characteristic features from the ‘old’ intemationalisers. It 
inherited its British manufacturing operation following the acquisition of the 
European operations of Chrysler in the mid-1970s which it mainly bought for its 
French operations, leaving the integration of the UK unit until the 1990s1 2.
Table 7 — 1: French multinationals’ stages of internationalisation
Period o f  foundation  /  
International context
Pre-1970s M id-1980s M id-1990s
Pre-1970s:
Little internationalisation  
Little com petition  
Colonialism; no group synergies
Peugeot
Schneider
Total
1980s:
International deregulation  
First steps abroad
Alcatel
Crédit Lyonnais 
Danone 
Saint Gobain 
Vinci
Vivendi Water
1990s:
Strong international p ressures  
Rapid internationalisation  
Integration o f  structures
AXA
La Redoute
The second phase took place in the late 1980s and marks the beginning of the 
internationalisation of French companies on a large scale. In the context of
1 Schneider acquired the two French electrical equipment manufacturers, Merlin Gérin and 
Télémécanique in 1976 and 1988 respectively, and which it merged into Schneider Electric in 1994.
2 Crédit Lyonnais established a subsidiary in the UK in the late 19th century, as banks followed 
multinationals abroad (Jones 1996), but its behaviour remains closer to companies that 
internationalised in the 1980s as the group begun an ambitious global development in the late 1980s. 
In the UK, the group acquired operations which were much larger than its original subsidiary.
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worldwide deregulation, French companies began internationalising in the UK, albeit 
in a cautious and sceptical manner as we saw in Chapter 5.
The last and current period we have identified in the evolution of French 
companies began in the latter half of the 1990s and has been marked by a rapid 
acceleration of internationalisation under powerful imperatives of globalisation. The 
accelerating process of regional integration, the increasing opening up of national 
markets worldwide in response to liberalisation and deregulatory trends and the 
globalisation of competition have forced companies to internationalise in order to be 
able to survive the cut-throat competitive environment. All sectors have been taken 
in by the spiral of globalisation and worldwide consolidation, even those previously 
purely national. French companies, which were previously not concerned by 
internationalisation, such as the insurer AXA and the retailer La Redoute, began to 
rush abroad, whilst those that left their borders ten years earlier accelerated their 
global development.
The period at which firms adopted internationalisation appears to have a direct 
effect upon their behaviour and the way they react to the demands of the international 
environment, as well as upon the strength and number of French features that emerge 
abroad. As we saw in Chapter 6, French firms which have been in the UK for more 
than twenty years have well-established, more cumbersome structures and tend to be 
less receptive to change, and overall display a French style of behaviour. In group 
Schneider, the strong and lasting influence of the French parent on the behaviour of 
UK operating company made it more difficult to integrate its disparate operations, 
and as a result, created problems for the subsidiary to properly evolve in the 
competitive UK market. Total faced difficulties in reforming its organisation 
structures, given its long-established, highly centralised and hierarchical structures. 
Peugeot also considered its UK operation as an appendage to group operations and 
faced some resistance from the local management teams when it moved to integrate 
the operation, the legacy of its long international history.
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In contrast, the newcomers on the international scene have had little 
difficulties adapting themselves because they did not have the weight of history upon 
their shoulders. One observes a freshness in the behaviour of AXA and La Redoute, 
as reflected in their rapidity to act, their open-mindedness and diversity. These 
companies have had the advantage firstly of being on virgin ground abroad as well as 
developing at a time when all firms are internationalising and where the basic rules 
and methods of success abroad are increasingly known and shared amongst 
companies. These new companies are no longer the pioneers of internationalisation 
in the way that those who left their borders ten years ago were. Further, their 
behaviour is dictated by strong international competitive pressures. AXA and La 
Redoute are thus more malleable in today’s fast-changing international markets. One 
finds that French features are much less marked than in the group of oldest 
international companies.
The group of companies that internationalised in the second period are mid­
way between these groups. They benefit from an international experience while not 
having had time to export their cumbersome French structures in the operating 
companies. They departed from their domestic environment cautiously and have 
gained both their French culture and an international culture and thus benefit from an 
international experience which is highly pertinent for their development in today’s 
international markets. Like the young ones, they find themselves market responsive 
and flexible3.
In this chapter, we will thus explore how companies have responded to the HR 
challenges posed by their rapid internationalisation, and the effects of their
5 The conclusions we draw from firms’ period of internationalisation disproves a number of statements 
and typologies found in the literature. Perlmutter’s long-established typology whereby companies 
would develop through various stages from an ethnocentric through a polycentric to a geocentric 
approach are not grounded. ‘Length of international experience' does not imply ‘international 
maturity' - by that we mean familiarity with Anglo-Saxon rules of behaviour: companies that 
internationalise in today’s context adopt a global frame of mind very rapidly as exemplified by AXA 
or La Redoute, when those that internationalised thirty years ago are in no better position to respond to 
current challenges. Developing a geocentric organisation is not natural as Perlmutter’s typology 
suggests, and depend upon a much more complex set of factors (cf. for example Chapter 6 and the case 
of Alcatel).
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international background upon their responses. Given that French firms have evolved 
in a static and closed labour market at home, this raises the issue as to whether they 
have developed a strategic approach to managing their human resources abroad. The 
chapter begins with an examination of the profiles of French companies’ international 
managers and how they are developed, pointing to a highly distinctive, elitist 
approach. It then considers companies’ responses to developing international systems 
of career development, examining their evolution through their internationalisation.
7.2. Specificities of French companies' international managers
In this part, we consider who are French companies’ international managers, 
first examining their profile and secondly how companies develop them. The profile 
of international managers is highly distinctive and strongly specific to French 
companies. They are by and large constituted of French executives. These 
individuals belong to a group, which is a small, highly skilled elite with concentrated 
power and responsibilities.
In the early stages of their internationalisation, French companies relied upon 
their own managers to handle their international development. Vivendi Water and 
Saint Gobain are illustrative cases. Both companies had very few internationally 
skilled staff when they began internationalising in the late 1980s and sent their own 
French executives to take responsibility for overhauling their British operations. The 
period of integration of their acquisitions was a highly strategic phase as companies 
launched significant restructuring and investment projects. Relying upon home 
nationals enabled them to ensure changes could be carried out within group 
requirements, as well as ensuring a transfer of their technical expertise and group 
methods. Further, it enabled French managements, who had little international 
experience, to imbue themselves into an international culture.
As Bauer and Cohen (1981) showed, French executives are selected within a 
very restricted pool and form a small elite (cf. Chapter 4). They are drawn from the
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top administrative and engineering schools, they occupy executive positions from the 
outset, and they are intensively socialised to the group. They thereby constitute a 
team of managers who are imbued in the same culture, share the same values and 
have a common vision of business and, having spent their careers within the group, 
are very attached to it.
After the initial phase of integration, French companies continued to manage 
through a core of managers. These managers, having gained precious international 
skills to their group, were then entrusted with key responsibilities. Rather than 
implementing structures that would enable them to be replaced by local nationals, one 
finds that French companies have tended to multiply the responsibilities of incumbent 
French managers. We showed in Chapter 6 that French expatriate managers 
cumulated sometimes three or four roles. One also sees companies using their trained 
international managers to support their international expansion in other regions of the 
world. Gradually, these managers acquired unique skills, becoming almost 
irreplaceable. Thus, French companies have developed international managers, but 
who are essentially French nationals and in small numbers, thereby reproducing the 
same pattern as in their domestic operations.
Depending upon their length of international experience, there are variations 
across companies however, some having more or less international managers, and 
more or less French nationals. Total which has operated abroad for many years and 
operates in a highly internationalised sector, has a much larger population of 
international managers - totalling around 1000 in the oil exploration division which 
accounts for about a fifth of the division’s total workforce. None the less, one finds a 
similar elitist vision of management development in the group. Thus, its high 
potential managers are part of an elite who have been recruited as high potential 
managers. These managers have an international vision, they have had several spells 
abroad, are multi-skilled and capable of operating in diverse international 
environments. The bulk of Total’s international managers is constituted by French 
nationals, although the group has over time developed a number of British managers
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amongst its senior managers given the long involvement of the group in the North 
Sea.
Companies that are young internationally have a more diverse international 
management profile. In AXA and La Redoute, international mobility is embryonic, 
but one finds a far greater proportion of foreign managers in posts of responsibility. 
For example, two-thirds of AXA’s top 400 executives are foreign managers. Alcatel, 
which as we saw has had a distinctive international development from other French 
companies, also has a highly internationalised cadre of international managers with 
around two-thirds of its top 500 managers being non-French.
The development o f French companies’ international managers
As a result of their distinctive traits, international managers à la Française are 
developed gradually and slowly. The development of high potentials in the majority 
of French firms will be carefully planned over several years through succession 
planning and French companies put significant resources into their development.
The predominant philosophy found across companies is to develop managers 
who are polyvalent and highly socialised. For example, in Saint Gobain, managers 
considered as high potential managers are extensively rotated across functions 
throughout the group. Although not systematic, the career path of an individual will 
typically include a stay in corporate planning functions so that they can gain an 
understanding of strategy development and key strategic issues facing the group; an 
operational responsibility such as that of heading a manufacturing operation. The 
group will also seek to give its key managers specific experiences such as managing 
large teams or putting them in a crisis type of situation, for example a company facing 
a strike, which the company sees as a way of evaluating managers’ ability to react in 
complex situations. High potential managers will also be exposed to various 
management training programmes.
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Through these experiences, French companies seek to develop well-rounded 
executives, with an in-depth knowledge of the company. Having been rotated 
extensively and having held a large number of responsibilities within the group, they 
are multi-functional. They have a command of the key issues the business is faced 
with, and of highly complex strategic, financial or technological issues, as well as an 
extensive networks of relations within the group.
Total has, in addition, a distinctive policy of placing an emphasis upon 
international mobility for developing its top managers. The group sees it as the main 
way to create highly skilled managers capable of adapting to any given situation. 
Senior managers are systematically rotated geographically but they are also rotated 
across functions on average every three years, and if a manager is not available for 
mobility, he is no longer considered to be a high potential manager. Foreign 
managers who are seen as having the potential to be group managers are strongly 
socialised: they will systematically be sent on assignment at headquarters so that the 
group can assess their competence and ability to fit into the group culture.
Whilst French international managers are carefully and well-developed, their 
career development is not part of a strategy and, rather, takes place largely on a case- 
by-case basis. The career development of individuals often remains under the 
discretion of their superior, and thus depend upon criteria which remain subjective. 
One also finds that it takes place mostly through an evolutionary career path rather 
than via training programmes. Given French companies’ elitist vision of management 
development, most French companies do not have a management development policy 
that covers the entire managerial population. Management development policy is 
mostly reserved for managers who have already been selected as high potential 
managers. Companies do offer training programmes that target a broader population 
of managers but their purpose is to develop information exchange and integration 
rather than real development. For example, Crédit Lyonnais developed a programme 
‘Crédit Lyonnais Global View’ targeted at different categories of managers, which is 
a short course providing a general introduction to participants about the different
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activities of the group and is aimed at developing participants’ sense of belonging to 
the group. Real development programmes are mostly restricted to high potential 
managers.
French firms’ approach to management development contrasts with Alcatel’s, 
for example. The group has radically overhauled its development approach and its 
policy is now integrated into corporate strategy. The corporate training programmes 
are aimed at reinforcing the group core values and allow for an integrated individual 
career path. Thus, the group development policy covers all managerial levels, 
including executive managers, young high potential managers who have three to five 
years experience, as well as key managers, such as Key Account Managers and other 
specific expert roles. Alcatel has placed much emphasis on acquiring key behaviours, 
which have been clearly defined and do not solely focused upon technical skills: they 
include team work, cross-functional decision making, mutual trust, sense of common 
goals, quick decision making and an international spirit, as well as key competencies 
of customer orientation, financial awareness and leadership and also an orientation 
towards performance management. For each managerial level and function seen as 
strategic to the group, Alcatel develops its managers within a well-defined policy. 
For example, Key Account Managers develop a global vision of the group, leadership 
skills, the capability to assess their relationship to customers and shorten the sale 
cycle. Thus in contrast with French companies, the group has a clear and global view 
of the competences of its managers.
Conclusion
At present, French companies’ philosophy with regards to the development of 
international managers is to develop a kind of ‘super-elite’, made up mostly of French 
managers who are highly skilled, strongly committed to the group, and who are the 
pillars upon which the organisation depends. As a result, it takes many years to 
develop them. Consequently, this kind of approach does not enable the development 
of international managers on a large scale. As French companies step up their
168
1HRM ill French M
internationalisation and need an increasing number of international managers, their 
policy, based on non-objective criteria and highly specific to the firm, is likely to 
conflict with their requirements internationally. In addition, their approach of 
developing an individual seen as high potential over many years, whilst being 
satisfactory in a stable environment, is less suited to a fast changing environment 
where skills are constantly changing and one cannot predict the kind of skills that will 
be needed tomorrow.
French companies’ philosophy is also in opposition to the vision of the global 
firm ABB, which, as stated by its CEO, is to give managers at all levels of the 
organisation a global outlook through a formative international assignment4 (see also 
Bélanger et al. 1999). ABB’s policy is to organise transfers on a massive scale and in 
a systematic fashion, so that managers will return in their country having learnt a 
different culture, a language, a different perspective of their job, which will enable 
them to be more competent in their own country. Out of this large base, ABB can 
identify managers who have the potential to be among the top 500 managers. In this 
way, the group is not only developing the elite, but competences at all levels of the 
organisation, and is thereby a way of creating an international culture. One can see 
that, relying upon a restricted pool of international managers is unlikely to be 
sustainable in an international firm over the longer-term, and French firms are likely 
to have difficulties developing managers with such specific profiles, and may 
eventually face problems of shortage, an issue we will come back to in the next 
section.
7.3. The development of an international human resources policy
This section deals with how French companies have responded to 
implementing an international system of HRM, in order to enable the development of 
managers throughout the firm, and the identification of high potential managers. One 
can distinguish two phases of development: in the first phase spanning the late 1980s
4 Financial Times, ‘Making local heroes international’, 17 January 1994.
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to the early 1990s, French companies began to emphasise the internationalisation of 
their human resources, but one sees little tangible results. It is only from the late 
1990s onwards, as globalisation accelerates, that companies begin to develop a more 
strategic vision of the development of their human resources internationally.
1. An embryonic IHR function
The starting point to implementing a strategic IHR system is to create an 
international vision in the HR function. In French companies, the HR function is still 
young internationally. Within the companies that began internationalising in the late 
1980s, HR issues were not given priority and were not subject to a reflection on the 
part of companies, as managers focused solely upon operational issues. As noted 
above, French executives handled HR issues at this stage. They personally identified 
and nominated the managers to be placed in key positions abroad, and continued to 
manage a core networks of managers. In those companies, the HR function was not 
involved. For example, Vivendi did not have a corporate HR function with 
international responsibilities until the mid-1990s. Further, one finds that HR 
managers often had little international experience and tended to remain centered upon 
their domestic operations.
Total however, which had long been internationalised, possessed a 
professional international HR function. It had a well developed IHR structure both at 
corporate and divisional level; a key element of which was a strong network of 
gestionnaires de car riè res, who were responsible for international mobility and 
management career development worldwide. The group had a well-defined IHR 
recruitment, management development and international mobility policy. The 
group’s logistics was capable of handling around a 1000 international assignments in 
its exploration division alone and of rotating managers every three years, on a 
systematic basis.
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However, even in this case, one found that line management played a 
prominent role and was not independent of the HR systems and structures. 
Operational managers in the centre retained powers over key decisions relating to 
recruitment, promotion decisions, and remuneration according to criteria which 
remained subjective. The group HR function was limited to handling non-strategic 
HR issues, and administering a certain number of formalised processes, which 
included yearly appraisals with the hierarchical superior together with reviews of 
identification and assessment of high potential managers.
Whilst there has been a growing awareness amongst French companies of the 
importance of taking responsibility for the training of their employees rather than 
relying on the education system over the last decade, which has led to a greater 
professionalisation of the personnel function under the concept of ‘gestion des 
compétences’, and has seen the development of more formalised tools such as 
individual appraisal systems5, there is broad evidence that there remain dysfunctional 
tendencies as line managements retain a predominant role in the management of 
individuals and there is still little transparency as to the conditions of promotion and 
development of individual managers (Roussillon 1998). This French manager 
outlines the difficulty of changing mentalities:
in French M ultinationals
‘End-of-year performance appraisals are of no use if people are not 
courageous: it is courageous to say to someone we like to work with and 
who one is comfortable working with, ‘you have to think about your future 
career, you have to change job or division’. And it is courageous to say to 
someone who is not performing well that ‘there is a problem’, that we will 
help him, I do not mean necessarily to leave the group, but perhaps re­
training him, so that precisely the individual is not handicapped 
subsequently. Line managers do not all have this attitude, but they should 
have. So, bosses must be good managers.’
Thus, at this stage, the HR function within the bulk of French organisations 
remained in the shadow of operational managers. By handling the development of a 
restricted number of individuals, operational managers encroached upon the role of
5 Le M onde, ‘Du diplome 1 la formation tout au long de la vie’, 6 January 1999.
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the HR function and prevented it from conducting its role in recruiting, developing 
and identifying individuals throughout the whole organisation, in a systematic 
fashion. The function lacked the powers and financial means to be able to implement 
policies. As a result, one still does not find a well-defined HR policy in terms of 
recruitment, promotion and identification of managers abroad.
French companies have thus not reached the stage of maturity of a strategic 
HR function of the kind found in Anglo-Saxon firms, where increasingly, the HR 
function is seen as a ‘business partner’ and its role is to align HR strategies and 
policies to business strategy, and is given clearly defined powers and responsibilities 
to develop and implement HR policies (Ulrich 1996; Dolan and Schuler 1995). 
Developing a strategic IHR function would also demand HR managers, who have a 
different kind of competence than that found in traditional personnel functions, and 
who have a good understanding of the business and its human resources implications.
2. The implementation o f an international HR system
Up until recently, French companies put little emphasis on finding non-French 
international managers. As noted above, as French multinationals developed abroad, 
managers who handled the development and subsequent integration of acquired 
operations were French and they formed the bulk of companies’ pool of international 
managers. This constituted what can be characterised as the first stage of the 
internationalisation of human resources in French companies.
However, from the early 1990s onwards, companies, as their 
internationalisation accelerated, became more aware of the need to internationalise a 
broader group of managers. Thus, all have intended to change the profile of their 
international managers and set themselves objectives of internationalising non-French 
managers. Crédit Lyonnais, for example, had 400 expatriate managers out of whom 
less than 10% were foreigners and aimed at raising that proportion to 50%. Total 
aimed at doubling the number of non-French top 200 managers from 50 to about 100.
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Some companies had developed clear ambitions. For example, Crédit Lyonnais, 
Schneider and AXA developed charters for the internationalisation of management, 
which emphasised their political will to become truly multinational, to give 
managements an international dimension, to create an international mobility and 
delegate responsibilities to local managers. They also created an HR department with 
international responsibilities, and resorted to consultants.
However across all companies, one finds that those ambitions were not 
realised. Companies’ principles, more or less clearly defined, were not always 
followed by an action plan for a variety of reasons and companies came up against 
problems in either formulating or implementing a coherent IHR policy. Firstly, one 
notes a lack of willingness amongst French managements to put the structures in 
place because of a lack of outside pressures. Vivendi Water and Saint Gobain for 
instance, after having overhauled their British operations, continued to rely upon a 
handful of French managers to head their international operations, multiplying 
responsibilities upon them, which postponed the need for developing a larger pool of 
international managers. During this period, there was thus little commitment within 
those firms for setting up international management development structures.
Secondly, in other cases, the heavy French corporate structures were a banner 
to the effective implementation of corporate policies6. One often came across internal 
political games blocking the development or implementation of an IHR policy. For 
example in one company, following a change at the head of a corporate HR function, 
the HR director stopped a number of corporate IHR projects which had been launched 
because he sought to minimise group interference in his area of responsibility. In 
another company, the implementation of a common job evaluation system eventually 
fell by the wayside, as it was disputed by a French executive who disagreed with his 
departments’ classification.
6 Out of concern of confidentiality of individual managers, we anonymise those cases.
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VThese examples are not exceptional cases within our sample of companies. In 
one company, the Centre launched an ambitious programme of international mobility 
aimed at developing 1000 international managers. But, when the British HR team 
proposed the centre to do roadshows in the UK to advertise the programme to UK 
managers, their French counterparts backed off asking British managers to wait, as it 
begun to grapple with the issue of who should bear the cost of mobility and how the 
group should go on about marketing its policy. Further problems arose, inherent to 
the French structure and its highly hierarchical organisation. Whilst corporate HR 
directors were prioritising international objectives, middle managements, not used to 
taking decisions at their level, did not have the competence or decision-making 
authority to translate those objectives into effective policies. Thus, a lack of 
commitment for change from top managements, and cumbersome structures which 
were ill-adapted to receiving changes, constituted a handicap for French 
multinationals in implementing IHR structures.
Whilst some companies remained at the stage of philosophical ideas, others 
made unconvincing attempts to internationalise their HR policies as they 
implemented policies partially or inappropriately. Some companies began 
implementing career systems by identifying high performing managers in their 
operating companies, but whose role was limited as they were not part of an 
integrated central structure. For example, Danone set up career committees where 
local high potential managers were identified by the operating company and the 
centre, but these had limited capacities because selection criteria and methods of 
identification of high potential managers were not clearly defined and the career 
development of high potential local managers was not followed up at group level. 
Similarly, Schneider set up ‘people reviews’ within local operating companies, but 
without setting up a formalised or active tracking system of the career paths of these 
local managers at corporate level.
Companies also launched a number of initiatives which included advertising 
senior international positions across the world, or compiling extensive databases of
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managers of their operating companies on their French model but which had little 
functionality and remained mainly a source of information. A number of firms 
initiated young managers’ development programmes, but on an ad hoc basis. For 
example, groups would recruit young Europeans through their operating companies, 
and send them on temporary assignment in France so that they could be sent back to 
their country of origin or in other regions. These addressed specific needs rather than 
being part of an international recruitment policy.
Some companies sought to impose a French approach to management 
development, with varying degrees of success. Peugeot implemented its system of 
management development in the UK operating company, but was forced to backtrack 
shortly after, as its system proved ill-adapted to the specificities of the UK labour 
market. The system was based upon a French vision of career management 
development, that is managers’ careers were planned ahead over several years and 
remuneration was a function of individuals’ seniority, concepts which were not 
common the British labour market where pay was increasingly linked to the job and 
managers’ current performance on the job. Under the Peugeot career management 
system, the UK company found that it lacked the flexibility to adapt its remuneration 
policies to attract and retain staff to UK competitors, and the group was eventually 
forced to withdraw the system.
There was thus at the time a lack of comprehension of how to develop a 
coordinated HR function. In this case, Peugeot was also misled by previous 
experience within its Spanish subsidiary, in which it had successfully implemented 
group policies without encountering major cultural issues. The situation was different 
however as firstly the Spanish labour market was not as competitive and secondly, the 
operating company did not have at the time a well-established career management 
system, and thus the system was of benefit to the Spanish operating company.
Compared with other companies which were in the embryonic stage of an IHR 
policy, Total had a well-developed international human resources policy, which is
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explained by its long international history. But, paradoxically it also showed a 
backward side and its French approach remained strongly marked. Thus, it 
established criteria of identification of high potential managers which were subjective 
or too specific to the French context, such as judging the potential of a manager to 
move two levels above the present post within five years; strict age limits; and a 
willingness to be mobile. The process of identification was done in a collegial 
manner, based on the cross-judgement of several executive managers at corporate 
level, helped by the corporate HR function together with the national unit, rather than 
relying upon objective criteria. French managements favoured this process over one 
based on a set of competencies often found in Anglo-Saxon firms for it was based on 
proximity and the intimate knowledge of managers identified, as a French manager 
explains:
‘This enables us to develop an opinion on people. To the extent that people 
rotate every three years, in a Management Committee of say eight to ten 
people, it is very rare that people being considered are not known to some of 
them, either because one has worked with the person considered. It enables 
us to have several opinions, so, so and so will say ‘X would be suitable for 
the job’, and somebody else will add ‘well, I worked with him, I think he 
lacks this and this” .
Further, the system of promotion of Total was obscure and secretive, as those 
considered to be high potential managers were not told that they were being managed 
by the group, and promotion criteria were not clearly established nor given to 
managers.
The identification of high potential managers was strongly biased, as it was 
within a restricted pool that companies were selecting their future key managers. In 
Total, to be considered as high potential, the candidate had to be recruited as a high 
potential, the company’s selection criteria remained highly restrictive. Further, 
individuals’ career was carefully planned over five years, via systems of succession 
planning, whereby on key positions, several potential successors were considered as 
managerial replacements whilst the managers’ next move was planned ahead.
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In Total, this French-based approach was rejected by its British management 
who saw the process as being highly subjective and further, saw it as not providing 
managers clear possibilities of career development within the group. However, it was 
these managers who the company had difficulties retaining in a highly dynamic 
labour market. The British unit amended the parent policies and added behavioural 
competencies to its evaluation system so that the individual managers could be 
assessed on a common basis, as well as on their ability to demonstrate a number of 
managerial competencies such as their leadership skills. It also added other 
categories of high potentials to those of the parent which focused upon high potential 
from 35 years of age onwards, to include a definition of young high potential 
managers who were less than 30 years old, as well as a category of expert 
professionals who, whilst not being necessarily considered as high potentials were 
highly skilled and seen as capable of undertaking expatriates assignments.
During this initial phase, one generally finds that companies had a French 
vision of the management of human resources, and a lack of understanding of the 
dynamics of the UK labour market. For example, French managements remained 
strongly attached to the loyalty of managers to the group and the notion of paying 
managers as a function of seniority rather than performance. As a result some lacked 
sensitivity to the issue of staff retention in the UK market. When a British manager 
resigned from the organisation, a common trait in the UK as managers seek to 
accelerate their careers (cf. Chapter 5), it was seen as a betrayal by French managers. 
French companies’ restricted vision was also explained by the importance given to 
education credentials obtained by managers and the emphasis upon technical 
competence of managers over other skills such as leadership and management skills. 
Thus, during this period, French companies lacked an open mind towards identifying 
British managers’ potential.
One also sees among some companies a lack of trust and a willingness to 
delegate responsibilities to competent non-French managers, which explains 
companies’ difficulties in reaching their targets of internationalisation of non-French
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managers. As we saw in Chapter 6, for a long time, power and control remained in 
French managements’ hands. Though also evident amongst companies that 
internationalised ten years ago, this is especially marked in the ‘old’ group of 
companies, where one sees French expatriate managers succeeding another over 
several generations rather than delegating responsibilities to local managers. Total 
which had a long international experience abroad had over time promoted a sizeable 
number of British managers as cadres dirigeants. But, these had been extensively 
socialised within the group and were considered part of the group. One found that 
promotions of other non-French managers, as part of the company’s policy of 
internationalisation of management was taking place on a case-by-case basis. 
Further, Total retained decision-making power over the appointments of national 
units’ entire senior management teams and the identification of high potential 
managers, as well as retaining a say in the appointments of the level of managers at 
the levels below. Thus, in the centre, functional heads were given global 
responsibilities for the identification and promotion of their managers worldwide, and 
were backed by a network of ‘gestionnaire de carrières’ responsible for the 
administering of the movements of staff as well as collection of information upon 
each individuals.
Similarly, as Schneider begun to internationalise its human resources policies, 
it did promote some British managers to senior positions in its UK operating 
company but these remained exceptional cases. The establishment of trust thus 
remained a slow process within this group of companies, and as a result they have had 
very low quotas of foreign managers in their management ranks. Total and Schneider 
still had an overwhelming proportion of French managers amongst their pool of 
international managers.
It is noticeable that whilst French companies were mainly concerned with the 
issue of internationalising their managements during this period, Danone’s human 
resources policies abroad also dealt with the management of non-managerial grades, 
although the group remained an exceptional case within our sample. This response
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was linked to the group founder’s distinctive socio-political orientations. The CEO of 
the group, Antoine Riboud, was convinced that economic and social aspects were 
inextricably linked in an organisation, and that in order to prosper, companies must 
seek to reconcile both the interests of managements and individual employees. These 
values formed the basis of the group social policy, the ‘Double Projet Economique et 
Social’ which was developed in the 1970s and was highly progressive at the time. 
The dual project carried these principles to all areas of personnel management, from 
industrial relations, training, remuneration to work organisation (Riboud 1987). 
Central elements to the group policy were the obligation to recognise and work with a 
representative body of the workforce, and in case of redundancies the need to find 
employees made redundant alternative employment. The group’s remuneration 
policy also included profit-sharing, which it saw as a way of involving workers in the 
company’s financial results.
As Danone begun to internationalise in the late 1980s, very rapidly, the group 
decided to transfer its social policy abroad (Mendes 1994). In order to implement 
Danone policies within national units, the group created an Organisation-Formation 
function in each national unit, based on the French model, whose role was to work 
with operational managers on issues of work organisation. The corporate HR 
function, relayed by regional HR ‘coordinators’, established very regular liaisons in 
all key areas with foreign operating companies’ personnel managers. Danone also 
established relations with the International Foodworkers Union from the mid-1980s 
onwards and set up a European Works Council at a very early stage.
Danone remains unique in its willingness to develop a strong social policy 
abroad. In spite of the philosophy having sometimes restricted applicability abroad, 
for example in aspects such as industrial relations or workforce remuneration given 
the very local nature of HR issues the group touched upon, the importance attached to 
the personnel function within the group none the less contributed to the development 
of a coherence across the group operations, and to give weight to local personnel 
functions through their intensive contacts with the Centre.
IHRM in French Multinationals
17‘>
Thus, during the period from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, French 
companies’ attempts at implementing an IHR function met with mixed success. One 
sees a slow period of gestation between firms’ ideas and their actual implementation. 
Their partial vision of management development together with their lack of 
willingness to delegate responsibilities and centrality of trust in their management 
style has acted as a brake upon the internationalisation of competences and the 
implementation of international structures for management development.
One sees implications in the behaviour of each group of companies. 
Companies that have internationalised for more than twenty years have more 
developed policies but also more marked national features, as one finds a reluctance 
to delegate responsibilities with the desire to impose a French model upon the 
operating company. In the group of companies that internationalised over the last ten 
years, in addition to having a similar elitist mentality of people development as the 
others, their young international age and lack of pressures they faced for 
implementing an IHR policy, all together explain their under-developed or absence of 
IHR structures.
If French managements’ elitist conception of management development has 
acted as a brake upon the development of international managers, there are also 
purely practical obstacles due to the French context which have not facilitated 
companies’ task of developing foreign managers. With the exception of Total and 
Alcatel, there were only few cases of British managers who were sent to the 
headquarters in order to be developed, and, according to French and British 
managements alike, this exercise met with only limited success. Language and the 
substantial differences in culture between France and other countries have acted as 
two deterrents to integrating foreign managers into French companies. Only Alcatel 
has adopted English as the official language and all meetings are conducted in 
English. Whilst other French companies have begun to recognise both French and 
English as working languages, in reality meetings were overwhelmingly conducted in
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French. According to HR managers, the complex social and legal environment also 
makes the practicalities of expatriation such as pay strategy more difficult.
An additional factor which explains why French managements have not been 
inclined to send foreign managers to their French operations is that, since their home 
market has reached maturity, there is little that foreigners can add in terms of 
expertise in France. Companies’ focus in the early stages of their internationalisation 
was to turn round their acquisitions and thus they concentrated their best human 
resources in Britain. Subsequently, as acquisitions were overhauled, companies’ 
strategic priorities shifted to their global development, and competent non-French 
managers have tended to be used in other parts of the world to manage the 
development of companies in those regions. Furthermore, as companies are currently 
seeking to reduce employment at home, they face difficulties in securing the return of 
their French expatriate managers, let alone of foreign managers. It therefore would 
require a very long-term vision and strong commitment on the part of companies to 
develop foreign managers. Total was the only company which was rotating to 
headquarters foreign managers seen as having high potential, systematically and on a 
significant scale.
A final point is that the integration of foreign managers into the French 
structure remained difficult because of aspects of the French corporate culture. As a 
British manager explains:
‘This is difficult for them (foreign managers) to integrate into the 
environment. Collaboration is an issue (...), there is this business about 
confidentiality, (the UK) is more opened. They are not given much 
information, they are not sure what it is they are to produce’.
Thus, the obstacles due to their domestic context have also constrained French 
companies’ ability to develop foreign managers. This is particularly problematic for 
them, for, because of the still overwhelming importance of the Centre in strategic 
decision making as well as the informal and network-based French management 
system, it is almost impossible to conceive developing a high potential manager
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without a period at head office. This factor also explains why French companies have 
in tum extensively used their French expatriate managers, as they find themselves 
being the only trained international managers.
In conclusion, the period spanning the late 1980s to the first half of the 1990s 
represents a growing awareness amongst French companies of the need to develop 
international HR structures, with the implementation of some elements of 
internationalism. This period is however marked by a lack of experience of the HR 
function internationally and the lack of an open mind, as French multinationals tend 
to look for ideas among themselves. As a result, implementation has remained 
chaotic. One sees a patchwork of policies rather than an integrated and coherent IHR 
strategy, itself reflecting a partial comprehension at this stage of a strategic HR 
function and the structures that are required to implement an effective system. One 
sees a tendency towards addressing the issues linked to their IRH needs, but a set of 
national features prevent them from either developing or implementing strategic 
responses.
3. Shift towards a strategic IRH function
In recent years, there are signs that the IHR function has evolved towards a 
more strategic approach within French companies and that they have begun to 
implement an IHR policy, mainly in response to the pressures of accelerating 
internationalisation.
Companies that internationalised ten years ago in particular have in the 
current period had to deal with the repercussions of their prevailing vision of 
management development and have been faced with a shortage of skills abroad. 
Relying upon a handful of highly competent managers who belonged to the group 
worked well in the early years of their internationalisation. But, once 
internationalisation became more significant and companies reached a significant size 
abroad, it stretched their human resources to their limits. Danone exemplifies the
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consequences of companies’ ten-year-long restricted approach to management 
development. As the group stepped up its internationalisation in the late 1990s, it 
found itself facing difficulties in staffing its national units because highly skilled 
French managers accumulated responsibilities until reaching their limits, without 
putting in place succession planning structures to develop local managers capable of 
taking over from them. In response to this, Danone has over the last few years 
radically shifted its management development policy and placed priority upon quickly 
identifying and developing locals with the potential to take over from expatriate 
managers.
On their own domestic markets, the international system is gaining pace and 
also challenging French companies’ approach to people development. For instance, 
the concept of ‘employability’ — the need for workers to maintain their competence to 
remain employable by the organisation and outside - is emerging as the notion of job 
for life is beginning to erode and with it workers’ attachment to their firm. 
Increasingly, employees are no longer expecting a career for life with the group they 
join as in the past, and are taking responsibility for advancing their own careers. 
Together, these developments have rendered aspects of French companies’ approach 
to people development obsolete and laid bare some of their excesses.
In response to these pressures, many companies are giving themselves the 
means to change and implement an effective IHR policy. Companies have increased 
the financial resources allocated to the HR function. A number of companies are also 
bringing in outside expertise and in particular tapping into managers with an Anglo- 
Saxon perspective of HRM. Group Redoute brought in an HR director who spent 
part of his career in an Anglo-Saxon group. Vivendi resorted to one of its Spanish 
HR managers with experience of multinationals, as a consultant in order to develop 
its IHR policy. Danone also introduced a number of outsiders with Anglo-Saxon 
backgrounds in its HR department marking a break with the traditional policy of the 
group and a willingness to radically re-position the role of the function to address
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more strategic needs. Further, French firms are increasingly looking for best 
practices in IHRM in other international companies.
Consequently, there are signs that the HR function in French companies has 
begun to address more strategic concerns. For example, Danone, faced with 
difficulties resourcing its foreign units, has implemented policies aimed at 
internationalising the profile of its managers as rapidly as possible and inculcating a 
group culture. These have included the creation at European level of a management 
development position, responsible for staffing positions across European units and 
identifying mobile professionals and high potential managers. Operating units’ 
general managers have been set objectives for developing local resources 
internationally and given clear guidelines for the promotion and the identification of 
high potential managers. The group has also implemented a policy for graduate 
development in each region of the world, Europe, Americas and Asia, which consists 
of recruiting graduates with international profiles and putting them on a fast 
management development track, that includes an assignment outside of their home 
country in the first two years. Since its inception in 1997, the group has trained more 
than 150 graduates in Europe. Finally, with the view of ‘danonising’ local managers, 
Danone has begun internationalising its training programmes and setting up training 
facilities in some of the countries it is established in. Along similar lines, Vivendi 
Water and Peugeot, for long under little pressure to develop international HR policies, 
have begun questioning their IHR policy and establishing elements of international 
management development structures. Saint Gobain also began to feel the strains of 
internationalisation upon its existing HR resources and is now prioritising the 
internationalisation of its function.
Alcatel has also radically shifted the focus of its policy. Following the re­
organisation of the group into global product lines, the company has created a 
position of management development at Business Division level as well as reinforced 
the structures and financial means of the corporate HR function. The Centre has also 
begun to actively involve itself into organisation and succession planning reviews of
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its business divisions by setting up regular reviews, as well as implementing a 
formalised and fine-tuned tracking of high potential managers’ career development 
that is closely integrated with group strategy (Falcoz 1998). The group is in the 
process of developing a common performance management system for high potential 
managers so as to give a framework to operating companies as to the kind of future 
managers they should be seeking to develop locally. Further, moving away from an 
approach where the group was handling the career of individuals, Alcatel is actively 
encouraging individuals to be proactive in terms of managing their careers by making 
available directly to them all posts available as well as training opportunities through 
the company’s Intranet, thereby reflecting a willingness to enlarge its base of 
identification of high potential managers.
Further, in order to regenerate their management structures and prepare their 
future international managers, companies, which put a halt on recruitment for over a 
decade with only minor incoming flows, have launched large-scale recruitment 
campaigns. They have also begun opening up their traditionally closed sources of 
recruitment internationally. For example, Schneider is developing liaisons with 
national units as well as established partnerships with universities and business 
schools, often across regions to help recruit high calibre and internationally-minded 
graduates. Faced with a decline of their image among graduates, French companies 
have also initiated actions to promote a positive image and selling themselves to this 
population. The development of the Internet as a recruitment tool has developed 
rapidly, and has accelerated the broadening of their recruitment base.
These recent developments amongst French firms indicate that they are on the 
way to adopting a more efficient approach to developing their human resources 
internationally. Yet, at this stage, it is too early to assess the effects of the policies 
companies are putting in place. On the one hand, thanks to the experience gained 
over the first few years as well as their more strategic focus, the partiality 
encountered in the previous period may be less apparent. Changes also appear to be 
taking place more rapidly within some firms than in others. Thus, the young
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companies, AXA and La Redoute show greater responsiveness as they have not 
hesitated resorting to expertise from outside and have rapidly delegated 
responsibilities to British managers. Alcatel, because of its international maturity (cf. 
Chapter 6), has moved more speedily towards a strategic IHR function.
On the other hand, there are still underlying problems in developing a 
strategic IHR approach. Firstly, French companies remain confronted with difficult 
challenges in developing local managers. Training a local manager is a slow process, 
not only does it require developing someone’s competence on the job, but it also 
involves inculcating group methods and culture. As companies relied upon their 
French managers who were loyal to the group, the inculcation of values was 
automatic, but they found that training a local manager is an entirely different matter. 
Companies estimate that it takes two generations of expatriate managers to develop a 
local manager. In wanting to delegate competence too early, one of the companies 
which entrusted local managers with a group project encountered problems in the 
implementation of the project, because local nationals were not sufficiently trained to 
understand group requirements.
Secondly, companies are facing strong internal resistance to changing existing 
hierarchical structures. Even though some are bringing in outside expertise, they still 
face challenges in integrating change. For example, in one case, the introduction of a 
young managers’ fast track development programme was badly perceived by senior 
managers who felt bypassed by incoming young managers, given the still important 
notion of seniority in French organisations.
Thirdly and finally, implementing a strategic system from recruitment to 
promotion affects all aspects of a firm’s modes of functioning and will imply a 
profound cultural change for French multinationals. The case of La Redoute where 
the new head of HR, trained in Anglo-Saxon practices, is in the process of 
implementing an Anglo-Saxon model of HRM in the French company, is revealing. 
The basic principles upon which such a system is based are the existence of intensive
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cross-functional mobility at all levels, significant investment in training and 
development and the delegation of responsibilities at an early stage: these elements 
ran counter to the established practices of French companies.
The key characteristics of the model implemented by La Redoute is firstly to 
delegate responsibilities early to individuals, and ensure they have under them all the 
key levers required to perform their job, which in turn are the pre-requisites for 
having lean organisations. This requires individuals to have a global vision of 
business, hence a strong emphasis is placed upon cross-functional mobility at all 
levels of the organisation, a point confirmed by Derr and Briscoe (1998). A manager 
must be rotated across different functions after a minimum of three to a maximum of 
seven years, except for highly technical jobs which do not account for more than 10% 
of the whole population.
Secondly, individuals must be promoted rapidly on the basis of their 
performance and their potential. In this way, mobility at all levels within the 
organisation is created, enabling the constant regeneration of skills: an individual in a 
team will learn a specific role, then is promoted to another domain, the head of the 
team leaves and the manager underneath is promoted. Through this process, 
everyone can learn a role in a kind of a domino effect. Whilst one individual might 
not possess all the skills, the team as a whole can compensate, hence a greater sharing 
of skills throughout the organisation. In such a system, internal mobility together 
with a much higher personnel turnover implies that to be effective and to compensate, 
there is a need to have a regular and larger flow of graduates.
Thus the system places emphasis upon the development of competence at all 
levels of the organisation, and gives each employee the means to develop his potential 
by giving him clear promotion criteria, as well as well defined career paths that can 
be followed, potentially, up to executive level. The organisation will put in place the 
systems to identify high performers and will develop their competence, filter out 
more individuals and so on and so forth. This requires a degree of uniformisation of
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management development policies within an international group to ensure that local 
companies have a framework as to the kind of managers they should be looking to 
develop and that the whole population will be covered. At operating company level, 
this can be limited to strong guidelines, for example with regard to the development 
of their local high potential managers. Then, as managers are filtered through 
different levels, the centre can manage the top management population.
Thus, in contrast with French organisations that focus upon a small number of 
individuals, an integrated HR system starts from a large pool of individuals who will 
progressively be filtered out at different stages until they reach the top of the 
organisation (figure 7 -  1). Derr and Briscoe (1998) liken it to a funnel turned upside 
down. This enables the organisation to have competent individuals whilst being able 
to identify high performers, and for individuals to develop their competence and 
therefore have portable skills within the organisation and outside.
Anglo-Saxon model: 
Selection of a large 
number of individuals 
who will be developed 
gradually and on an equal 
basis, and out of which 
the elite will be filte 
out at different stages
French model: Focus 
upon a restricted pool 
of individuals whose 
career will be 
gradually built up 
within the
organisation
The arrow
Figure 7 - 1 :  Typical Anglo-Saxon and French management development philosophies
In such a system, the organisation’s role and in particular the HR function’s 
role is to think through the development of each category of individuals depending
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upon both their performance and potential, as well as to help line managers and 
individuals develop good processes and practices.
The case of La Redoute gives some indications of future HR developments 
within French companies. It shows that a French national can be taught Anglo-Saxon 
practices, and therefore the difficulties of implementation are not so much due to 
cultural determinism as one of comprehension and experience. Nonetheless, 
introducing this type of system still requires a degree of maturity, as the whole 
Anglo-Saxon philosophy to people development is opposed to that of French 
companies. At La Redoute, the HR Director was in the process of implementing this 
system in the group, but in spite of having an ideal background for introducing 
change - as he has an international experience and is a French national, and benefiting 
from a young and dynamic culture internationally, he still faces hurdles and the 
process of change is likely to take several years.
There are significant obstacles to be overcome both in terms of definition of 
policies as well as mentality. Firstly, it would require French companies to possess 
operational managers that accept delegating powers for the management of human 
resources to a strong HR function. It would demand a shift from a technical culture 
to a managerial culture whereby managers are assessed, developed and promoted not 
solely on their technical competence but on their leadership skills. As a French HR 
manager puts it:
‘One must appreciate a manager on his ability to manage. When one will 
show them that they are not good managers, that they guarantee power and a 
sphere that does not rely upon their competence to manage people, one will 
break that (technical) logic. If a manager, when he has good people keeps 
them for himself, or if he keeps complaining about the work of his people, he 
is a bad manager. (...) Being a manager is something that needs to be 
taught, the firm must believe in this and help young people learn these 
things’.
Secondly, to create a dynamic internal labour market where everyone is 
continuously developed and high performers identified, it would require an awareness
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by firms of the importance of internal training and development and a vision which 
sees everyone in the organisation as having the capability, if trained and given the 
means to, to become competent. This stands in opposition to French companies’ 
notion of development whereby the focus is upon on a small group of individuals. As 
Bauer and Cohen (1981) argue, the lack of delegation of competence in French 
companies and the monopolisation of skills by a small number of individuals at the 
top of the organisation, and the lack of mobility of managers underneath them, are a 
key reason for the perpetuation of hierarchical structures. As long as a system is 
static, the HR function cannot play a strategic role.
7.4. Conclusion
French companies have belatedly begun to shift their elitist vision of 
management development, becoming aware that the long-term issue is to give and 
develop competence locally. For a long time, they have relied upon a handful of 
French managers to handle their international development. As they were young 
internationally, the partiality of their development policy abroad was not apparent. 
Nonetheless, as their internationalisation accelerated, French multinationals have 
reached the limits of their expatriate-based system.
One can thus speak of a two-phase awareness in French firms’ 
internationalisation of their human resources. In a first phase, one sees the beginning 
of an awareness of the importance of managing their human resources internationally 
but there was a gap between companies’ realisation of their needs and the actual 
implementation as a result a lack of experience, difficulties of introducing change in 
the French organisation and a partial vision due to their French context and their 
notion of people development. It is when faced with a drying up of their pool of 
international managers in a context of rapidly aeceler'ung internationalisation and the 
benefits of experience, that a more coherent and strategic vision of HR abroad 
emerges, thereby marking a second phase. Thus, whilst the previous period could be 
characterised as one of integration and change in companies’ structure, in the latter
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half of the 1990s one can speak of a change in mentality occurring in French 
companies. This is also a time of instability and incoherence as firms are in the 
process of questioning their management development approaches.
Implementing a strategic HR system calls for a different paradigm from 
traditional French firms’ conceptions, and there thus remain structural obstacles to the 
development of international managers, that is an understanding of what is an 
international manager, how to identify and develop them, and even handling their 
development.
During the last decade, on finds that French multinationals have intended to 
transfer as many French features as they possibly could. In the current period 
however, under the intensifying pressures of globalisation, some of these French 
features have lessened. Therefore, to say French multinationals have such and such 
features is both partial and out of fashion. But, adopting this contextual approach, we 
can make generalisations about the behaviour of French managements abroad: we 
pinpoint specific features of the French approach, which, on one hand, belong to a 
time period, and on the other can be indicative of a propensity of the French 
companies to behave in a particular way in the future.
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Chapter VIII
THE ANGLO - SAXONISATION OF FRENCH MULTINATIONALS: 
GREAT-BRITAIN AS A LEARNING PLATFORM
8.1. Introduction
In Chapter 5, we showed how French companies have had to discover and 
adapt themselves to the UK environment. Having evolved in the bosom of the State 
and long been shielded from international competition in their domestic environment, 
they had no prior experience of an Anglo-Saxon economic system. They proceeded 
largely through trial and error and adopted various responses in order to survive in the 
British environment. Through this process, whilst some French features transpired, 
others diminished due to the influences of the local filters they were confronted with, 
thereby denoting that French managements underwent a degree of learning. It is 
important to note that in the course of this process, in addition to adapting some of 
their existing features, French managements have gained features which they did not 
have previously, and which they have integrated in various aspects of their modes of 
functioning. This chapter focuses on exploring in greater detail the forms and 
dimensions of this learning process, illustrating how French managements have 
integrated this newly gained experience for their ongoing international development. 
This issue has also led us to explore the interactions between French multinational 
companies and their domestic environment, as French managements have even used 
their international experience at home. We thus come full circle, as the French
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business system is not only a starting point for French multinational companies, but 
also a finishing point.
It is important to note that the issue examined in this chapter is the learning 
process o f internationalisation by French managements resulting in them adapting 
some of their national features as well as gaining others, rather than being concerned 
with the phenomenon of diffusion of best practice throughout the organisation. This 
was addressed in Chapter 6 where it was revealed that French firms are at an 
embryonic stage. The literature on the diffusion of best practice has shown how 
multiple direction learning processes can develop within the multinational firm, 
which may create a dynamic of its own leading to the ‘learning organisation’ (Bartlett 
and Goshal 1990; Bélanger et al. 1999). Whilst our findings point to a general trend 
across French firms suggesting the importance of the experience they have gained 
from their British operating companies and thus how the influence has worked from 
the operating company to the Centre, the phenomenon can only be demonstrated on a 
case-by-case basis and does not constitute a policy of exchange of best practice 
throughout the organisation.
The first section presents the forms and characteristics of French 
managements’ learning experience of Anglo-Saxonisation with regard to their 
international development, where the attractiveness of the British model over other 
countries to French companies is emphasised. Secondly, the nature of the influence 
of French multinational companies upon their own environment is examined, and 
their actual impact discussed, drawing attention to some of the key problems 
companies are confronted with on their home ground.
8.2. The Anglo-Saxonisation of French Managements
Britain has provided French managements with real life experiences of a 
market-based governance regime, thereby giving them their first experience of 
internationalisation influenced by the Anglo-Saxon model. French managements
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have via the contact with their British counterparts learnt new skills, which they were 
not familiar with in the past or did not fully understand. Firstly, French managements 
have learnt the English language, which, though a basic issue, is the universal 
business language of today and a fundamental requirement in order to be able to 
operate internationally. French managements did not possess strong language skills 
when they first set foot in the UK, which we saw was an obstacle to their effective 
integration. So important are language skills that French companies usually send 
their managers on intensive English courses in order for them to become proficient in 
English. Thus, being able to acquire those linguistic skills in an English-speaking 
country is a strong asset for French companies. The second area where the learning 
process has been important to French companies is the economy. As Britain achieved 
a much more advanced degree of marketisation than most other countries, it 
constituted a rich source of learning by observation for French managements. Faced 
with fierce foreign competition for many years, British companies had long placed 
emphasis upon customer service, cost effectiveness as well as market-responsiveness 
and had thus gained strong competitive advantages at this level.
Acquiring an Anglo-Saxon conception of conducting business has been all the 
more important to French companies since it has become the reference model 
worldwide over the last decade. Initially, Britain was the first country along with the 
USA to embark upon a wholesale economic liberalisation and certainly well before 
global forces began impacting upon Continental Europe in the mid-1980s. The 
British response from the late 1970s onwards did not come about as a result of a 
worldwide trend of liberalisation as is the case today, but emerged from an economic, 
political and cultural context specific to the UK: it was initiated by a pro-market 
Conservative government, supported by a strong industrial lobby, which sought to 
stop the economic decline of Britain by resorting to market-led solutions, which 
themselves were in the continuity of a long tradition of minimalist state intervention 
(cf. Chapter 5). Today however, the liberal model is no longer confined to UK 
borders as deregulation trends are spreading worldwide pushed by powerful 
technological, economic and political forces. Following the collapse of the Soviet
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Union, together with the failed attempts in South America and Asia to maintain 
protectionism, the rules of free trade have imposed themselves upon the majority of 
countries, who are increasingly adopting the similar responses of opening up their 
markets, deregulating and privatising. Throughout Europe, the deregulation of 
utilities is taking place in telecommunications, transport and energy. In response to 
the globalisation of competition, firms are also adopting common responses by 
maximising efficiency, diversifying their products and services, globalising their 
operations through mergers and acquisitions, responding quickly to fast-changing 
markets: overall, they are behaving more like typical Anglo-Saxon firms.
In the new globalised context of the 1990s, the skills French managements 
have gained in the UK have in turn been applied to their international development. 
As the current context marked by the globalisation of competition forces firms to 
engage in the relentless pursuit of growth to ensure their survival, one has seen 
French companies’ international growth rapidly accelerate as indicated in table 8-1, 
and acquisitions growing exponentially: overall, in the year 1999, mergers and 
acquisitions by French companies have increased by more than 120%'. Whilst 
Europe accounted for more than two thirds of their total investment flows between 
1988 and 1994, French firms have significantly increased their investments in the US 
market whilst beginning to invest in Asia-Pacific, where they were lagging behind 
other multinational companies1 2. One thus sees a surge in the confidence of French 
companies in the way they respond to global competition, in contrast to their caution 
of the 1980s. This reflects the fact that Anglo-Saxon characteristics have become 
more integrated into their modes of functioning. A few case studies illustrate the 
mechanisms at work in firms currently undertaking global strategies, and how they 
have benefited from the entry of a British unit within their group to establish a 
worldwide presence.
1 Le M onde, 'L'année où les groupes français se sont métamorphosés', 11 April 2000.
2 The share of the European Union declined steadily since the mid-1990s, accounting for 46% in 1998. 
The USA was the first recipient country of French companies’ investments in 1997 and 1998, 
accounting for 19% of the total; investment flows in South-East Asia doubled to 9.3bnFF over 1997 
(Bulletin de la Banque de France, Les Flux d ’Investissem ents D irects de  la France avec l ’Etranger en 
IW 8 . June 1999, Nb 66).
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Table 8 - 1 :  French FD1 Outflows 1995-1998
FDI Outflows 
(bnFF)
Year-on-year % 
increase
1995 78.6
1996 155.6 + 98%
1997 207.7 + 33%
1998 239.4 + 15%
Source: Bulletin de la Banque de France, Les Flux d ’investissem ents 
Directs de la France avec l ’E tranger en 1998. June 1999. Nb 66.
Since the mid-1990s Vivendi Water, pursuing a new strategy of triadisation, 
has rapidly expanding in the US, Australia, and South-East Asian markets in response 
to the globalisation of the water industry. The industry has become global in recent 
years as developed countries, faced with increasing difficulties in meeting their 
growing needs for financing services under budgetary constraints, have responded by 
either privatising their water services along the lines of the UK model or giving long­
term contracts to private companies to manage and operate their services along the 
lines of the French business model. Developing countries are also resorting to private 
capital to help meet their huge infrastructure needs3. As in the utilities, Britain 
pioneered the introduction of competition as well as innovative arrangements to 
supervise industries, in particular the creation of economic regulators acting 
independently from the government and charged with protecting competition, 
controlling prices and ensuring quality, Vivendi Water through its ten-year long 
involvement in Britain developed knowledge of this model and its rules of economic 
governance, and the kind of monitoring by an economic regulator over a utilities 
firm’s strategy. The group has used the expertise it has gained from the UK 
marketplace to access firstly the Australian market in 1996 and then the US market in 
1999. As a French senior manager of the group explains:
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‘(In Australia), we found people speaking the same language I mean not only 
in linguistic terms, but also in terms of economic regulation, it has been 
important in approaching the market. And also our British companies had 
established cooperative links with Australia for a number of years (before we 
acquired an operation over there), this has been very helpful.’
The group is now seeking to use its Australian base as a stepping stone in 
Asian markets4. Subsequently in 1999, the group was able to acquire the largest US 
water distribution company US Filter, in response to the privatisation and 
liberalisation of the industry there during the late 1990s. Its counterpart Lyonnaise 
des eaux has similarly tapped into the expertise of its British operations, as it was 
through one of its British subsidiaries that it purchased United Water in the US, in 
1998. Thus, in addition to their initial lead in terms of internationalisation which 
were established thanks to the features they inherited from their domestic 
environment (cf. Chapter 5), French water companies’ experience of privatised and 
regulated British markets has given them a headstart in responding to the deregulatory 
trends taking place worldwide throughout the water industry. This has reinforced 
their global pre-eminence: Vivendi Water and Lyonnaise des eaux together won more 
than half of the biggest private sector contracts awarded between 1993 and 19975.
In the construction industry, after having dragged the French group Vinci to 
its knees financially, Norwest Holst has become a strong asset in the new construction 
context of the 1990s. The Anglo-American type of construction contract, based on 
the separation of design and construction, is indeed gaining momentum in Europe and 
other parts of the world, under the powerful influence of large and globalising British 
and American engineering-design companies (OECD 1995). As Vinci had been used 
to the Continental contractual model, the experience it has gained from operating in 
the UK construction marketplace has been beneficial. Thus, Vinci cooperates closely 
with Britain on international contracts in Anglophile countries, for example by 
tapping into the British operating company’s managers in order to use their
3 L'U sine Nouvelle, ‘L’industrie française de l’eau a soif d’international', 10 September 1998.
4 This type of indirect targeting of markets through third-country bases is likely to become more 
frequent as multinational companies are seeking to establish a presence in all the major markets of the 
Triad.
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commercial skills in drawing up contractual terms, which demand highly 
sophisticated legal skills. One of the responsibilities of French expatriate managers 
posted in the UK is to facilitate networking between both sides on international 
matters. French managers claim the acquisition of these type of commercial skills, 
which hitherto were alien to them, has enabled them to respond very promptly and 
effectively to international construction projects. Thus, whilst Vinci initially adapted 
itself with difficulty to the UK environment, it has now built upon this experience.
The retail group Redoute has also put the lessons gained from its acquisition 
of Empire Stores to maximum use in deploying its global strategy. The retail 
industry, multi-domestic until the mid-1990s, recently became global, and La 
Redoute has pursued an aggressive international expansion. It acquired one of the 
largest American home-shopping companies Brylane in 1998, after acquiring British 
Empire Stores six years earlier. One of the French expatriate managers, which was 
subsequently selected to co-head the international expansion of the group headed the 
negotiations and relied on several key British managers through the negotiation 
phase. Some now sit on the Board of Brylane in order to oversee its integration 
within the group. La Redoute is also repeating the success formula that has emerged 
thanks to its British operation in the United States and elsewhere, whereby it uses the 
resources and management approach of acquired companies to introduce its own 
product catalogues into the host markets, as opposed to launching its products 
through its own means as it had unsuccessfully attempted in the UK. It was found 
that the second approach taken by the group enabled it to maximise synergies as well 
as fit the requirements of each market. The highly competitive home-shopping US 
market shared similarities with the British system, in terms of an aggressive 
commercial approach and high segmentation of customer markets, which gave French 
managements a strong advantage in defining its marketing approach. Thus, La 
Redoute who adapted itself from the outset to the UK environment ten years ago is 
now replicating this form of adaptation in its international development. 5
5 Cf. F<x>tnote 3.
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The acquisition of STC by the telecommunications group Alcatel has also 
turned out to be more than an acquisition for the French group. The international 
division of its corporate marketing department in its submarine division was split into 
two parts, with the British side being given responsibility for all the countries having 
natural affinities with the UK and the French side overseeing the rest of the world. 
By doing so, the group sought to respond more effectively to the needs of global 
telecommunications groups, most of which have their headquarters or are located in 
the UK market. The shift reflects a recognition of the significant lead the UK market 
has taken in terms of creating a highly competitive and sophisticated 
telecommunications market.
As these examples suggest, having gained their first experience of 
internationalisation in the Anglo-Saxon style, French managements used their newly 
gained skills and experience extensively to help gain access to foreign markets which 
shared similarities in their modes of governance with Britain, noticeably the difficult 
and highly competitive US market. The significant benefits of French companies’ 
passage through Britain are further demonstrated by the fact that, historically, their 
attempts to penetrate the US market had been unsuccessful (Wilkins 1993), whereas 
now, they are succeeding.
A further reflection of the importance for French managements of acquiring 
this first Anglo-Saxon experience to buttress their global expansion is that companies 
use their British operating units as a development ground for their French managers. 
Managers can learn the language, be trained to Anglo-Saxon techniques of 
management and imbue themselves in the culture, and subsequently be sent to other 
parts of the world in order to spearhead the international development of their firms. 
For example, in Vivendi Water, General Utilities has been a training school in 
deregulated markets to many French engineers. The head of the Australian unit of 
Vivendi Water for example is a French national who was previously on assignment in 
General Utilities, whilst the team that is searching for new markets in Asia is led by a 
French national who had been assigned to General Utilities for a number of years.
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The banking group Crédit Lyonnais maintains an extensive number of French 
managers in its UK operations on two to three year assignments in order to expose 
them to the unique expertise of the London financial industry. As a French senior 
manager put it:
‘It seems to me essential that our (French) managers get to know this world, 
for Britain is in many ways a better base for the internationalisation of the 
group than the US where we do not yet have an experience as well-rounded.
And I insisted that my successor (as head of the division) sit on the board of 
our British companies for this very reason’.
British managers also constitute a valuable pool of competence for French 
companies since they have a number of natural advantages over their French 
counterparts, namely the language and their knowledge of the Anglo-Saxon way of 
conducting business. This makes them more readily exportable to certain regions of 
the world.
One also increasingly sees international responsibilities being delegated to the 
UK operations. In the building materials group Saint Gobain, Stanton is involved in 
establishing the group in the US and South Africa. The banking group Crédit 
Lyonnais, capitalising on the expertise of the City of London and its status as the 
leading international centre, established its London operation as one of its three 
global centers of competence, from which it is heading a number of business 
divisions worldwide. The UK operation of Vivendi Water was also given 
responsibility for building up a presence in countries of the old Commonwealth, 
namely India and Pakistan. The food group, Danone which sold its grocery division 
in 1996 as part of its re-positioning strategy, did retain its UK operation, HP Sauce 
which it had acquired in 1988, specifically to use it as a channel to develop its market 
share in China which is one of the major export markets of the British company, and 
to export Asian products back into the UK and European markets in order to respond 
to the growing demand for oriental food, a trend in which the UK market is in the 
lead. There is thus an economic reason behind French firms managing their 
international expansion in certain regions of the world from their UK base rather than
Britain as a learning platform
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\from France: they have taken advantage not only of the British expertise of 
deregulated markets, but also the country’s traditional trade links with the US and 
Asia-Pacific, notably Hong-Kong and Australia, a legacy of its imperial power and its 
colonial empire. French managements’ efforts to federate their foreign operations 
underlie a significant change in perspective as they become increasingly aware of the 
potential of their British base and its unique positioning in the international economic 
order. Though for a long time French companies did not see much point in investing 
in Britain, their British experience has contributed to opening up their inward-looking 
vision and giving them a more global outlook.
French companies’ UK experience has not only played a significant role in 
their approach to making acquisitions, but, in some cases, has facilitated the process 
of integration itself. Saint-Gobain’s integration of two recent acquisitions made in 
the UK, as part of a strategy to develop its leadership in water pipe systems 
manufacturing, stands in marked contrast to that of Stanton ten years ago. Senior 
managers from Stanton, French and British national managers, were given 
responsibility by the group to integrate the two companies. From the outset, 
managements took firm control of the companies, reshuffled the senior management 
teams and defined a restructuring planning within several weeks which was promptly 
implemented. The rate of absorption of companies was much quicker as, within less 
than two years, the companies were considered overhauled and integrated by French 
managements when Stanton’s integration spread well over five years. The learning 
curve of Saint Gobain from the integration of Stanton is thus obvious.
There are several levels at which the experience gained by Saint Gobain and 
other companies has been felt. Their experience has led to them first and foremost 
developing a strategy. As globalisation of markets accelerates, under the process of 
European integration with the advent of the Single Currency and the full liberalisation 
of specific sectors, the opening up of Asian markets following the 1997 financial 
crisis, internationalisation has become a priority for French groups, which have a 
clearly-defined strategy of setting foot in all the major markets of the Triad. When
Britain as a learning platform
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acquiring a company, managements know where it will fit within the group strategy, 
in terms of cost, commercial or manufacturing synergies, an aspect which was lacking 
ten years ago.
In addition to bringing them a stategy, French firms have also a more defined 
mode of integration. Even if it remains an adaptative shift rather than a radical 
change in approach in that none of our case studies has turned a la GE where all 
aspects of integration are measured, codified and nothing is left to chance (Ashkenas 
1998), French managements are more able to anticipate critical factors that can have 
an influence and mould them in order to mitigate their impact, as they have gained an 
understanding of the issues involved in integrating foreign operations thanks to their 
prior experience in Britain. This is clearly demonstrated in the case of Saint Gobain, 
where senior managements have acted upon the selection of the host management 
team, the pace of integration and the extent of communication. As Hubbard (1999) 
notes, whilst all factors can not be foreseen (e.g. market downturn), some are 
nonetheless under a company’s control, in particular those related to the management 
of the integration process. The apparently greater ease with which acquired firms 
have been integrated perhaps also reflects the fact that greater time is given to pre­
study acquisitions by companies, an element we saw was critically missing from their 
strategies in the late 1980s. Indeed, if French firms are moving faster they are also 
more careful: for example, prior to the acquisition of its British companies, Saint 
Gobain had carefully examined their competitive situation and determined a strategic 
plan of integration. Pre-acquisition preparation enabled management firstly to assess 
the risks involved and secondly to evaluate the feasibility of overhauling the target: 
this allowed them to minimise the risk of a bad purchase, and having delimited the 
problems, management were able to move quickly in the integration phase.
An additional element which plays a role in making French managements 
more efficient with regards to handling acquisitions is familiarity with the host 
environment itself. For example, French managements have experimented with the 
flexibility of the British institutional environment, and are now aware that they can
2o.t
a learning platformBritain <
conduct radical restructuring of firms in a short space of time to make a company 
more efficient, which according to our interviewees, is a factor which can affect 
decisions to buy as well as the subsequent strategy adopted towards the acquired 
company6, as this French senior manager explains:
‘The strategy of the group is clearly to be the leader on its markets, if we are 
considering acquiring a firm that is in poor competitive conditions, in the UK 
we will not hesitate to buy it, in France, we would think twice’.
A further element which might also explain the easing of the integration of 
acquisitions by French companies is that French managements’ features are evolving 
on their own ground. Indeed, as discussed below, the French institutional context has 
evolved towards a more market-based regime over the last decade and therefore 
aspects of the Anglo-Saxon system are increasingly learnt in France, which 
contributes to narrowing the cultural gaps between the nations. French managements 
are importing a more ‘adapted French model’, both as a result of the features they 
have evolved abroad and the influence of their own environment, so that the clashes 
of culture are not as strong, thereby facilitating the process of integration.
However, whilst experience of acquisitions enhances the probability of 
success in integrating an operation, too much experience can have negative 
consequences as managements can become too confident of their expertise of 
integrating acquisitions, losing its open mind and overlooking the acquired 
companies’ strengths. There is then the risk of bulldozing, so to speak, the acquired 
company. This has been observed in some of our case studies, and remains a 
possibility knowing French managements’ ingrained desire for retaining control.
6 This, if needed, confirms the openness of the UK as double-edged from the point of view of the 
country's economic welfare, as it remains vulnerable to foreign multinational companies' investment 
decisions and economic cycles. In addition, the UK is not beyond a reversal in its fortunes as one of 
the most hospitable host countries to foreign investment in particular to manufacturing industries, first 
because it no longer holds a unique advantage as it competes with other European nations for capital in 
the globalised world economy, secondly because of the effects of the persistent high pound upon firms’ 
competitiveness, itself a feature of the UK business system and its bias towards the interests of the 
services industry; it has been highlighted in recent moves by major Japanese manufacturers to source a 
greater proportion of components from the continent, or decisions by multinational car companies to 
close off operations to respond to the global car market downturn.
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It also has to be noted that the overall economic context within which French 
groups operate has also evolved, in turn affecting a number of factors that have 
undoubtedly had an impact upon the handling of acquisitions. Thus, whilst in the 
1980s cross-border mergers and acquisitions were rare, today information about 
companies’ situation is widely available - the nature of the problems affecting Rover 
or Nissan are well-known -  and the ‘do’s and don’ts’ for integrating acquisitions are 
widely shared amongst companies. Further local management reticence, strong ten 
years ago, is lessening as the benefits and the necessity of being part of a large group 
are now recognised. Similarly French management’s fears of being misled and losing 
control are also reducing, helping to facilitate the establishment of trust in the 
relationship between both sides. On the other hand, the globalising economic context 
introduces new difficulties, with markets becoming increasingly competitive and 
dynamic. As we saw in our study of the telecommunications industry, the effects of 
such ‘moving’ filters are likely to become stronger, thereby creating new obstacles to 
companies in the process of integration.
Conclusions
For those companies which have been involved in the UK, Britain has given 
them their first experience of internationalisation in the Anglo-Saxon style and as 
such has acted as a springboard for their subsequent international expansion. One can 
thus speak of a learning process for French managements in the UK, which in turn 
denotes a newly gained receptivity. Whereas they began from a position of 
disadvantage and were not equipped to evolve within a business environment 
governed by market principles ten years ago, French managements have acquired 
Anglo-Saxon skills. They are now able to function effectively under the rules of the 
global international order, as reflected in their responsiveness, the greater facility with 
which they are making acquisitions, and, in some cases, integrating them.
The arrival of French firms in the UK ten years ago has thus been a key stage 
in this learning process. The fact that Britain had effected its transition to a market-
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oriented regime more than ten years before most countries has been beneficial for 
French companies, as this time-lag has enabled them to offset their being unfamiliar 
with Anglo-Saxon ways. Their prior experience of international operations in Africa 
or Southern Europe was not the kind of internationalisation that gave them the means 
to operate in the current international context, because the African model is not that 
of the rest of the world. But, their experience of the British marketplace has given 
them a headstart and prepared them for European and global competition.
8.3. Interactions of French multinationals and their domestic business system: 
the ‘boomerang effect’
France is not only a starting point for French multinational companies, but 
also a finishing point. Indeed, French managements have been found to use the 
international experience they have gained not only for their global expansion but back 
in their own market.
The French governance regime has undergone significant change over the last 
ten years and evolved away from being state-led to a more market-based system: this 
has been reflected in an increasingly arm’s length relation between the State and 
industry, the introduction of competition in a number of spheres of the French 
business system as well as growing internationalisation (Cohen 1996; Schmidt 1996; 
Boyer 1997). Under the pressures of global competition, arising from deregulatory 
trends within the European Union and world-wide which have hardened in the last 
few years, a spate of French companies have begun to be privatised in many segments 
of the public sector which were at the heart of the French statist industrial policy 
(telecommunications; air transport; defence; banking; insurance). Further, in the 
traditionally large French public sector, some degree of competition has been 
introduced in telecommunications and electricity, as the European-wide liberalisation 
of those sectors has become effective since the late 1990s, leaving an increasingly 
large proportion of the French business system exposed to competition. As a 
consequence of these developments, France has also seen a rapid and dynamic rise in
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foreign direct investment7. Thus, the traditionally closed and protected French 
business system has begun to crumble under the intensifying pressures of 
globalisation.
These pressures in turn force French companies to be increasingly transparent 
in their business practices and relations with the State and more accountable to third 
parties, in particular shareholders and customers. No longer being able to rely on 
statist and national institutions for business, they are forced to become more 
competitive, as well as adopt a more short-term focus in defining their business 
strategies and priorities. Strikingly therefore, as a result of the changes the French 
governance system is currently undergoing under the constraints of globalisation, 
French companies are being forced to move in the direction of an Anglo-Saxon 
model, which directly attacks features we defined as distinctively French, namely 
their secrecy, their lack of performance-orientation and their engineering-ethos.
As the French institutional environment is evolving towards a market-based 
system, the experience which French multinational companies have gained at the 
point of contact with British managements who have long had to deal with these kind 
of rules, has facilitated their adaptation to the new French context. In particular, 
French managements have imported back elements of British strategic flexibility, a 
concept which was very different from what they were accustomed at home and from 
which they have drawn lessons. French companies have gained a new perspective on 
managing organisations, which has in turn prompted them to re-think the optimisation 
of their own French operations, through a return effect which can be referred to as the 
'boomerang effect’.
In the past as we saw in Chapter 4 a whole context had led French companies 
not to act and react upon their organisations. Operating within constraining social 
and organisational environments, the general attitude among French managements
7 FIJI reached an unprecedented 165.4bnFF in 1998, representing 2'if of GDP twice the level of 1994 
(Bulletin de la Banque de France, lj;s  Flux d 'lnvestissem ents Direct de la France avec I'E tranger en 
1998. June 1999. Nb66).
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has long been to avoid touching their organisations for a number of complex reasons: 
the rigidities of their organisations, a focus on technical issues at the expense of the 
managerial aspects of their organisation, the fear of creating social conflict which 
might tarnish their social image in France, added to the fact that organisations are 
embedded in a set of relations with suppliers and customers. The weight of national 
institutions together with French managements’ reluctance to change their 
organisations reinforced one another over time to create institutional inertia.
French managements’ rationalities as they set foot in Britain were conditioned 
by their domestic institutional context, but their British experience has opened their 
eyes to flexibility. As Britain has a very malleable institutional environment, French 
managements were able to experiment with all facets of organisational change. We 
can recall for example, how Saint Gobain’s radical restructuring of Stanton helped to 
restore its competitiveness, through a rationalisation of the factories which were split 
into small units specialised by product, a significant downsizing and delayering of the 
organisation structure. In addition, flexible working-time agreements gave the British 
operation a significant capacity to respond to changes in business cycles. Having 
effected a successful turnaround and even surpassed its sister units as productivity has 
doubled, Stanton was seen as a model for its market-responsiveness and cost 
effectiveness. Vivendi Water also successfully undertook two waves of 
organisational restructuring of its UK operations which enabled it to make significant 
efficiency gains. French companies were thus able to successfully restore the 
competitiveness of their British operations in a relatively short space of time.
This first-hand experience of conducting significant organisational 
restructuring has helped French managements realised that not only could 
restructuring actually be carried out, but it could also be achieved with relative ease, 
thereby challenging their implicit norms and understandings and enabling them to 
come out of a frame of mind where change was impossible at home. As this French 
manager explains:
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‘One of the things we found out in Britain is that we could through 
restructuring organisations make productivity savings. Whereas in France, 
for a long time our philosophy basically was market growth. For each 
contract, we were of course looking for an overall level of profit, 10, 20 or 
30%, but once an operation was up and running, we did not really seek to 
maximise its efficiency. (...) So in Britain we saw that if we got down to the 
task, we could restructure organisations. Hence, the restructuring of our 
French organisation which we launched less than two years ago’.
The following cases are concrete examples of the benefits brought about by 
companies’ international experience. Vivendi Water recently launched the first major 
restructuring of its French operations in order to respond to the growing competitive 
pressures it faced as a result of its increasingly arm’s length relations with 
municipalities which themselves were subject to tighter budget constraints; the 
anticipation of the arrival of foreign utilities group on their market threatening the 
company’s market share; as well as the introduction of media and public attention 
into its traditionally secretive business practices. The lack of dynamism in the 
company’s organisation structure showed itself via the fact that a multitude of 
structures acquired over the years through external or internal growth had 
mushroomed without ever being rationalised. The restructuring involved the merging 
of all these companies and the rationalisation of key functions. With the help of 
American consultants, a three-tiered organisational structure was implemented: all 
key functions were consolidated within ten ‘regions’, whose role was to ensure the 
co-ordination of fifty ‘operational centres’ in turn overseeing 140 so-called 
‘agencies’. The re-organisation also involved the introduction of measures aimed at 
improving customer satisfaction, marking a shift away from the group’s engineering- 
driven approach. These included call centres, Charte Clients and other customer 
initiatives. According to managements, these measures were directly inspired by the 
example of its British water companies which were more advanced in terms of 
customer relations management under the regulatory regime in place.
In Saint Gobain, management had continued to live on its bureaucratic and 
hierarchical system throughout the postwar period. The group recently undertook the 
first major reform to the organisation of its French operations, which aimed at
Britain
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improving the overall competitiveness of the operation in the face of the globalisation 
of competition. Saint Gobain senior management looked to Stanton’s lean and 
reactive structures as a model of organisation, and in particular aimed along similar 
lines at splitting its main manufacturing operations into small units specialised by 
product lines. The group assigned the head of manufacturing in its British operation, 
who was a British national, as head of R&D in France to oversee the restructuring of 
the group’s factories and technical functions in France, thereby reflecting the 
company’s intentions to tap into its managerial expertise. Further, changes were 
pushed through by senior production managers, who had been posted a few years 
earlier to Stanton with a remit to implement the restructuring of the British operation. 
Under the influence of those French and British managers, a near-revolution was 
taking place within factories, as the company was seeking to move away from its 
highly centralised and bureaucratic mode of control: factory managers for the first 
time were granted autonomy for determining their own budgets, and for the 
management of their production lines (work organisation; staffing) which had 
previously been the prerogative of central corporate functions.
Our findings thus point to significant management-led reform taking place 
within French organisations under the strong pressures of globalisation of France’s 
own international firms. The radical character of the organisation reforms which are 
being introduced following a long period of organisational stability and gradual 
adjustments, demonstrate that French managements, long blinded by their 
environments, have woken up to the necessity of making themselves more 
competitive within their own markets, because sooner or later they will no longer be 
able to rely on their national institutions for business, and it is no less than their 
survival on their own market that is at stake.
However indications from our case studies suggest that reforms are taking 
place slowly and with difficulty, all the more so since they have taken place belatedly. 
Managements’ restructuring plans have provoked fierce reactions from managers and 
employees alike. The tensions encountered are reflective of two conflicting logics,
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that of efficiency maximisation within a still conservative corporate culture. Thus, 
our observations show the transition to a more competitive organisation model is far 
from being automatic and that there are obstacles on the way of managements.
One of the difficulties in undertaking the reforms is linked to the opacity of 
operations, the legacy of hierarchical organisations. The typical French factory was 
in fact a ‘black box’. Because there was little delegation of responsibility within the 
factory and little emphasis on maximising efficiency, managements and workers had 
limited knowledge and management tools, which would have helped them to identify 
the sources of productivity gains. Management is at present, confronted with the 
problem of gaining an understanding of how responsibilities are allocated and of 
existing business processes.
Changes also challenge the deep-seated technical culture of French firms. 
Whilst engineers traditionally occupied a central position in French firms’ decision­
making processes increasingly, the engineering function is no longer the key but part 
of the production process, under the combined influences of the ‘boomerang effect’ 
and the growing emphasis upon services resulting from changes in market conditions. 
Thus, the sacrosanct status of the French engineer is being eroded as other functions, 
namely finance and marketing, are assuming increasing importance. The shift in 
logic is further evidenced by signs of appointments of managers with a business 
background in those companies, which traditionally leaned quite heavily towards the 
recruitment of managers from the French engineering Schools. Thus, this is a further 
indication that one might be witnessing the gradual dissolution of an engineering- 
driven culture and a transformation into an efficiency-oriented one.
Further, the moves by managements to create more performance-oriented 
organisations turn the notion of seniority and a job-for-life upside down, and thus are 
resisted by managers and employees. Resistance to change within the French 
organisation is also explained by the high average age of their workforce, which in 
some companies stands at 45-50 years old, itself the consequence of employment
211
policies within French companies that have been pursued over the years as they 
stopped hiring in order to reduce their employment structures, given the difficulties of 
making employees redundant. The lack of movement in and out of the organisation 
in tum leads to strong clashes of culture between the few recruits and the long-serving 
employees. In addition, within the still important, though lessening, seniority-based 
culture, French managements have little flexibility to replace senior managements by 
fear of hurting sensibilities: some pro-change managements complained of hesitant 
top managements in making new appointments at senior management level that could 
have accelerated the change process. Finally, managements’ efforts to make their 
organisations more efficient are further constrained by the social environment, as we 
saw in Chapter 4. Whilst our case study firms face over-staffing and high labour 
costs, they are also required by the Government and the unions to maintain levels of 
employment.
French managements in both organisations, faced with those challenges, have 
slowed down the pace of reforms. In Saint Gobain, for example, managements 
managed to introduce greater decentralisation within the factories, but put the second 
phase of the restructuring of factories on hold. Vivendi Water has undergone 
organisation-wide reform but this has been limited during the first phase to regional 
consolidation due to social and local political pressures to retain jobs. The way 
French managements approach change however is indicative of the benefits of 
international experience gained. Senior managements have phased in their reform 
process, as opposed to imposing reforms in one block, reflecting an awareness of the 
capacity of their organisations for absorbing change. Thus, whilst they are 
conducting the change process within an Anglo-Saxon frame of mind, they 
nonetheless retain a French sensitivity.
Through these cases, one thus finds that French managements have learnt 
from the capacity of change allowed by the British environment and have imported 
back some of these concepts into their own environment. Figure 8 -  1 recapitulates 
the key relationships identified in this chapter.
Britain as a learning platform
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‘filters’ —
2 3
4
5
1. French multinational companies 
seek to transfer their features
2. Through their contact with 
international filters, some features 
are blocked and adapted, and new 
features gained
Figure 8 - 1 :  ‘Boomerang effect’ and global forces as the two sources of 
change in the French business system
Within the new French context, the ‘boomerang effect’ has been beneficial to 
French multinational companies, as it has put them in a better position to react to 
competitive pressures they now face. Given the radical differences between the 
French and the market-based system, those French multinational companies who have 
ventured outside of their borders are more likely to adapt themselves successfully to 
the new French context and restructure their organisations, than ‘local’ French 
companies that have little in common with the Anglo-Saxon system and to which 
competition might come as a greater shock. This is all the more so since we know 
that the management of change is not a distinctive French feature. Firstly, 
internationalised French companies have the advantage of having gained a different 
perspective on conducting business generally, enabling them to look at their 
organisation with a fresh eye. Secondly, French managements’ Anglo-Saxon
3. ‘Boomerang effect’: French 
multinational companies having
evolved, are spearheading change in 
France
4. Arrival of competitive pressures 
in France, as a result of global forces
5. The ‘new’ French context is 
affecting features o f French 
companies
experience has influenced chosen methods of restructuring to reduce costs, namely a 
greater emphasis upon maximising the use of existing assets, through consolidating 
and rationalising work processes, as well as the development of the service side of the 
business. Thirdly, having a first-hand experience of conducting restructurings, 
companies are also likely to be more capable of positively evolving their 
organisational structures, because they are knowledgeable about the ins and outs of 
restructuring issues.
One final point is that the ‘boomerang effect’ underlies features which we 
have encountered throughout this study, in particular the attitude of French 
managements towards change and innovation. It is indeed paradoxical that it is 
international French companies as opposed to ‘local’ ones which are bringing about 
changes to the French national business system. The French institutional business 
system is undertaking reforms under the constraints of outside pressures, rather than 
evolving from within. The current phase which French firms are going through can 
be characterised as a period of destabilisation and incoherency. After having evolved 
for many years in a protected environment, a number of taboos are being broken 
within organisations. As seen against a long period of stability and incremental 
organisational change, even more than a learning process, it is a revolution which is 
occurring at present within French organisations.
8.4. Conclusions
French companies lagged behind in terms of Anglo-Saxonisation as they left 
their protected environment in the late 1980s. However, our findings reveal that 
overall they have adapted well to the international context, and have thus proven to be 
good learners. Gradually, French managements have integrated some Anglo-Saxon 
methods in their modes of functioning. When ten years ago, they were clearly ill- 
equipped to operate in a market-regulated system, today they are proceeding fast and 
with confidence, taking an active part in the globalisation trend. Britain has given 
them their first experience of internationalisation in the Anglo-Saxon style, and its
B rita in  as a  lea rn in g  p la tfo rm
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ten-years lead in implementing a market-oriented framework has facilitated their 
evolution towards an international model.
Our findings show that the adaptation of the French management model to the 
globalised international order is currently taking place under the combined pressures 
of growing competition arising from the opening up of its markets, and its own 
international firms’. However, the move towards a more efficient and service-led 
model is taking place at a pace which the French institutional context can tolerate: 
because they have long evolved in a closed and hierarchical model, neither structures 
nor people’s behaviour have yet adjusted to the current changes that are sweeping 
through French organisations.
This lack of local dynamism is a handicap for French multinational 
companies’ competitiveness as they are competing globally and are required to be 
highly productive, though this is likely to weigh increasingly less upon their 
performance. Indeed, as French companies have embarked upon a strategy of 
globalisation, the French base is becoming less preponderant accounting for 
sometimes less than half their turnover. Their domestic operation is no longer a 
priority because their market is mature and stable. The ‘big’ weight of French 
institutions is thus becoming a ‘little’ weight.

Chapter IN
CONCLUSION: FRENCH MULTINATIONALS’ INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY. 
NATIONAL SPECIFICITIES AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS
Introduction
Our study of French multinationals’ international strategies has enabled us to 
identify and characterise the existence of a distinctive management style abroad. By 
doing so, we attempted to throw some light on debates as to whether international 
firms’ national identity is being eroded by the forces of global competition. Our 
approach has been to define a ‘mode of thinking’, characteristic of French 
managements abroad, which will influence how French managements react, 
independently of the time or space conditions they operate in. This behaviour was 
identified through the examination of a diverse sample of French multinationals and a 
dynamic analysis of their international strategies over the last decade.
The first section summarises the features, which together characterise French 
managements’ behaviour abroad. A discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the French management model as French companies are becoming global, then 
follows. The theoretical implications of our findings are then addressed, before 
raising a number of questions as to the evolution of the French international model in 
tomorrow’s global environment.
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9.1. French managements’ behaviour abroad
The study of French companies’ international strategies has permitted an 
identification of a distinctive French management model. One cannot speak of a 
French management model in the strict sense of the term however, in the same way as 
the academic literature has been able to define a Japanese and American model, 
constituted of a set of well-defined management methods. Our findings have 
nonetheless revealed a distinctive national character, but that this national influence 
varies across firms.
One of the key features which underpins French managements’ actions is a 
long-term vision, which they have retained when operating abroad. Managements are 
attached to their firm and driven by the desire to ensure the success and long-term 
viability of their business, rather than solely maximising profits. Rarely do French 
managements leave their operating companies without direction, and it is common for 
them to institute an overall set of philosophies and commit long-term financial and 
managerial resources.
A further, related, characteristic is that French managements retain a strong 
technological identity that, consciously or unconsciously, guides them in the 
development and implementation of their international strategies. French 
managements’ long-term vision together with their engineering ethos implies a desire 
to involve themselves in the running of the operations and understand their 
functioning in detail. This style of management is apparent not only at strategic level 
but also at operational level, in particular in technical matters.
Characteristically, it is through managers that French companies control their 
operations. French firms have the cult of the manager. At the heart of their modes of 
operating abroad, one finds a core of powerful, highly skilled, executive managers, 
who are fully entrusted by the Centre and monopolise functions and responsibilities. 
Moulded in the same culture, this small elite is strongly attached to their group, and it
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is through them that a group culture is created. The system permits an informal type 
of management between the Centre and the operating company, effective 
communication amongst them and a rapid decision-making process. However, it 
implies a degree of secrecy and opacity within the firm, as responsibilities remain 
concentrated in the hands of a few individuals and the system remains based on trust.
Driven by a desire to be successful operators, French managements show 
perseverance in their work. Even in difficult situations, one finds within French 
managements a determination to overcome obstacles and find long-term solutions. 
This, together with their hands-on management style, has enabled French companies 
over time to acquire a distinctive form of integration and adaptability to the situations 
they encounter. This is reflected in the fact that they have learnt from the British 
marketplace as well as been receptive to Anglo-Saxon methods.
Although it is evident that French managements’ capacity of adaptation has 
increased with international experience, French companies’ approach to change still 
remains un-natural as one finds a lingering resistance to change. A first facet of this 
trait is that French companies are rarely proactive in undertaking change, often 
reacting to outside pressures instead, and, further, are often reluctant to address the 
more fundamental implications that undertaking a change process would require 
internally. Secondly, this feature implies a partial vision of the problems that 
management are faced with, which prevents them from understanding a problem in its 
totality and / or implementing an effective solution. Finally, French firms’ resistance 
to change arises from the lack of an open mind and a vision centred upon their firm, 
which result in managements’ keen attachment to implement their group methods 
abroad.
Relatedly, whilst French companies move forward within a long-term vision, 
they rarely take uncalculated risks. Faced with a new situation, one will find French 
managements proceeding cautiously, step by step and pondering the situation before 
deciding the course of action to he followed. A corollary of this trait is a certain lack
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of initiative evident in the French corporate culture. Consequently, as the 
examination of French firms’ evolution through the 1980s and part of the 1990s has 
shown, they have tended to adopt ‘followers’ strategies’ rather than being ‘trend­
setters’. and tended to evolve through a stage-by-stage approach rather than 
progressively.
Thus, the examination of French firms’ strategies has revealed the existence of 
a distinctive management style. However, French companies are simultaneously 
evolving towards an international model of organisation, as some of their traits have 
lessened whilst they have acquired Anglo-Saxon characteristics.
9.2. Strengths and weaknesses of the French management model
The French management model has been found to be globally successful. 
Over the last decade, French companies have successfully adapted to the demands of 
international markets. Some of their features have helped their transition to an 
international organisation model, even though others have constituted more of a 
handicap. This section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the French 
international management model in today’s global marketplace.
French firms departed from a difficult environment in the late 1980s, which 
had long been protected and resistant to liberalisation. They entered the UK in a 
cautious way, without experience of a market-based economy. However, their 
management system has turned out to possess a capacity of adaptation, enabling them 
to adapt to the international environment and catching up in terms of international 
management methods.
Initially, French companies did not demonstrate a strong adaptability 
however, and their resistance to change was strongly marked. Strongly attached to 
their nationality, they lacked an open mind, which led some of them to set foot in the 
UK with colonial inclinations. Some companies made mistakes by excessively
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seeking to retain control and to implement group practices which were ill-adapted to 
the British context. As a result, French firms suffered reverses, which created 
tensions with British managements and sometimes delayed the integration of their 
operations.
However, in spite of the negative aspects of their interventionist style of 
control, French managements’ key strength has been the ability to persist as they have 
worked durably with their British operations. This has helped them overcome 
adverse situations, and gradually learn from and integrate into the UK environment. 
They have taken advantage of the knowledge they gained from the British 
environment, and have been able to incorporate it effectively into their modes of 
functioning.
This learning process has manifested itself via the fact that French 
managements have gained in responsiveness, and in their ability to make and, even, 
integrate acquisitions rapidly and effectively. Their newly gained receptivity has also 
facilitated their adaptation to their own domestic market, which in recent years has 
been faced with increasing competitive pressures, as the French system itself has 
begun opening up under the forces of globalisation. Thus, through a ‘boomerang 
effect’, French managements have incorporated Anglo-Saxon concepts of flexibility, 
hitherto unfamiliar to their contexts, and have re-thought the optimisation of their 
operations and appreciated the need to undertake organisation reforms.
French firms are thus more receptive, less ‘colonial’ and more willing to trust 
and delegate responsibilities to foreign managers. In addition to acquiring Anglo- 
Saxon traits, some of their features have begun to evolve. French firms’ prudence, 
strongly marked in the early stages of their internationalisation, is now much less 
evident. Further, in contrast with their autarky from the past, one finds that French 
firms are increasingly opening up to the outside world and becoming less secretive. 
One also notes a desire to gain in rigour and clarity, as firms set up global product 
lines and introduce more formalised modes of management systems. However, this
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Itrait is likely to evolve slowly and be resilient, as the French management system 
remains informal and essentially based on trust.
Some features have also been abandoned through the course of their 
internationalisation. It is noticeable that features of their IR scene were by and large 
not exported because they were not viable abroad. There was however evidence in 
the early stages of firms’ internationalisation of a concern for preserving a social 
ethos, even though, one might expect this specificity to lessen over time, as 
companies are faced with intensifying competitive pressures.
Some of French companies’ national traits have thus helped them adapt to the 
international environment. Companies have gained an international maturity over the 
last decade, that put them in a strong position to respond to globalisation. Thus, the 
‘failure’ of French companies abroad which one could have expected as they departed 
from a domestic environment which was still relatively closed and far behind the 
market-based international economic order, has not taken place. Their lagging behind 
has been a mixed blessing in a way, since it has eventually enabled French 
managements to be more receptive, enabling it to progress and gradually integrate 
Anglo-Saxon methods. In addition, although French firms were lagging behind in 
terms of Anglo-Saxon methods, which is the dominant model at present, they 
inherited a sound technological base, which has enabled them to maintain a consistent 
level of competitivity and contributed to their success abroad.
Even so companies’ resistance to change is lessening and is gradually making 
way to an increasing capacity of adaptation as French companies have gained an 
international experience, this trait remains marked in the ‘older’ and the ‘younger’ 
firms alike. Our findings have revealed that French companies’ resistance to change 
still has numerous repercussions in a wide range of domains, and has led 
managements, confronted with change, to react belatedly or partially implement new 
management methods. Thus, confronted with the need for change, one often finds a 
gap between managements’ capacity to identify a problem and their implementing an
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effective policy. Whilst French managements are able to see the problems they are 
faced with, one very often sees that they do not give themselves the means to 
implement solutions, and that fundamental change only takes place when outside 
pressure is such that there is a necessity to change.
The analysis of French companies’ responses to implementing a strategic 
international human resources system, which is a new field to them, illustrated the 
dynamics of change à la française. One will have to wait a decade after French 
managements’ initial awareness for the need to internationalise their human resources 
in the early 1990s, before French companies really begin putting in place 
international structures of management development and accept the delegation of 
responsibilities to foreigners. Our evidence shows that companies have continued to 
rely upon a closed cadre of international French managers and have not changed their 
policy, until faced with shortage of qualified international managers, as their 
internationalisation accelerated and their pool of international managers failed to 
grow quickly enough to meet their growing international HR needs.
Even if in recent years, as internationalisation has accelerated, one sees a 
growing awareness amongst firms for the need for a more strategic IHR function, 
they remain faced with the challenges of implementation. The specificities of their 
approach to management development have acted as a brake upon the implementation 
of effective IHR structures. In spite of managements’ will for developing 
international managers, firms have retained an elitist vision of management 
development, and, as a result, experienced difficulties in developing a comprehensive 
IHR policy from recruitment to promotion, and career development.
Thus, as French firms’ approach to implementing IHR structures illustrates, 
certain traits are likely to be a handicap, for they can prevent French managements 
from either understanding or implementing certain kind of changes that are required 
in the international environment. Implementing a strategic HR function affects all 
aspects of the firm and requires a system where responsibilities arc delegated; a
mobility is created, individuals are developed on a wider basis, from which an 
international elite can be identified. This approach still stands in opposition with 
French firms’. The reliance upon a small elite is an ingrained trait that French 
companies will have difficulties getting rid of, and, in our view, goes against the grain 
of an efficient management system in an international organisation. The centrality of 
managers is indeed a double-edged strength, for although French companies possess 
very strong human resources competence, they remain in very small numbers and the 
system remains dependent upon them for its successful functioning.
Further, if French managements have successfully adapted to the international 
environment, they are encountering greater difficulty in adapting their domestic 
organisations to the international arena, where their strategic maneuverability is still 
constrained by the broader political, institutional and organisational environments in 
which they operate. Our findings have revealed that French managements are taking 
advantage of the opportunity that the French business system is under pressure to 
change as well as their international experience of restructuring organisations, to push 
through changes within their domestic organisations. But, the process of putting 
domestic operations to the level of international best practice is taking place slowly. 
If this lack of local dynamism remains a handicap for French firms, the weight of 
national institutions upon firms’ performance is none the less declining, as an 
increasing number of French multinationals are now pursuing global strategies and 
make more than half their turnover abroad.
The French model is thus successful globally, as certain traits have provided 
French managements with distinctive strengths, in particular it has acquired a 
capacity of adaptation whilst being able to retain its nationality. Paradoxically, what 
is a source of strength is also source of fragility. Other traits have put French firms at 
a disadvantage in implementing certain international questions of a strategic nature.
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9.3. Theoretical implications
This research proposed to throw light on the arguments as to whether the 
nationality of multinational firms is likely to disappear under international market 
pressures as writers such as Ohmae claim, or alternatively, whether firms’ national 
model is resilient and, as a result, unlikely to depart significantly from pre-existing 
organisation patterns as the culturalist and institutionalist perspectives argue. Our 
findings actually reveal a mixed pattern. French companies evolve towards an 
international model as a result of the globalisation of competition, as some of their 
traits have lessened whilst they have acquired Anglo-Saxon characteristics. 
Paradoxically, their evolution takes place within a French pattern as they retain 
distinctive features. The French model is globally successful, and its distinctiveness 
has been a source of advantage on the international scene. There thus exists a French 
‘third way’ in between those two extreme predictions, and contrary to the globalist 
perspective, there is no ‘one best way’ to success.
The transition to an international model of organisation is neither automatic 
nor unilaterally determined by market pressures, as the globalist strand of literature 
assumes. The French model is radically different, in its philosophies, culture, and 
structures from the way the Anglo-Saxon system works and its efficiency. Those 
contradictions have inevitably influenced the ways and means through which French 
companies have adapted to international markets. They have retained distinctive 
features and have not reached the stage of globalisation of firms like ABB, who have 
become nearly a-cultural in their search for maximising efficiency. Alcatel was the 
only firm within our sample, which did break away from its domestic model and 
transform its organisation into a global model, but we saw that its internationalisation 
path was the outcome of a large number of factors and remained exceptional.
The emerging international model can best be described as a kind of ‘hybrid’ 
model, which can no longer be regarded as French, but which is not Anglo-Saxon 
either. It is a mixed pattern, constituted of both French specificities and Anglo-Saxon
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characteristics. It is noticeable that French firms are becoming more like Anglo- 
Saxon firms under the pressures of international markets, whereas evidence suggests 
that Anglo-American firms, although becoming more global, fundamentally retain 
their basic philosophies and management approach. In this respect, French 
companies follow a similar path of internationalisation to German multinationals 
(Femer and Quintanilla 1998; Femer and Varul 1999).
The situation is not static with regard to the effects of national identity upon 
international firms, and a number of developments combine to gradually reduce the 
importance of national institutions. Firstly, as we saw French companies are evolving 
towards an international model. If they remain attached to their environment of 
origin, where they maintain their headquarters and major operations, they are 
nonetheless increasingly distancing themselves from their domestic markets. As they 
are now committed to a strategy of globalisation, the predominance of their domestic 
base is declining, and often accounts for less than half of their total turnover. Alcatel, 
for example is the product of the French statist production system, which has enabled 
the emergence of a powerful national actor and a strong engineering capability. But, 
today, the group can no longer be considered as a state-owned firm: its domestic base 
accounts for less than 30 per cent of group turnover; its research centres are dispersed 
worldwide; and its interests, long tied to the nation’s, are increasingly purely 
economic. The family firm Danone makes over fifty per cent of its turnover abroad, 
and is increasingly managed according to shareholders values and no longer 
according to its founder’s values. These developments are manifested in the growing 
tensions between firms and the constituents of their domestic environments 
(governments, unions and local communities), as companies, operating under the 
constraints of international markets, are increasingly having to make economic 
decisions which go against the interests of their home market.
In addition, and increasingly, new generations of French managements are 
exposed to internationalisation at a very early stage and will, as a result, tend to be 
less indoctrinated by their domestic system than previous generations. Finally, the
22(,
French business environment is itself evolving towards a more market-oriented 
system under intensifying global pressures. Together, these developments are likely 
to lead to a gradual lessening of internal forces within the French system.
If firms are becoming increasingly detached from their nation of origin, the 
most enduring aspect of national identity is national managements’ character 
however. As we found, French managements continue to retain control of their firms: 
their domestic environment remains protectionist and does not enable trouble-free 
take-overs of national flagships, whilst managements remain reluctant to promoting 
foreign managers to strategic positions. As managers obtain the bulk of their business 
education in their country of origin, they continue to have a distinctive influence on 
their firms’ international operations. Thus, although aspects of nationality are 
lessening under international market forces, others are likely to persist and the 
nationality variable remains an important explanatory variable of firms’ behaviour at 
an international level.
In the same way as our research has demonstrated the continuing influence of 
national culture upon firms’ behaviour, the analysis of the mechanisms of adaptation 
of French multinationals to the UK context has shown that local specificities remain, 
and cannot be ignored by international firms. In contrast with claims from the 
globalist strand of literature, local cultures are not only residues in a global garden. 
Nonetheless, the actual strength of this filter will vary depending upon other 
intermediate variables, and international firms can use a range of strategies to 
alleviate the impact of local factors.
The analysis of the interplay of ‘national’ and ‘host’ cultures has enabled us to 
define more precisely, the role that national cultures play in cross-border operations. 
In contrast to conventional arguments that cultural differences are a major cause of 
failure in cross-national mergers (Cartwright and Cooper 1992), we argued that whilst 
being an important variable, it is not the catalyst of the failure - or indeed success - of 
a cross-border acquisition, and that other factors play a more prominent role. For
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example, some the difficulties experienced by French companies as they set foot in 
the UK ten years ago could be attributed to local managements’ receptivity which 
demonstrated a reluctance to be acquired at the time, as well as the international 
context of the 1980s where internationalisation was less common, rather than cultural 
factors. Whilst not being an initial condition, cultural differences can none the less 
facilitate or hinder the process of integration by affecting other variables. Eventually 
however, cultural differences are not set in concrete and firms can adapt to a local 
environment. A cultural clash can be recognised and overcome, and further, 
companies can benefit from it.
A ‘behavioural ’ approach to examining the nationality effect in international firms
In order to analyse the nationality effect upon French multinationals’ mode of 
management, our approach has been to define a ‘mode o f thinking’, or ‘managements’ 
behaviour’, which is composed of a set of features, which will exert an influence 
upon how French managements react abroad independently of when, where or in 
which sector they operate.
This behaviour will not express itself in identical forms in practice however, 
as, depending upon the international filters that are met, it may filter through at 
varying degrees o f intensity. One can then distinguish between three kinds of cases: 
firstly, traits can emerge in their entirety; they can also filter through occasionally, as 
they can be diminished or prevented from going through. Finally, the firm can 
acquire new traits through the course of its international experience, which can 
become part of its behaviour abroad. A national managements’ behaviour can thus be 
regarded as potential set o f features, which will express itself, if allowed to under a 
given context.
For example, our findings revealed that the technological identity of French 
firms invariably transpired abroad, irrespective of the filters met. French 
managements’ resistance to change was a feature, which was more marked in some
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contexts than others, however. For example, it varied depending upon the period of 
internationalisation: firms that internationalised over twenty years ago, during a 
period in which they duplicated their structures abroad, were generally more 
imprinted by a distinctive French behaviour than ‘younger’ international firms, which 
were highly responsive and open to the outside world, as they internationalised in the 
highly competitive international context of the mid-1990s. Even in young firms 
however, this trait remains ingrained, and thus can potentially re-appear in a different 
set of circumstances. French firms’ caution, strongly marked ten years ago, has now 
lessened as French companies have gained international experience.
Further, whilst all French companies have sought to retain control and 
implement group methods, one finds a wide variety of outcomes and very different 
forms of imposition across firms as each has had to contend with different kind of 
filters. In the absence of constraining filters, Saint Gobain was able to implement its 
approach in its entirety. Vivendi Water however had to refrain from imposing a 
French ethos because of the local nature of its sector, but eventually it managed to 
circumvent this filter and export its approach. La Redoute, because of its young 
international age, still lacked the infrastructure, and was thus content with controlling 
its British operation at arm’s length; the trait was thus not apparent in this instance. 
Having identified this feature, one can thus predict how French managements, left to 
itself, will tend to react in a given situation. This tendency however will express 
itself in practice, if international filters that are met allow it to.
Our approach also enables us to take account of new traits which the firm may 
gain through the course of its international experience. Thus, we found that through 
its ten-year long international experience, French managements have gained a 
distinctive receptivity, which it now uses abroad, and this constitutes a new feature of 
its behaviour abroad.
( o n c lusion
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This concept of national managements’ behaviour abroad, enables us to 
address the shortcomings of the existing theoretical approaches to the study of the 
nationality effect upon international firms. Compared with culturalist analyses, which 
conceptualised national culture as deep-seated and essential values that managements 
will retain abroad, our approach takes account of the evolution of managements’ 
features abroad, as it introduces the notion of variability in the extent with which 
features may filter through abroad. The culturalist approach, whilst having the 
advantage of emphasising the pervasive and intangible influence of national culture, 
does not account for the evolution of features as managements depart from their 
environment of origin to the international arena. Whilst we know which national 
features firms initially possess, our approach does not make them an arrival point, but 
is able to specify which features will filter through, and with what strength. For 
instance, we established that French firms by their nature will manage through 
managers, but they have not always been able to do so depending upon the context in 
which they operate: the construction firm, Vinci for example was constrained by the 
highly localised nature of the sector it operated in and was consequently forced to 
operate at arm’s length. National features will potentially express themselves under 
certain conditions, and thus abroad, one will find a mixture of features in their initial 
forms and features which have been lessened.
It also marks a theoretical advance on the institutionalist approach, which did 
not address the issue of the generalisability of its conclusions to all firms of a given 
nation. By taking into account a small number of parameters, its conclusions were 
constrained by the spatial or temporal contingencies of the firms they studied. It 
risked omit ‘potential features’ which filter through occasionally. For example, in the 
construction firm, Vinci, management’s national traits led it initially to seek to gain 
control and implement its own approach. However, the sectoral variable dictated 
otherwise and management was not able to do so eventually. Even though it could 
not be observed in this particular case, this trait remains part of French managements’ 
character and can potentially manifest itself in a different context. Only a method of 
research that considers a comprehensive number of international filters, can enable
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the identification of managements’ features abroad in a comprehensive and 
systematic fashion, and thus go beyond the filters. By detaching ourselves from the 
practical level to obtain a mode of thinking of management, our approach has the 
advantage of drawing a behaviour, which is independent of the filters met, and thus 
applicable to other French firms which have internationalised at the same time as our 
own case study firms, as well as to companies that will internationalise in the future.
The main limitations to the applicability of this method of research however is 
the necessity to be sensitive to the nationality of origin of the multinationals studied, 
because of the necessity to go beyond subjective judgement and stereotypes. Nor 
does this method of research lend itself to quantitative, survey-based studies: 
identifying a behaviour requires a dynamic analysis and a global understanding of 
firms’ strategies over time, as well as the integration of a large number of 
intermediate variables in order to identify their potential impact upon the passage of 
national features.
Having characterised a French management style internationally, conducting 
studies of multinationals from other countries, using this conceptual approach, would 
enhance our understanding of their national traits, and how they evolve under the 
influence of international factors. Studies could focus upon other European firms to 
remedy the bias of the management literature towards Anglo-American and Japanese 
multinationals, and focus upon countries which have distinctive institutional and 
cultural legacies.
9.4. French multinationals' national identity in tomorrow’s global environment
Qualifying the phenomenon of globalisation and emphasising the continuing 
presence of national specificities is not to deny the profound evolution currently 
taking place in the international economy. On the contrary, by gaining an 
appreciation of the complex influences of national identity upon their modes of 
functioning abroad, firms can become more aware of their own cultural dimension,
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and even that of the countries in which they operate. It then becomes possible to 
understand which parts of the model can be adapted to international competition and 
the borrowing of international best practices. It also points to which national 
tendencies can be detrimental to the overall efficiency of the model and ought to be 
avoided, as well as to those that are sources of advantage and should be emphasised.
Global pressures have intensified since the mid-1990s, as worldwide 
deregulatory trends have accelerated, the process of regional integration deepened, 
and trade intensified. In addition, French firms have increasingly had to contend with 
shareholders, an emerging filter, which we have not examined in this research. 
Shareholders have grown in importance, being less and less accommodating and 
increasingly looking to maximise the returns on their investments. Their growing 
influence upon firms’ strategies marks a new era after that of rationalisation and cost 
reductions, as they force companies to go one step further in the search for 
maximisation of profits and in finding new ways of maximising efficiency.
French companies have thus had to respond to these strong pressures, and 
have rapidly adopted a strategy of internationalisation to remain competitive. Their 
model at present is thus going through a profound mutation. The question is how will 
French companies’ international management model evolve and what degree of 
internationalisation will it reach. Up until now, French companies have followed a 
‘third way’, but it is still not clear what kind of model is going to emerge. Will 
French companies manage to find a way to accommodate shareholders’ pressures 
whilst maintaining their identity or is there a risk that they disown their identity in the 
search for profit-maximisation? Will companies manage to ‘choose’ their 
shareholders or will they be under their yoke? Are we heading, as evidence from the 
car industry seems to indicate, towards a policy of common platforms and producing 
the same product under different brands, or will French companies’ distinctive 
engineering vision remain?
, ________ ________ Conclusion
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This raises the question of how this new phase of globalisation should be 
approached, and as to the possibility and desirability for French firms to abandon 
their model in favour of an Anglo-Saxon one. At a time when the pace of change in 
international markets is extremely quick and all firms spiral towards globalisation, it 
is important that firms remain aware that cultural differences do exist and of the 
consequences of making certain changes which would be running against any 
ingrained specificities of their system. Some elements of the Anglo-Saxon system 
which impose themselves upon French firms, go against the grain of their own 
cultural traits and are not adapted to French specificities. Adopting features which 
contradict their nature in a sudden and abrupt fashion could lead to clashes with the 
existing system. For example, the global environment exerts severe pressures and 
imposes a financial vision upon companies. A radical shift to a financial culture 
could fragilise French companies’ technological base, which has so far contributed 
greatly to their success. French managements have not been used to managing a 
business according to purely financial indicators, which in turn requires a certain 
degree of maturity. Similarly, size is a new concern to French multinationals, which 
have made a large number of acquisitions in recent years. As French managements’ 
preferred way of operating is through managers and that managing through financial 
control systems is not in their nature, one could expect problems of integration of 
their newly acquired firms. Further, French companies normally approach change in 
a cautious manner. In the current environment, if French companies disown their 
prudence, this raises questions as to whether the system as a whole will adapt to the 
change, given firms inherit a culture of resistance to change.
These questions are legitimate when we know that, when French companies 
have sought to emulate Anglo-Saxon concepts without first understanding the nature 
of change and aligning the rest of the system to international best practices, the 
changes were eventually counter-productive. The French management model in its 
present form is radically different and incompatible with an Anglo-Saxon model of 
competition, and as such, bringing in Anglo-Saxon concepts in French companies is a 
delicate matter.
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Conclusion
In today’s global markets, our conclusion is that there is space for a French 
way to internationalisation, and for French companies to manage and respond to 
international markets through distinctive means which are as effective as the Anglo- 
Saxon model. The question for the future is whether French companies will be under 
the yoke of globalisation.
2.'4
\APPENDIX: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This section outlines in greater detail the process o f data collection in each 
French multinational, and the issues that were investigated in the companies.
As discussed in the methodology chapter, the number of interviews conducted 
varied from a minimum of around ten interviews up to twenty per company, and a 
well-balanced number of interviews was carried out at headquarters and operating 
company level. The table below indicates details of interviews conducted in each 
company. It also specifies the number of French expatriate managers who were 
interviewed within the UK operating company.
Headquarters Operating
Company
Total
Total French
expatriates
1. Alcatel II 12 - 23
2. AXA 4 5 - 9
3. Crédit Lyonnais 5 6 1 11
4. Danone 6 6 2 12
5. La Redoute (PI'R) 4 7 2 11
6. Peugeot 5 9 1 14
7. Saint Gobain 9 9 3 18
8. Schneider 9 8 2 17
9. Total 9 6 1 15
10. Vinci (Vivendi) 6 8 3 14
11. Vivendi Watcr 
(Vivendi)
7 11 3 18
Total 75 87 18 162
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French companies’ international strategies were examined through four key 
issues: firstly, the process of integration of their British acquisitions; secondly, the 
internationalisation of their corporate structures and modes of control; thirdly, the 
internationalisation of their human resources and finally, what French multinationals 
gained from their experience in the British market. We present here the questions 
that were asked to all companies. It has to be bome in mind, however, that the 
interview questionnaire was semi-structured, and that we retained a degree of 
flexibility to allow for important issues to emerge in each company and be followed 
up in greater detail.
We will note that all interviews were taped on conditions of anonymity of 
individuals interviewees. Similar questions were asked to managers across different 
functions and at different levels of the organisation, which enabled us to reconstitute 
the whole picture of French firms’ international strategies in an impartial way.
1. The integration o f British acquisitions
Questions were asked to French managers, who were responsible for the UK 
market, and who had been directly involved in the acquisition and integration of the 
British acquisitions we considered, about the history of their UK acquisitions from 
the very beginning of their entry in the British market, from the late 1980s onwards. 
We thus inquired about their motivations for implementing themselves in Great 
Britain, what entry strategy they adopted and what were the reasons for this. We then 
followed through the management process of the integration of their British 
acquisitions. We thus asked French managers what were their strategies upstream, 
that is what were their initial intentions, what were their degree of knowledge of 
managing abroad and in the UK specifically, how they approached the issue of 
integration and what aspects they prioritised.
We then investigated how French managements went about implementing 
their strategies: as we were seeking to identify typical traits of character, we were
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concerned not only with the details of what was being implemented, but also with the 
obstacles that French managements encountered in the UK market, how they then 
responded to the difficulties that they met, and what were the actual consequences of 
corporate strategy upon the UK operation.
The issues surrounding the actual implementation of French multinationals’ 
strategies were pursued with French corporate managements at product line level, the 
British executive management team, as well as French expatriate managers who had 
been assigned to the UK unit, for the latter were knowledgeable about both corporate 
philosophies and the cultural and organisational context of the local unit. Further, in 
functions where it emerged during the course of research that French policies were 
introduced, we examined in greater detail how policies were perceived and 
implemented, by interviewing British middle managers, for example plant managers 
and specific operational managers.
Finally, those questions were asked to managers across the major functions 
(finance, human resources, marketing, production and engineering), for we aimed to 
understand French companies’ international strategies as a whole, and not only in 
specific functional areas. Indeed, we realised that, as French managements were in 
the early stages of the integration of their acquisitions, they were implementing many 
changes in all the key functions and therefore it was crucial to gain a comprehensive 
understanding of their international strategies, to understand the specificities of 
French managements’ approach.
2. internationalisation o f corporate structures and modes o f corporate control
A second major theme dealt with the evolution of French companies’ 
corporate structures in response to international market pressures as well as their 
modes of corporate control.
.................. Appendix
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We followed through how French firms responded to the globalisation of 
competition in their respective industry both in terms of their product strategies and 
their corporate structures, as we found French multinationals were going through a 
process of fundamental change in order to align their corporate structures to the 
global environment. Here, we investigated the type of organisation model French 
firms were evolving towards; the kind of organisational changes companies 
introduced; the philosophy behind those changes; what were the key organising 
principles of the global product line structures which firms were putting in place (i.e. 
the roles of each level in the organisation structure); the difficulties that were 
encountered and how French managers were effectively able to operate within this 
kind of structure. Depending upon the organisation structure of each of our case 
study firm, those questions were asked to managers at corporate headquarters who 
were directly involved in the restructuring process and to managers in key selected 
functions which were found to take on a global role; we also asked similar questions 
to the senior management team at product line level and at Area level; and finally to 
the executive management team at national level.
We also aimed to characterise each company’s mode of corporate control and 
management process. Thus, questions at different levels of the organisations dealt 
with the operating company’s degree of autonomy in all the major functions, and the 
modalities of control used by headquarters, including: the use of expatriation, the 
existence of formal mechanisms, and corporate policy with regards to the circulation 
of information throughout the organisation.
Given the centrality of the human rapport in French firms’ modes of 
functioning, we put emphasis upon understanding firms’ internal structures of power 
and control. We thus conducted intensive interviews with French executives, French 
expatriate managers, hut also British managers, about how French expatriate 
managers operated, what were their actual roles within the organisation, what were 
the reasons behind their use, as well as the question of succession planning of the
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British senior management team. This enabled us to gain an intimate knowledge of 
French managers’ roles and informal ways of operating in each company.
3. The international management o f human resources
The third issue focused upon the strategic management of human resources 
management at the international level. Our study focused on how French companies 
developed their international managers as well as how they created an international 
culture, rather than dealing with the management of non-managerial personnel, for it 
was found that, as French companies were new internationally, they did not focus 
upon developing a comprehensive IHR policy from top management to workforce 
levels, and those issues were by and large left to local discretion.
We asked what were the key changes that companies made in their IHR 
policies throughout the course of their internationalisation, so as to follow through the 
development of their IHR function from the very beginning - which took place ten 
years ago in the majority of French multinationals. We looked at the role of the 
corporate human resources function at an international level; how companies 
conceived the development and career management of their international managers 
and what were their policies in the field of recruitment, development and promotion 
of international managers. We investigated those issues with French HR managers 
responsible for international HRM as well as for management development; with HR 
managers at the UK operating company level; and finally with French executives, for 
they were found to play a prominent role in the management of people 
internationally.
We finally followed up on how successful the implementation of these 
policies were, the problems French firms were confronted with, and the outcomes of 
corporate policies, by interviewing the management team at operating company level.
Appendix
4. Britain as a learning platform
Finally, we sought to understand the extent and ways in which the experience 
that French managements gained in the UK was useful for their internationalisation, 
for it emerged through the course of fieldwork that French companies were learning a 
great deal from their British experience. We thus asked corporate managements’ 
views on the issue, and to point to the concrete examples in which they used their 
international experience within their organisation, and how they went about 
implementing it. French expatriate managers were also questioned with particular 
attention on that issue, as bearing both French and Anglo-Saxon cultures, they turned 
out to be used extensively by their organisation to disseminate their knowledge of 
internationalisation to other parts of the group.
We also followed up the question of the extent to which the international 
experience which French managements acquired, influenced their management 
approach on their own domestic market. We asked French executives, who were also 
overseeing the French market, whether they applied their international knowledge to 
their domestic operations, and if so, the changes that they sought to introduce; how 
they handled the change process in France; and the issues they encountered 
throughout the process.
In order to gain a greater sense of the kind of changes introduced as well as 
the extent and ways in which Anglo-Saxon concepts were indeed incorporated into 
the existing French organisation structures, we interviewed French senior managers 
who had sole responsibility for the French market and were involved in the 
restructuring process, about how they perceived the changes introduced by top 
management and the challenges which they were confronted with in implementing 
them in France.
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